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The Kashmir dispute has been dominating the India-Pakistan relationship ever since the 
birth of the two states in 1947. It has also played a significant role in border disputes 
between China and India over Askai Chin which continues to date. Kashmir lies between 
three of the most populous countries of the world: India, China, and Pakistan, covering a 
land mass of over 80,000 square kilometres, and inhabiting over 17 million people. The 
struggle over the Kashmir valley has been one of the most prolonged conflicts of the last 
century. Since the controversial arrival of Indian forces in Kashmir on 27 October 1947, 
the territory of Jammu and Kashmir has been divided by a ceasefire line or Line of 
Control between sides, under Pakistani and Indian control respectively. Since 1947, 
India and Pakistan have failed to reach consensus on an agreement for the territory of 
Kashmir. Instead, they have fought four wars (1948, 1965, and 1971 and 1999). There 
have been two United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefires in 1949 and 1965 respectively 
and 58 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on the Kashmir dispute. 
Most recently on 5 August 2019, an illegal and unilateral abrogation of Article 370,35a by 
Modi’s government drew a tsunami of world condemnation. This dissertation employs a 
tri-dimensional analytical framework for an exploratory study through geopolitics, 
neorealism, and neoliberalism theories, relevant to the subject under discussion, to 
conceptualise the dynamics of this research topic.  
This dissertation covers the following: Chapter 1 provides the objectives and motivation 
of the study, as well as the research questions that the study will aim to answer, by 
utilising desktop qualitative research methodologies and also by employing theoretical 
analysis framework and literature review. Chapter 2 focuses on defining the historical 
context of the Kashmir dispute and its embryology (1856-1999), geopolitical positioning, 
geography and demography. Chapter 3 examines the most significant documents, 
treaties, accords, instruments and agreements. Chapter 4 analyses South Africa’s 
foreign policy vis-à-vis Kashmir by examining and defining the South African foreign 
policy, its instruments, the evolution of foreign policy (1994-2020). This section also 
reviews in detail South Africa’s relationship with Kashmir, India, and Pakistan. Finally, 
Chapter 5 is a conclusion of this dissertation which summarises the key findings, 
providing recommendations and scope for further studies. This section of the dissertation 
will also gauge whether South Africa can get involved and play a possible role as a 
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 BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Kashmir dispute has been dominating the India-Pakistan relationship ever since the 
birth of the two states in 1947. It has also played a significant role in border disputes 
between China and India over Askai Chin (a portion of Kashmir). Kashmir lies between 
three of the most populous countries of the world: India, China and Pakistan, covering a 
land mass of over 80,000 square kilometres – almost the size of the United Kingdom 
(UK), and inhabiting over 17 million people (Lamb, 1991: 6).  
 
The struggle over the Kashmir valley has been one of the most prolonged disputes of 
the last century. Since the controversial arrival of Indian forces in Kashmir on 27 
October 1947, the territory of Jammu and Kashmir (often referred to simply as Kashmir) 
has been divided by a ceasefire line or Line of Control (LoC) between sides under 
Pakistani and Indian control, respectively. Since 1947, India and Pakistan have failed to 
reach a consensus on the territory of Kashmir. Instead, they have fought four wars 
(1948, 1965, and 1971, and 1999). There have been two United Nations (UN) 
mandated ceasefires, in 1949 and 1965 and 58 United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions (Wheeler, 2010: 319-344). Most recently, the world witnessed 
another stand-off between the two nuclear arch-rivals in a suicide attack in the Pulwana 
region on 14 February 2019, in which 40 Indian paramilitary police were killed (Herrara, 
2019).  
 
UN peacekeepers have been monitoring the de facto border to this day (UNMOGIP, 
2019). The question of self-determination for Kashmir has been a part of the dispute 
since 1948, when Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, referred the dispute to 
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the UNSC, mentioning a plebiscite as the solution to determine Kashmir’s future. The 
right of self-determination: “All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development. Unrepresented Nations and people Organisations’ 
(UNPOs) members are indigenous peoples, minorities, unrecognised states and 
occupied territories that have joined together to promote their right to self-determination, 
while also defending their political, social and cultural rights and preserving their 
environments” (UNPO.org, 2017), of the Kashmiri people has been discussed as a 
peace strategy for Kashmir, ever since Jammu and Kashmir signed a mysterious 
“Instrument of Accession” with  India’s Maharaja Hari Singh in October 1947. India 
accepted the Instrument of Accession with the caveat that a plebiscite would be held 
once law and order was re-established. UNSC Resolution 47 of 1948 was passed, 
noting that “both India and Pakistan desire[d] that the question of the accession of 
Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic 
method of a free and impartial plebiscite” (UNSCR, 1948).  
 
In 1950, another UNSC resolution was issued to reinforce the 1948 resolution, which 
emphasised the urgency of free and fair plebiscites in Kashmir. Pursuant to this 
resolution, Sir Owen Dixon went to the subcontinent as UN representative, to seek the 
implementation of a ‘free and fair’ referendum. Dixon was the only mediator to date, to 
get close to a resolution of the Kashmir situation. He proposed, as the most equitable 
and peaceful solution, to divide disputed Kashmir into three areas: Hindu and Buddhist; 
Muslim; and Jammu and Kashmir valleys, for either referendum or independence 
(Noorani, 2002). In the contemporary history of Kashmir, the most recent attempt to 
resolve the issue was through former Pakistani President, General Musharraf’s, four-




The people of Jammu and Kashmir have never received their promised plebiscite; 
hence, the issue of self-determination continues to be a constant source of abandoned 
hopes and void promises. Self-determination is a major part of the national level 
discourse and narrative, ultimately turning into a popular uprising against what is 
perceived as the illegal occupation of Kashmir by India, which until 2018 has resulted in 
the loss of over 90,000 lives (Amnesty International Report, 2018). This perception is 
fueled by several UNSC resolutions on Kashmir, which call it a disputed territory 
between India and Pakistan, and call for free and fair plebiscites (Rahman, 1996: 15-
16). 
 
The Indian government’s unilateral revoking of Article 370, 35a on 5 August 2019 has 
heightened tensions in Indian-administrated Kashmir. In 1954, Article 370, 35a was 
implemented into the Indian Union Constitution, providing semi-autonomous status to 
the state of Kashmir. In Indian-administrated Kashmir over 80% of its population are 
Muslims. By revoking Article 370, 35a and introducing new domicile rules,  providing 
non-Kashmiris with the chance to reallocate and buy land and houses in Kashmir, there 
is a view by political analysts (Parker, 2019) that this is a strategy employed by the 
Indian government to alter the demographics of the territory. Hereto, the UN Secretary-
General, Antonio Guterres, released a statement appealing for “maximum restraint” and 
reiterating the UN’s position that “the status of Jammu and Kashmir is to be settled by 
peaceful means, in accordance with the UN Charter” (UN News 2019). 
 
The motivation for conducting this study on the Kashmir dispute is the fact that it is a 
real threat to peace in the South Asian region. India and Pakistan are both nuclear-
armed powers. Hence, an escalating dispute over Kashmir can result in over one-third 
of the entire world population being adversely affected by a nuclear war. The recent 
Pulwana attack and subsequent brief skirmishes between India and Pakistan 
demonstrate the real danger of a nuclear showdown (Herrera, 2019). Indeed, world 
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intelligence agencies have noticed movements around nuclear ballistic missile 
launching pads, on both sides of India and Pakistan, along with areas of nuclear 
warhead deployment by both India and Pakistan (Herrera, 2019). 
 
In 1998, at the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Conference in Durban, South Africa, then 
South African President, Nelson Mandela, stated: “All of us remain concerned that the 
issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved through peaceful negotiations and 
should be willing to lend all the strength we have to the resolution of this matter” 
(Mandela, 1998).  
 
This passionate plea was in line with the newly democratic South Africa’s foreign policy 
principles: advancing human rights; promoting democracy; promoting universalism 
based on respect for international law; the pursuit of peace through non-violent 
mechanisms; and international cooperation to promote economic development. When 
Thabo Mbeki became President (1999-2008) his administration focused on the same 
five key priorities, but Mbeki further prioritised peacekeeping, deploying about 3,000 
troops to Burundi and to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Youla, 2007).    
 
Because the foundations of South Africa’s foreign policy are based on advancing 
human rights and promoting democracy, among other principles, there is a question 
around whether it has, or whether it could, play a role, possibly through mediation, in the 
Kashmir dispute. South Africa has a track record of success with mediation in other 
territories. For example, in 2014, former President Jacob Zuma appointed then Deputy 
President Cyril Ramaphosa as special envoy to the Sri Lankan peace mediation 
process (SA News, 2014). Prior to that, in 2009, then President Thabo Mbeki was 
appointed by the African Union (AU) to broker a power-sharing and mediation deal 
between South Sudan and Sudan (Hendricks and Lucey, 2013). In both cases, South 




1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The objectives of this research study are to investigate the root causes of the Kashmir 
dispute and why the dispute has remained unresolved since 1947, as well as to 
investigate what foreign policy position, if any, South Africa has adopted on the Kashmir 
dispute.  
 
To achieve the research aim, this dissertation will be guided by the following three 
research questions: 
 
1. Why has the Kashmir conflict remained unresolved since 1947? 
2. What is South Africa’s foreign policy position, if any, on the Kashmir dispute?  
3. How should South Africa use its current sitting on the UNSC and the principles of 
its foreign policy to contribute to the peace process of Kashmir? 
 
1.3 SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review is divided into two focus areas: 1) Kashmiri history and the 
evolution of the disputed territory; and 2) South African foreign policy in general and 
then in relation to Kashmir. There is a vast array of literature on the subject of Jammu 
and Kashmir, ranging from religious (Ziegler, 1985: 363-470) and geographic (Lamb, 
1991: 4-17) to economic root causes, or a complex blend of several factors (Wirsing, 
1998: 151-173; Habibulah, 2004: 4; Mayfield 1955: 181-196). Moreover, a theme has 
emerged in more recent literature, emphasising the diversity of the people of Kashmir 
and their role in the middle of the two great regional powers of Pakistan and India 
(Schofield, 2010: 83-92). Previously, most of the literature was focused on the root 
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causes and historical aspects of the Kashmiri conflict, but very little emphasis was put 
on the diversity and ethno-linguistic composite of the Kashmiri population, and their 
needs, desires, and aspirations. 
 
Korbel (1954: 482-490), and Lapierre and Collins (1975: 345-349) blame British 
colonialism for the birth of the dispute. In their analyses, they stress that mutual 
suspicion, resentment, and anger have almost thwarted the long-standing agreement 
between the governments of India and Pakistan, which prevented the fate of Kashmir 
from being decided by the democratic process of plebiscite. In their book, ‘Freedom at 
Midnight’, Lapierre and Collins (1975: 345-349) point out that the crucial maps setting 
the boundary separating India and Pakistan were drawn in 1947, by Sir Cyril Radcliffe, 
who had never visited India before being appointed as the chairman of the Boundary 
Commission. They depict the fury of both Hindus and Muslims who were misled by their 
communal leaders during the partition and the biggest mass slaughter in the history of 
India, as millions of people were uprooted by the partition and tried to migrate by train, 
oxcart, and on foot, to new places designated for their particular religious group. 
 
Kashmir historians, Josef Korbel in his book ‘Danger in Kashmir’ (1954: 482-490), 
Mohan Kirshen Teng in ‘Kashmir Article 370, Chapter 4’ (Teng, 1990), and Victoria 
Schofield in ‘Kashmir in Crossfire’ (Schofield, 1996: 83-92) share similar viewpoints, and 
further add that deeply rooted political rivalries between the major religious communities 
of the subcontinent and the greed or personal short-sightedness of the leaders on both 
sides of the border, are the root causes obstructing an amicable, peaceful solution to 
the conflict. Echoing this, Korbel (1954: 487-490), and Philip Ziegler in an authorised 
biography of Mountbatten (Ziegler,1985: 363-370), argue that the partition of British 
India into India and Pakistan epitomises the politics of identity in its most negative form. 
They emphasise that the partition replaced trust and understanding with fear and 
insecurity, thereby generating anger at various levels of state and society.  
7 
A new revelation into the dispute comes from the daughter of Lord Mountbatten, 
Pamela Mountbatten, in her book ‘India Remembered’ (Mountbatten and Hicks, 2007: 
86-94). She wrote the book based on 60 years’ worth of declassified documents from 
the Royal British Archives, on Indian partitioning. The work confirms a not-so-platonic 
affair between Edwina Mountbatten and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, and how it influenced 
the Radcliff Boundary Commissioner in not awarding Kashmir to Pakistan, despite the 
fact that it was predominately populated by 90% Muslims (Mountbatten and Hicks, 
2007: 86-84). This circumstance is also referred to in the book ‘Indian Summer’ by Alex 
Von Tunzelmann (Tunzelmann, 2007:120-127). He describes the story as an 
extraordinary story of romance, history, and divided loyalties, set against the backdrop 
of one of the most dramatic events of the 20th century (Tunzelmann, 2007: 120-127). 
An important point here is that within the literature, there is evidence of researchers who 
emphasise either the Indian or Pakistani perspective; as such, this research aims to 
take a neutral stand on the Kashmiri perspective. 
Learning from how South Africa went from the most complex and violent political 
anarchy through a negotiation journey towards liberation and peaceful transition to 
democracy can offer some valuable lessons for the Kashmir conflict. With South Africa 
having emerged from a history of protracted intra-state violence and unrest, the 
democratically elected South African government continues to emphasise: 
Socio-economic development cannot take place without political peace and 
stability as they are a necessary condition for socio-economic development. 
Conversely, socio-economic development is necessary in the context of 
addressing the root causes of conflict and instability. Within this framework our 
efforts are directed at creating an environment in which all states on the continent 




This research study will examine the relationship between South Africa, Kashmir, India 
and Pakistan, and South Africa’s foreign policy towards these two main stakeholders of 
the Kashmir dispute. South Africa’s most notable foreign policy footprint has been its 
involvement in dispute mediation and peacebuilding efforts on the African continent. 
The Mandela administration became a key interlocutor in the Burundi conflict in the 
early 1990s. This trend was followed in later years when the Mbeki administration saw 
itself playing a central mediation role in the DRC, Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe: as 
outlined in the text ‘Foreign policy in post-apartheid, security diplomacy, and trade’ 
(Adebajo and Virk, 2018: 51, 93, 259, 428). The Zuma administration continued with the 
conflict mediation brief in Zimbabwe, within the ambit of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) mandate. These conflict resolving efforts continued in 
recent years, with the Zuma administration playing a key role as a conflict mediator in 
Madagascar and Lesotho (Mathebula, 2016: 3).  
 
It is important to note that South Africa is currently sitting on the UNSC as non-
permanent member (2019-2020) having served twice before (2007 to 2008 and 2011 to 
2012). Graham (2016) contends that in reviewing South Africa’s voting behaviour at the 
UN, including in the UNSC itself, between 1994 and 2014: 
It is evident that South Africa has stumbled at times and sidelined certain 
principles, human rights promotion in specific countries most importantly... It 
could be said that South Africa’s policy evolved from one unsure way to touch 
upon the human rights problems at the United Nations, to one rooted firmly in 
nurturing solidarity with its Southern partners in Africa and the rest of the world. 
This reflects a young democracy finding its method within the multi nation 
organizations and making an attempt to balance the external expectations of the 




This book also reveals how South Africa “has a consistent policy at the UN of non-
interference with human rights abusers, but there can be exceptions” (Graham, 2016: 
300).  For example, South Africa has taken a public stance against Israel for human 
rights abuses (Graham, 2016: 300). This feeds into the second research question of this 
study: ‘What is South Africa’s foreign policy position, if any, on the Kashmir dispute?’ as 
the Kashmir dispute includes the issue of human rights abuses. 
 
1.4 THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
This study will employ geopolitics, elements of neorealism and neoliberalism, and 
foreign policy theory in its framework. The first concept of geopolitics will provide the 
fundamental basis of this study, while the concepts of neorealism and neoliberalism will 
be used as status quo-oriented and problem-solving theories, which share several 
assumptions regarding the actors, values, issues, and power arrangements within the 
international system. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, both theories relate to two 
different worlds: while neorealists focus on security issues, being concerned with issues 
of power and survival; neoliberalists study political economy and focus on cooperation 
and institutions (Dunne, 2006: 185-204). 
 
For neorealists, states are self-interest-oriented and as such, an anarchic and 
competitive system pushes them to favour self-help over cooperative behaviour (Lamy, 
2006: 205-206). This standpoint helps one to understand the arms race taking place 
between India and Pakistan. Moreover, it enables one to comprehend the alliance 
building efforts of both countries, especially India’s strategic partnership with the United 
States (US) and Pakistan’s partnership with China. Furthermore, neorealists argue that 





There are two barriers to international cooperation: a fear of those who might not follow 
the rules and the relative gains of others (Lamy, 2006: 205-206; Sridharan, 2005: 103-
107), which explains why little economic cooperation has taken place between India and 
Pakistan. Importantly, this also explains why the grand energy cooperation of building 
the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) 
pipeline projects have not materialised (to be explained further in Chapter 2). The recent 
opening of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has also taken advantage of 
the geostrategic positioning of Kashmir on the world map and there has been much 
debate in international forums about China’s revival of its ancient silk routes as the “One 
Belt One Road” (OBOR) project. The OBOR initiative, is mainly to increase the regional 
cooperation and develop trade and economic collaboration. Nonetheless, with the 
OBOR initiative China is also seen to be using commerce as a tool to expand its 
geopolitical and geostrategic influence. This article tries to highlight various aspects of 
OBOR (Blah, 2018).  The above-mentioned assumption of neorealism enables the 
researcher to examine the issue from a security-based realist perspective.  
 
For neoliberalists, cooperation is easy to achieve in areas where states have mutual 
interests, but unfortunately, Kashmir lies at the heart of it, as a pivotal unresolved 
dispute between India, Pakistan, and China. They believe that actors with common 
interests try to maximise absolute gains for all parties involved, as opposed to the belief 
of neo-realists that the fundamental goal of states in a cooperative relationship is to 
prevent others from gaining more, as explained in ‘International Politics, Power, and 
Purpose in Global Affairs’ (D’Anieri, 2010: 56-86). This perspective of neoliberalism 
explains how the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), the only major economic cooperation 
agreement between India and Pakistan, has successfully survived (Lamy, 2006: 205-




Elements of other theories relevant to the study fall within the framework of conflict 
resolution and positioning theory. The analysis of Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri 
national-level discourses on the Kashmir dispute rests on the doctrines of positioning 
theory. Positioning theory provides a unique tactic for examining Kashmiri nationalism 
and the continued treatise of opposing groups as major contributors to the conflict, as 
opposed to studying only the dispute itself. As this analysis of the Kashmir conflict will 
hopefully demonstrate, switching the emphasis from the origin of the dispute itself to a 
peacebuilding model, can shed new light on an otherwise intractable dispute and 
potentially contribute to establish a peaceful resolution. The role of South Africa in this 
regard will be specifically investigated, based on previous examples of South African 
mediation that have successfully shown impact. This includes South Africa’s active 
support for the Norwegian-led peace process in Sri Lanka, which led to two Tamil Sri 
Lankan leaders visiting South Africa in April 2007 (NORAD, 2011) and later, a 
successful mediation in the Sudan and South Sudan conflict which resulted in a 
successful secession of South Sudan.  
 
The purpose of Sri Lanka asking South Africa’s government to assist them in their post- 
conflict era was to learn from South Africa’s violent struggle how to peacefully transition 
to a new democratic country. However, South Africa managed to effectively deal with 
issues of racial and ethnic discrimination, including constitutional developments, due to 
the willingness from both sides to reconcile and move forward. This was to seek ways of 
transition from violence to negotiations (NORAD, 2011). From this involvement of South 
Africa in Sri Lanka, it has been observed that when a non-traditional player leverages its 
influence, it can be more effective than a traditional role player. South Africa itself, as a 
contemporary historical case, demonstrates this well; for example, Scandinavian 
countries were more respected than Britain or the US for mediation purposes, by 
opposing parties in South Africa. It is envisaged that apart from hopefully   contributing 
to the literature, this study might prompt reflections on the Kashmir dispute  as well as 
examining how conversation, dialogue, and mediation from a South African neutral 
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foreign policy platform can assist academics and decision-makers in better 
understanding the 73 year Kashmir dispute and finding a peaceful solution to it. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study will employ a qualitative desktop-based research methodology, employing 
the tool of qualitative analysis. Qualitative analysis entails systematic text analysis of 
primary and secondary sources (Mayring, 2000). The researcher acknowledges that 
there may be a limitation to sourcing relevant material from Kashmir itself, given the 
volatility of the situation and fear of retribution. Furthermore, as noted in the literature 
review, the available secondary sources are often biased, leaning to either the Indian or 
Pakistani points of view. Hence, the researcher will attempt to overcome these 
limitations by sourcing and examining primary documents pertaining to the Kashmir 
conflict which are available in the public domain, such as archival documents, official 
statements, and speeches of various Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Foreign Ministers 
of India and Pakistan, and leaders/peace activists in Kashmir, as well as original 
government documents from India, Pakistan, and Kashmir from 1947-2019. UN 
resolutions and debates on the Kashmiri conflict will also provide important and valuable 
information on the discourse. Information on South Africa’s foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Kashmir from 1994 to 2019 will be drawn from the Department of International Relations 
and Cooperation (DIRCO) Archive in Pretoria, or online, as well as from official 
statements and speeches. The researcher will also draw on select newspaper articles 
from Kashmir, India, Pakistan, and South Africa. In terms of secondary sources, the 
researcher will examine journal articles, published papers, books, and book chapters as 
sourced through the University of Johannesburg’s library. Last, but not least, the 
researcher will draw information from personal research conducted during the course of 
his career as a peace activist for Kashmir, spanning over 20 years. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
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In Chapter 1, the motivation, methodology and structure of the study, as well as a 
literature review and theoretical framework were discussed. In Chapter 2, the aim is to 
introduce the Kashmir dispute in a systematic way in order to provide context for the 
study, explain the historical background of the Kashmir region, and demonstrate the 
evolution of the Kashmir dispute.  It also refers to the geography, demography, 
economy and geostrategic position of Kashmir, as these are all important elements in 
the understanding of the underpinning issues, concerning the contestation of the 
territories of Kashmir.  
 
Chapter 3 will examine the Kashmir dispute in post-independence India and select 
partition treaties, Acts, agreements, UN reports, international instruments and human 
rights reports which have a historical significance in the making of, or explanations for, 
the Kashmir dispute. Chapter 4 will examine South Africa’s foreign policy, if any, in 
relation to the Kashmir dispute. Finally, Chapter 5 will summarise the motivation for the 
study, the objectives of the study, and the findings of the study. Suggestions for further 





























HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND EVOLUTION OF THE KASHMIR DISPUTE 
 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to introduce the Kashmir dispute in a systematic way in order to 
provide context for the study, explain the historical background of the Kashmir region, 
and demonstrate the evolution of the Kashmir dispute.   
 
It will also refer to the geography, demography, economy and geostrategic position of 
Kashmir, as these are all important elements in the understanding of the underpinning 
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issues, concerning the contestation of the territories of Kashmir. For example, Kashmir’s 
geopolitical position is equally important for both, India and Pakistan: Kashmir provides 
India with connectivity to the most lucrative markets of the Central Asian Republics, 
while in Pakistan, all of the Pakistani main rivers flow from the Himalayan mountains 
and cross through Kashmir, making it  an issue of energy and agricultural survival. 
  
The discussion will then move into a very critical part of this research: why and how the 
Kashmir dispute started, and why it is still lingering as a hotbed of discontent and 
popular uprising. The historic context will be divided into two parts: 1846-1947 and 
1947-1954. Many incidents took place and treaties were signed between 1846 and 
1947; however, only a selected few will be discussed, focusing mainly on incidents and 
treaties that shaped the future of Kashmir, its political dispensation, and ongoing 
violence in the region. 
 
2.2 Background to the Dispute 
The Kashmir dispute is the oldest unresolved item on the UN agenda. There are 58 
UNSC resolutions in connection to the Kashmir dispute. The Kashmir conflict has been 
seen as a bone of contention in the India-Pakistan relationship ever since the ‘birth’ of 
the two states in 1947. It has also played a substantial role in border geopolitical 
disputes between India and China over Aksai Chin (a portion of Kashmir). As stated in 
Chapter 1, Kashmir lies between three of the most populous countries of the world: 
India, China and Pakistan, covering a land mass of over 86,000 square kilometres – 
almost the size of the UK, and inhabiting over 17 million people (Lamy, Baylis & Smith, 
2006: 6).  
 
The treaty of Amritsar and Lahore in 1847  has been identified as the start of the 
dispute, and since the arrival of Indian forces in Kashmir on 27 October 1947, the 
territory of Jammu and Kashmir has been divided by the LoC between the two 
territories, administered by Pakistan on the one side and India on the other (Lamb, 
1991: 6). India and Pakistan have failed to reach an equitable agreement regarding the 
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disputed territory of Kashmir. Instead, they have fought four wars (1948, 1965, and 
1971 and 1999). There have been several UN-mandated ceasefires over Kashmir 
disputes (1949 and 1965) (Wheeler, 2010: 319-344). Most recently, after a suicide 
attack in the Pulwana region (a district of the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir) 
on 14 February 2019, in which 40 Indian paramilitary police were killed; the world 
witnessed another stand-off between the two nuclear arch-rivals (Herrera, 2019). 
 
2.2.1 Geopolitics 
Geopolitics stems from the Greek word “Geo” meaning ‘earth’ or ‘land’ and politics 
which means ‘how a state should govern’ (Deudney, 2013). Geopolitics is regarded as 
leveraging power in politics by states through land, waterways, natural resources, and 
states’ geophysical positioning in the global arena. Geopolitics, therefore, focus on 
political power linked to geographic space, territorial waters, and land territory in 
correlation with diplomatic history (Rosenberg, 2016). 
 
2.2.2 Geography (location) 
In the context of this research, one needs to understand and appreciate the positioning 
of Kashmir, geographically, and why this territory is being contested between three 
nuclear powers: China, India, and Pakistan (see Figure 2.1). The Kashmir terrain is 
mountainous, and the topography is subdivided into seven sectors. From south-west to 
north-east, those sectors consist of the meadows, the Pir Panjal hill tracks, the Kashmir 
vale, the mighty Himalayas area, the basin of Indus River valley, and the Karakoram 
mountainous range. The valley of Jammu’s and Kashmir’s densely populated areas lies 
at an average altitude of approximately 1,679 metres. India controls the Vale which 




Figure 2.1. Map of Kashmir (Kashmir Study Group, 2016) 
 
Kashmir can support an economy based on eco-tourism, handiwork, cottage industries 
and labour-intensive agriculture. The foothills of the Hindu-Kush Himalayas mountain 
region are composed of a shallow strip of the connecting plain in the Indian-
administered southern part of Kashmir; and the north-western part of that region, 
consisting of the expanded part of Pakistan-administrated Kashmir. Kashmir is an 
agrarian economy − this is due to the free-flowing water from the melting ice from snow-
capped mountains which form rivers and tributaries − vital sources for agriculture 
activities (Kashmir Study Group, 2016). These waterheads are sources of hydropower 
energy generation, which are critically important for India, Pakistan and Kashmir, and 
provide an unobstructed flow of water for the agricultural needs of all the stakeholders. 




The Himalayan mountain range runs from the eastern region of Kashmir to the North- 
West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. The Himalayan southern borders extend 
beyond the southern parts of Kashmir. In between the northern and southern borders of 
Kashmir is Baltistan, which forms part of Pakistan and was leased through the Gilgit 
Agency to Pakistan just after the partition of India and Pakistan. Similar arrangements 
were made for Ladakh to India. It is important to note here that the Gilgit Agency was 
formerly a part of Jammu and Kashmir but was dissected and ruled by the British Indian 
empire after defeating Sikh ruler Partab Singh in 1889 (Schofield, 2003: 12-13). 
According to Khan (2019):  
The accession in case of Nagar and Hunza part of Gilgit agency was accepted 
and by the rules of transfer of power, there can be no doubt these states are part 
of the sovereign territory of Pakistan. The people of Gilgit agency never accepted 
the authority of Brigadier Ghansara Singh and realized the forced and illegal 
merger with Kashmir (sic) (Khan, 2019).  
 
Refer to Figure 2.2 for a better understanding of the Gilgit Agency’s geographic position 
in the Kashmir dispute. 
 




After the Indian forces landed in Kashmir’s capital Srinagar on 27 October 1947, the 
tribesmen of the Gilgit Agency and their associates started gathering in Gilgit. The 
residency of the Gilgit governor was surrounded by Gilgit Scouts (the real power in 
Gilgit) on 31 October 1947, and on the morning of 1 November 1947, the Gilgit Agency 
governor Brigadier Ghansara Singh was forced to resign. At this historical juncture, the 
people of the Gilgit Agency proclaimed Gilgit as part of Pakistan and hoisted Pakistan’s 
flag (Chohan, 1997: 203). This claim has been disputed by India which regards the 
Gilgit Agency as part of Jammu of Kashmir. 
 
There are two areas of Kashmir, ‘Ladakh’ and ‘Gilgit-Baltistan’, which are sparingly 
populated areas and consist of 50% of the total land mass area of Kashmir. In between 
these areas is the Plateau of Tibet which is surrounded by regional powers on the north-
east flanks of the Himalayas. The population mainly relies on cattle farming, dry fruits, 
timber, and limited agriculture (Evans, 1999). The legendary Chinese silk trade routes 
run through the Karakoram mountain range in the Gilgit Agency, and in recent years, 
the CPEC also passes through the same region of the Gilgit Agency (Kathwari, 2016). 
 
However, there is another border dispute on the Ladakh and Aksai Chin borders 
between China and India who have been in conflict over this territory since 1962, 
including a war between them where India lost 38,000 sqm of Ladakh to China, now 
known as Aksai Chin (Mayfield, 1955). The border tensions between China and India 
flared up recently, when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) repelled an Indian 
intrusion in the Ladakh area of Kashmir where they were building roads and bridges 
near the Galwan Valley that connects to the Daulat Beg Oldi air base. In these recent 
skirmishes between India and China, India lost over 100 soldiers and Chinese 
casualties are not known (Khan, 2020). Refer to Figure 2.3 for a map of the current 





Figure 2.3. Map of Sino-Indo current stand-off (Supplied in Khan, 2020) 
 
It is also worth noting that from the Karakoram and Himalayan mountain range, runs 
most of India’s and Pakistan’s river headwaters which provide most of the irrigational 
water and hydropower generation to Pakistan, Kashmir and India. In 1961, the World 
Bank (WB) mediated water disputes between India and Pakistan by setting up a water 
sharing modalities agreement between the two countries, the IWT of 1961. Another 
important point worth mentioning is that India and Pakistan were engaged in border 
skirmishes on the highest glacier of the world, the Siachen glacier, for almost 20 years 
(Kathwari, 1996). 
 
It is important to briefly explain the geostrategic position of the Siachen glacier which is 
located on the far north-western tip of the LoC between India and Pakistan, as shown in 
Figure 2.4. It is the highest altitude range in Kashmir territory, 17,770 feet above sea 
level, 78 kilometres in radius, and is also known as the second-largest glacier and 
highest battlefield in the world. In mid-April 1984, the Indian army launched Operation 
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Meghdoot and sent in their Kumaon Regiment with the Indian air force providing air 
support, to establish a listening post to monitor Pakistan and China’s military movement 
in the northern theatre of Ladakh in Kashmir. Given that the Siachen glacier is in 
Pakistan-administrated Kashmir, upon the discovery of the intrusion, the Pakistan army 
launched a counter-offensive which initiated a brief war. Pakistan managed to capture 
“Quaid Post” due to the Indian army running out of ammunition. Since 1984, both sides 
have lost over 2,500 soldiers, not due to bullet wounds, but to harsh weather conditions 
such as temperature drops to -55 degrees Celsius at night and snow blizzards, which 
are common occurrences on the Siachen glacier (Singh, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Map of battlefield of Siachen Glacier (Siachen Glacier, 2019) 
 
2.2.3 Demography 
In 2011, the population of Kashmir state was 12,548,925. In 2018, the population had 
grown to an estimated 14,324 million. The population is predominantly Muslim. Islam 
represents around 68.9% of the total population; 28.7% are Hindus; Sikhism represents 
around 1.9%; Buddhism 0.9% and Christians 0.8% according to the Jammu and 
Kashmir Population Census, 2011-2018, 2019 (J&K official portal, 2019). In 1947, the 
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Muslim population in Kashmir was over 90% of the total population. The above census 
demonstrates how the demographics have altered since 1947. 
 
2.2.4 Economy 
The potential of the economy in Kashmir is huge in the sectors of agriculture; freshwater 
fisheries; high value timber; semi-precious and precious stones, for example, rubies and 
emeralds;  marble; ferrous and non-ferrous metal; wool; hide; cashmere; saffron; tulips, 
truffles; fungi; fruits and vegetables, such as peaches, quinces, cherries, apples, 
peaches, seakale, beans, cauliflower, asparagus, beetroots, and artichokes, and crops 
such as  rice, wheat, corn, oats and barley (FAO, 2012). 
  
Kashmir handicrafts are known worldwide, for example, handmade cashmere shawls, 
cushions, traditional apparels, clay pottery, shalwar kameez, wool caps, wooden hand 
carved functional items, leather sandals and gloves (J&K Official State Portal, 2019). 
From the above lists, there is significant economic potential in Kashmir, and the 
potential benefits of these economic activities can be quadrupled if peace and stability 
can be achieved. In recent years, activities such as aquaculture, hydroponic, cold water 
fisheries and sericulture are expanding. Cottage industries are set up to take advantage 
of the sericulture − which is the farming of silkworms, since mulberry trees are found in 
abundance in the Kashmir region (J&K Official State Portal, 2019). Despite the turmoil 
in Kashmir, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2018 accounted for US$17 billion 
(J&K Official State Portal, 2019). The recent building of the CPEC, a revival of an 
ancient silk trade route as referred to earlier in this chapter, has raised Indian 
apprehensions, and Kashmir’s geostrategic position has come under the international 
spotlight, as the CPEC runs through the northern areas of Pakistan, which India claims 
to be part of Kashmir (Markey and West, 2016). 
  
Tourism is one of the fastest-growing economic sectors in the world. It employs more 
people than the world’s mining industry, and it is the second-largest employer after the 
transport industry. The world tourism GDP figures show that in 2018, the revenue 
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generated from tourism activities around the world was over US$7.6 trillion, and over 
1.2 billion people travelled the world (WTTC, 2019). Tourism is currently being 
underexploited in the Kashmir region due to the unrest, and many tourists will not travel 
to Kashmir for safety and security reasons. There are many subsectors of tourism that 
could benefit from a more peaceful region, for example, eco-tourism, high-altitude 
tourism, religious tourism, culture tourism, medical tourism, and of course, leisure and 
holidays. There are religious tourists from the Muslim faith visiting Hazratbal Sufi 
mosques in Srinagar, as well as Hindus visiting Vaisho Devi in large numbers every 
year, but these activities are still minor compared to what the potential of the region 
offers in terms of its tourism attractions (The New World Encyclopaedia, 2018). 
 
Having briefly discussed the geopolitical circumstances of Kashmir, through its location, 
demographics and economic prospects, it is now necessary to outline the history of the 
region.  
 
2.3 Historical Overview 
In this section, pre- and post-India and Pakistan partition treaties, Acts, agreements, UN 
resolutions, international instruments and human rights reports which have historical 
significance in the making of the Kashmir dispute, will be discussed. Particular 
emphasis will be placed on how they have shaped the future of Kashmir and how they 
are affecting the status quo. Since the history of the region stretches back several 
centuries, the research will provide summaries for most of the treaties and agreements, 
with some inclusions of complete treaties or agreements that the researcher has 
deemed important.  
  
To begin this exploration into Kashmir’s political history, the researcher compiled a 





Figure 2.5. Kashmir History Snapshot, 653 - 1947 
 
For the remainder of this chapter, the researcher has gone back as far as 150 years of 
Kashmiri history and dissected the most crucial documents providing critical information 
about the systematic degeneration of the Kashmir political system. The most important 
of these are the two sales deeds of Kashmir, also known as the Treaties of Lahore and 
Amritsar. The third most important document is the Act of Indian Independence, which 
has had the most enduring effect on the shaping of Kashmir, and directly contributed to 
the birth of the dispute over Kashmir. The fourth most critical and important instrument 
is the UNSC Resolution 47 of 1947, which refers to the promised plebiscites. In this 
document, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian Prime Minister after independence 
in 1947, commits to a free and fair referendum for Kashmiris.  
 
According to Ganguly (2006: 134), Nehru and subsequent Indian governments have, 
however, continuously denied the Kashmiri people the will for self-determination, which 
is pivotal to the status quo. It has resulted in a loss of over 100,000 lives and an 
ongoing dispute that could lead to a possible nuclear war between arch-rivals India and 
Pakistan. Today, the narrative of the oppressed people of Kashmir is based on their 
drive for self-determination as it is enshrined in UNSC Resolution 47. There are other 
treaties and agreements of note which hold importance, as they affect the peace of the 
south-east Asian region. This includes the IWT and the Islamabad Pact, also known as 
the India and Pakistan nuclear non-attack agreement. (Chapter 3 of this study will 
examine select treaties, accords, conventions and agreements in greater detail, as they 
form the foundation of this study’s argument and research question).  
 
2.3.1 The End of the Sikh Dynasty (1780-1839) 
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In the 1700s, Sikh military warrior Ranjit Singh defeated the long reign  of Zaman Shah 
of Afghanistan in 1780, and then ruled over the Kashmiri people until 1839. After 
conquering Kashmir and defeating the Afghan leader, Zaman Shah Ranjit Singh 
appointed himself as Maharaja of Punjab in 1801, and then continued to expand his 
kingdom from Gujarat to Multan (Grewal, 1990). The Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s powerful 
rule in Kashmir came to an end when the British defeated him in the first Anglo-Sikh war 
of 1845-46, which then led to the Amritsar treaty (Fenech, 2013: 239). 
 
2.3.2 The Treaties of Lahore and Amritsar, 1846  
From the time of the British arrival in August 1602 on the Indian subcontinent, there had 
been hundreds of small to large skirmishes, to full blown wars, between British invaders 
and the armies of local sovereign sultanaat state rulers. It should also be noted that in 
order to capture the entire Indian subcontinent, British invaders had fought well over 58 
major battles. The Battle of Sobraon was one of the most significant of all as it affected 
the future shaping of Kashmir in the pre-partition of India and Pakistan (Fraser, 1975: 
33-147). 
  
After the Sikhs were defeated by the British at the Battle of Sobraon, the British were 
able to make their way to Lahore. When they reached the grand City of Lahore, the 
Treaty of Lahore was signed on 9 March 1846 (Hunter and Cotton, 1931: 273). At this 
moment in history, the Sikhs were left with no choice but to sign the agreement with the 
British. This agreement states that the Sikhs held territories like Jalandhar Doab, 
Kashmir and Hazara and were to return them to the British. It was then that the world’s 
largest diamond the Kohi-i-Noor was taken by the British into their royal jewellery 
collection. The return of the Koh-i-Noor diamond has been requested by the 
government of Pakistan from the British government, to no avail (Eden, 1844: 14). 
 
In 1846, Indian Hindu Prince, Gulab Singh, mediated a surrender arrangement between 
British and Sikh forces, where it was agreed that the Sikhs would pay 1.2 million British 
pounds to the British East India Company to take Kashmir back from the British. 
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Unfortunately, the Sikhs could not pay the sum in time and Gulab Singh took the 
opportunity to negotiate with the British to pay a reduced amount of 750,000 pounds, 
and take the Kashmir territory of 86,000 square kilometres from the British East Indian 
Company under the Treaty of Amritsar (Rai, 2004: 27-133). As well as handing over 
land to the British, the Sikhs had to allow a British Resident, a British army contingent at 
Lahore and troops in other cities. This was regarded as a historical injustice, as for the 
cost of a mere 750,000 pounds, the entire region with over three million Kashmiri people 
was sold to Raja Gulab Singh without their knowledge, or consent (Cotton, 1918). 
 
The Treaty of Amritsar was executed on 16 March 1846. It formalised the arrangements 
between the British East India Company and Raja Gulab Singh. According to Article 1 of 
the treaty: 
Gulab Singh acquired all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies 
situated to the eastward of the River Indus and the westward of the River Ravi 
including Chamba and excluding Lahul, being part of the territories ceded to the 
British Government by the Lahore State according to the provisions of Article IV 
of the Treaty of Lahore, dated 9th March, 1846 (Rai, 2004: 27-133). 
 
2.3.3 The Indian Independence Act of 1935 
The Indian Independence Act of 1935 (see Figure 2.6), revised and finalised in 1947, is 
one of the most important Acts in the history of the India and Pakistan partition. The 
Indian Independence Act divided the Indian subcontinent into two newly independent 
countries, India and Pakistan. The prelude to the Indian Independence Act of 1935 was 
twofold in that the “Quit India” campaign was gathering momentum in British India and 
second the British were facing a stiff financial crisis in the aftermath of World War I 
(WWI). It was financially more and more difficult for the British to maintain their vast 
empire across the globe and they were in a rollback phase (Schofield, 2003). At the 
return of Mahatma Gandhi from South Africa with his political self-actualisation, he 
started the “No to Salt Tax campaign”. The Muslim leader of India and the Sikhs and 
Hindus were getting more organised, and British officials were finding it increasingly 
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difficult to rule India, especially without any finances given that the British East India 
Company was almost bankrupt (Sarkar, 1987). 
 
Soon after the introduction of the Indian Act of 1919, the Simon Commission was 
established by the British parliament to investigate the failure and grievance of Indian 
civil servants. The Simon Commission reported back to the British parliament in 1922, 
with the recommendation that the “diarchy” system of government was failing and 
should be revoked (Commons and Lords Hansard, 1933). Throughout 1930, a series of 
round table consultative meetings were held between British government officials and 
Indian leaders to find a middle ground to draft a new Act which would be equitable and 
acceptable by both parties. It can be said that the British were looking more and more 
into a model of self-governing of British India by Indian elected ministers.  
  
In the UK, after a defeat of the Labour Party in the 1933 elections, the newly elected 
Conservative Party was already working on a White Paper on India which consisted of 
4,000 pages, 473 articles and 16 schedules. This White Paper was set as a preamble to 
the Indian Act Bill of 1935, received the Royal Assent and passed into law in August 
1935. This Bill met stiff resistance from the Labour Party and its leaders, like Clement 
Attlee (Imperial Gazetteer of India,1940). 
 
At the end of World War II (WWII), the British government were facing stiff resistance at 
home from members of their own coalition government for the failure of the economy 
and damaging recession. At this point, the British government introduced the concept of 
“diarchy” in their colonies: they would offer a novel governmental system where the 
provincial “diarchy” would govern areas like education, agriculture, trade and industry, 
whereas areas like finance, defence, and telecommunications would still be in the 
hands of the British government. This new system of government was gazetted as the 
India Act, but unfortunately, the “diarchy” in its experimental stages met with resistance 
and was not successful as Indian Ministers still believed that they did not have enough 





Figure 2.6. Government of India Act (1935) 
 
2.3.4 The Mountbatten Plan 
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The Act of India 1935 was gazetted with the purpose of satisfying the discontentment 
among Indian leaders and civil servants about the British government and offered a 
semi-autonomous government. Problems arose from the Indian counterparts in 
accepting this new “diarchy” of power-sharing government ruling system as it was not 
well consulted, and Indian leaders were not involved in the preparation and drafting of 
the Indian Act of 1935. The Bill received a lukewarm response from Indian leaders and 
civil servants (Bridge, 1986: 76-110). 
  
After promulgation of the 1935 Indian Independence Act, British Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee, who was elected in July 1945, started to work on an exit strategy for the British 
from India, hence setting up a plan for India’s independence. Winston Churchill was the 
leader of the opposition Conservative Party and was deeply worried about the plan. He 
objected to the use of the term ‘independence’ because the new legislation was 
supposed to grant India and Pakistan dominion status. This, however, meant that they 
recognised the British King, George VI, as their head of state and that Britain would 
retain some influence over the country. However, the Labour Government supported the 
principle of independence for India, and in February 1947, it announced that British 
India would become fully independent by June 1948 at the latest. In the meantime, a 
provincial plan was prepared by Lord Wavell before he was replaced by Lord 
Mountbatten (Tunzelmann, 2007: 120-127); subsequently, it was public knowledge in 
the British parliament that Lord Mountbatten had accepted the position of Viceroy of 
British India (Ankit, 2014: 240-261). 
  
In June 1947, Mountbatten came up with a proposal concerning the dissection of the 
Indian subcontinent, and with a workable plan to transfer power to the new dominion, 
India and Pakistan. This plan, the third within 12 months (Cabinet Mission Plan of June 
1946; Attlee Declaration of February 1947), received the assent of the leadership of the 
major political organisations in India and Britain, although with heavy misgivings in India 
(Dutt, 1947: 210). Already in a speech to the Indian People’s Conference at Gwalior on 
18 April 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru declared: “Our aim at present is to liberate as much of 
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India as we can, one half or three-fourths, and then to deal with the question of 
independence for the rest” (Dutt, 1947: 210-219). 
  
Lord Mountbatten’s plan was not in any way a plan with pre-determined boundaries for 
the new dominions, but rather offered a provision and pretext of a working mechanism 
to divide the Indian subcontinent on the basis of the two-nation theory: the majority of 
Muslim areas to become Pakistan, while the Hindu majority areas would be Hindustan. 
This plan also took into consideration the demand by Muslim leaders that a newly 
created country, Pakistan, have their legislative assembly represented through 
referendum as prescribed by an earlier British Cabinet Mission Plan for the division of 
the Indian sub-continent (Butalia, 2017: 79-85). 
  
Another question remained unanswered: what would be the future of the 565 Princely 
states? With the ending of paramountcy, they could join either India or Pakistan, or 
announce their independence, and establish their direct relations with Britain. 
Furthermore, for the Mountbatten Plan to work, the legislation would have to be hurried 
through the British Parliament to establish the new dominion government/s. If the 
Mountbatten Plan went through, the result would have established the following states 
or state areas in India: 
1. North-West Pakistan, covering Western Punjab, Sind, and possibly the North 
West Frontier and Baluchistan, with a population of 25 million (17.9 million 
Muslims). 
2. North-East Pakistan, covering Eastern Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam, 
with a population of 44 million (31 million Muslims). These two areas, divided by 
a thousand miles, would constitute the Pakistan State or Federation, with a 
population of 69 million. 
3. The Indian Union or Hindustan, covering the rest of the British India empire, with 
a population of 224 million. 
4. The Princely states, covering two-fifths of the area of India with a population of 
93 million or one quarter, would join one or other federation, or possibly 
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independence in the case of one or two larger states, such as Hyderabad and 
Travancore, according to their present declared intentions (Marxists Internet 
Archive, 2013). 
 
In India, the main political leaders declared their acceptance of the British proposals, but 
with heavy misgivings as mentioned earlier in this chapter (Dutt, 1947: 210). Nehru 
declared to the Indian National Congress: “It is with no joy in my heart that I commend 
these proposals” (quoted in Dutt, 1947: 210). The Indian National Congress only 
accepted the present partition plan as a makeshift plan to win effective control over the 
maximum possible area of India, with the unchanged objective to lead forward to the 
united democratic Republic of India. This was made clear by a speech Nehru gave to 
the Indian Peoples’ Conference at Gwalior on 18 April 1947.  
 
Other Indian parties also sharply criticised the Plan. JP Narain, on behalf of the Indian 
Socialists, and PC Joshi, on behalf of the Indian Communists, sharply criticised the Plan 
as involving the dismemberment of India, and not representing a real transfer of power. 
Both parties opposed acceptance, with Joshi declaring:  
The new British Plan for the dismemberment of India is a desperate move 
against the freedom movement which stands for the complete independence of 
the whole of the country... Mountbatten’s Plan is not a genuine ‘Quit India’ plan, 
but rather one which seeks to keep in British hands as many economic and 
military controls as possible (UK Parliament, 1947). 
 
At this juncture of the British Indian partition, the Muslim League (Muslims’ 
representative party of all Muslims in British India) was not satisfied, declaring through 
Jinnah: “We cannot say or feel that we are satisfied or that we agree with some of the 
matters dealt with by the plan”. The Sikhs were also not satisfied. Baldev Singh 
declared: “It would be untrue if I were to say that we are altogether happy. The British 




In Britain, Conservative and Labour unity was proclaimed in support of the Plan. 
Churchill, in contrast to his opposition to previous proposals, declared his approval of 
the general lines of the Mountbatten Plan, and congratulated Attlee on his selection of 
Mountbatten as Viceroy. “The two men,” observed the Manchester Guardian (Randive, 
1975: 47) of Churchill and Attlee, “have not found so much common ground since this 
Parliament began”. On this occasion of the Parliamentary announcement, only William 
Gallacher (Scottish, trade unionist, activist and founding member of Communist Party of 
Great Britain) expressed criticism. In the city, Indian share prices immediately rose, 
following the announcement, with the Daily Herald noting, “The City gave its blessing to 
the Plan” (Dutt, 1947: 210) Internationally, the Plan had received high praise in the 
American official press, and the right-wing press of most countries. Last but not least, 
Dutt (1947: 210-219) explains: “Britain is being forced to take a page from America’s 
book and copy her policy in the Philippines — to give nominal false freedom. In other 
words, to clear out [or] to remain”. 
 
2.3.5 Revised Indian Independence Act of 1947 
 
In June 1947, Attlee’s government agreed to Mountbatten’s plan and resolved to bring 
about an early transfer of power from British India to the newly created dominions of 
India and Pakistan in the middle of August 1947. The Indian Independence Act of 1947 
was also passed. This Act would have a direct impact on the embryology of the Kashmir 
dispute. As can be seen in Figure 2.7, the Act made a recommendation for the setting 
up of two independent countries, “to be known respectively as India and Pakistan”. The 





Figure 2.7. Preamble of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 
 
According to the Indian Act of Independence of 1935, and the revised version of 1947, it 
is stated clearly that the Hindu majority parts of India were to become Hindustan or 
India, and the Muslim majority parts would become Pakistan. There was an inherited 
problem in this plan of division as some Muslims were in the east of British India, 
bordering Bhutan, Nepal, and Burma. Pakistan was made on two parts of the land: one 
on the north-west of the British Indian empire, known as West Pakistan, and the other 
on the far east of the British Indian empire, known as East Pakistan, and better known 
as Bangladesh today. This unnatural division did nothing for the future of Pakistan, 
given the eventual secession of East Pakistan as a separate country, Bangladesh, in 
1971 (Butler, 2002: 41). To understand the geography and Muslim-Hindu demography, 





Figure 2.8. Map of British India with Muslim and Hindu demography and separation of 






Figure 2.9. Map of Muslim population density in pre-partition of British India, 1901; the 
different shades of green denote the different densities of the Muslim population in 
British India at the time of the Indo-Pak partition (MapMania, 2007). 
 
2.3.6 The Radcliffe Boundary Commission 
Upon the arrival of the British in 1858 to the end of WWII, all 565 Princely states 
completed their accession to the British Indian Empire. The reversal of that accession 
was problematic, as at the British departure the royal ascent to the princely state would 
fall and the paramountcy would lapse; second, they would be automatically divided 
between newly created dominions of India and Pakistan. These 565 Princely states 
have never been part of proper British India, as they enjoyed royal assent and had their 
own Chamber of Princes in the British Parliament (1858-1947). The Act of Indian 
Independence of 1935 and the revised version of August 1947 stipulated that the 
Princely states had two options: one is that they either accede to the dominions by 
signing the instrument of accession or two, remain independent. There was the caveat 
that when acceding to newly created dominions, they must take into consideration the 
wishes of their subjects by consultation and consensus, and therefore, the ruler may not 
accede to either dominion by making a unilateral decision (Ferguson, 2004: 178-189). 
  
When the British were leaving India, they still had a responsibility towards their loyal 
Princely states and their future. The British Parliament made it very clear that, when 
power would be transferred to the two new dominions on 15 August 1947, the British 
paramountcy would lapse, and the Princely states would no longer have British 
privileges, nor would the British interfere in any of their future business, defence, and 
security matters. It was impossible for any Princely states to survive in this new set-up, 
and  they either had to accede, or remain independent, which would be logically not 
practical, as the smaller kingdom would be porous and non-defendable from foreign 




Sir Cyril Radcliffe was a lawyer by profession, and a British civil servant who had never 
travelled or lived in India before his appointment as Boundary Commissioner of the 
British Indian Empire, and he was appointed for the task of awarding mass land 
distribution to two newly created dominions. The Radcliffe Boundary Commission 
committees were instructed to “demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Punjab 
based on ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In 
doing so, it will also consider other factors” (Lamb, 1991: 4-17). This was an impossible 
task for someone who knew nothing about the ongoing cultural and religious issues, nor 
had geographical knowledge of the area, such as the path of watercourses and 
irrigation systems. The last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten viewed the appointment of Sir 
Radcliffe as Boundary Commission Chairman as impractical. They did not have an easy 
relationship. Moreover, the Indian political parties like the Indian Congress and Muslim 
League were also not satisfied with the appointment of Sir Radcliffe as Boundary 
Commission Chairman (Tunzelmann, 2007: 120-127). 
  
There was a fundamental problem in the boundary commission as Radcliffe was only 
given five weeks to implement the division and award all the problematic territories; the 
time was too short for him to consult and analyse the situation. Unfortunately, historical 
injustices occurred due to hastily awarding the boundaries between India and Pakistan; 
and Kashmir is one of the regions that is still experiencing significant challenges as a 
direct result of the commission’s decisions. Sir Radcliffe arrived in India on 8 July 1947 
and had to complete the boundary division on or before 14 August 1947. However, he 
managed to submit his final plan by 9 August, that would directly impact the future of 
two new countries, and the fate of over 300 million people on either side of the 
boundaries (Lamb, 1991: 75).  
  
This boundary division saw the biggest migration across newly created dominions, and 
a rough estimate of over 14 million people crossed the border. It is known as one of the 
most violent migrations, as in a short space of time, hundreds and thousands of the 
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people lost their properties and lives, in an overnight migration by oxcarts, rail and road 
(Pillalamarri, 2017). 
 
2.3.7 Controversy of Gurdaspur and Ferozepur Tehsil Awarding to India 
Stanley Wolpert writes that Sir Radcliffe in his initial maps granted the Gurdaspur district 
to Pakistan, but one of Mountbatten and Nehru’s greatest concerns over the new west 
Punjab border was to make sure that Gurdaspur would not go to Pakistan (Dhulipala, 
2015: 79) since that would be a disadvantage to India’s direct road access to Kashmir. 
As per ‘The Different Aspects of Islamic Culture’, a part of the United Nations Economic, 
Social and Culture Organisation’s (UNESCO) histories flagship project, recently 
disclosed documents on the history of the partition reveal British complicity with the top 
Indian leadership to wrest Kashmir from Pakistan (UNESCO, 2016). Based on the study 
of recently declassified documents, it has been convincingly proven that Mountbatten, in 
league with Nehru, was instrumental in pressurising Radcliffe to award the Muslim-
majority district of Gurdaspur in East Punjab to India, in order to provide India with the 
only possible access to Kashmir (Mooen, 2019). The editor of the Daily News, Andrew 
Roberts, believes that Mountbatten cheated over the India-Pakistan frontier, and states 
that if gerrymandering took place in the case of the tehsil (subdistrict) of Ferozepur 
(Mooen, 2019), it is not too difficult to believe that Mountbatten also coerced Radcliffe to 
make sure that Gurdaspur would be awarded to India, given that this vital piece of land 
would provide Indian rail and road access to Kashmir (Kaushik, 2015). It is important to 
understand that if both the tehsil of Ferozepur and Gurdaspur had not been awarded to 
India, then India would have no land connectivity to the Princely state of Kashmir. The 
British historian Alastair Lamb has dissected this injustice in detail by explaining the 
saga of the Radcliffe Boundary Commission’s awarding of the tehsil of Ferozepur and 






Figure 2.10. Gurdaspur Railway Network (Maps of India, 2019) 
 
According to the Act of Indian independence of 1935, revised in July 1947, the partition 
was supposed to be based on Muslim majority areas to be part of Pakistan, and Hindu 
majority areas to become Hindustan India. The historian Alastair Lamb recorded that 
the awarding of Gurdaspur went against the prescribed rules and he wrote in his book 
‘Disputed Legacy’ that Mountbatten who was not supposed to exercise any power or 
influence on the awarding of the boundaries, did so under pressure from Nehru and 
Edwina Mountbatten. Moreover, awarding Ferozepur and Gurdaspur to India was very 
questionable (Lamb, 1991:126) given that both of the tehsils had a Muslim majority 
population and were, therefore, awarded to India for unknown reasons. This remains a 
root cause of the ongoing Kashmir dispute and also goes against the prescribed 
modalities of the distribution of the subcontinent according to the Indian Independence 
Act of 1935, revised in July-August 1947.  Figure 2.11 reviews archival evidence. 
 




Figure 2.11. Extract from Indian Independence Act of 1947 (Hunter and Cotton, 2019) 
 
Alastair Lamb further stated in his book ‘Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990’ that 
without Gurdaspur’s award to Indian territories, India would have had no surface linkage 
to Kashmir, as Gurdaspur provides India with a vital road and rail link to Kashmir as 
shown in Figure 2.10. This linkage was later used by India to transfer and mobilise 
armies to invade Kashmir on 27 October 1947. Lamb regards this awarding of the 
Gurdaspur as a pre-plan attempt to annex Kashmir by India, with both Radcliffe and 
Mountbatten directly involved in this conspiracy (Lamb, 1991: 167-71).  
  
Other available documents shed further light on the situation. For example, as can be 
seen from an extract from the  Indian Independence Act of 1947 (as obtained from the 
British Royal Archives) in Figure 2.11, Gurdaspur was awarded to Pakistan under the 
The picture can't be displayed.
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geographical demarcation of West Punjab, which was earmarked to form part of 
Pakistan (Metcalf and Metcalf, 2016: 216-217). 
 
The awarding of Gurdaspur to India made it possible for Indian forces to amass their 
troops in Srinagar on 27 October 1947, thereby igniting a dispute that has continued to 
this day. It also allowed India to claim the 86,000 square kilometres of Kashmir valleys 
as part of its territory. The Gurdaspur issue has raised many questions around possible 
conspiracy or historical injustices by the British in the process of partitioning (Hunter and 
Cotton, 1931). The type of politicking behind the scenes between Nehru, Mountbatten 
and Radcliff was shrouded in mystery until the archival documents which had been 
closed were opened recently.  
  
2.3.8 The Instrument of Accession of Kashmir 1947 
The Indian government maintains that Maharaja Gulab Singh signed the Instrument of 
Accession on 26 August 1947, which provided India legality over sending its armed 
forces to Srinagar and claim Kashmir to be an integral part of the Indian union. There 
are two arguments to this: first, there is no evidence of an original copy of this 
“Instrument of Accession” (Lamb, 1991: 148-150); second, if this was true then why did 
it require Nehru to approach the UNSC for an urgent intervention in January 1948? This 
is another important point to raise because concerning the Kashmir dispute the Indian 
narrative has been that the issue is a bilateral matter between India and Pakistan and 
there is no need for third-party mediation. However, India made the issue an 
international point of concern when Indian Prime Minister Nehru took the Kashmir 
dispute to the UNSC for intervention (Lamb, 1991: 176). Figure 2.12 is a photocopy of 
the original instrument of accession of Kashmir. The legality and validity of this 
document is questionable. However, the Indian government has claimed the Kashmir 
territory which is  86,000 square kilometres and three times the size of Belgium (See 
Appendix A for a true copy of the actual instrument of accession of Kashmir which is 
stored in the National Archives of India). Any legal expert will declare this instrument of 
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accession as fraudulent and unacceptable due to omission, deletion and alteration 
without counter signatures from both parties. 
 
 




Figure 2.12. Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir State (1947) 
 
2.3.9 The Kashmir Dispute Post-1947: Aqua-Politics at Play 
 
“…Fierce competition over fresh water may well become a source of conflict and wars in 
the future” (Kofi Annan, March 2001). 
 
According to Dunne, neorealism and neoliberalism are particularly relevant theories to 
conceptualise the dynamics of this research topic. Both are status quo-oriented and 
problem-solving theories. They share many assumptions about actors, values, issues, 
and power arrangements in the international system. Both theories relate to two 
different worlds. While neorealists focus on security issues, being concerned with issues 
The picture can't be displayed.
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of power and survival; neoliberalists study political economy and focus on cooperation 
and institutions (Dunne, 2005: 185-204). 
 
For neorealists, states are self-interest-oriented, and an anarchic and competitive 
system pushes them to favour self-help over cooperative behaviour (Lamy et al, 2006: 
205-225). This standpoint helps one to understand the arms race taking place between 
India and Pakistan. Moreover, it enables one to comprehend the alliance building efforts 
of both countries, especially India’s strategic partnership with the US and Pakistan’s 
partnership with China. Furthermore, neorealists argue that states are rational actors, 
selecting strategies to maximise benefits and minimise losses.  
 
There are two barriers to international cooperation; they include a fear of those who 
might not follow the rules, and the relative gains of others (Lamy et al., 2006: 205-225; 
Sridharan, 2005: 103-124). These explain why little economic cooperation has taken 
place between India and Pakistan. Importantly, they explain why the grand energy 
cooperation of building the IPI and TAPI pipeline projects have not materialised. 
 
The abovementioned assumptions of neorealism enable the researcher to examine the 
issue from the perspective of the energy needs of India and Pakistan, also its regional 
security. For neoliberals, cooperation is easy to achieve in areas where states have 
mutual interests, but at the heart of it, Kashmir lies as a pivotal unresolved dispute 
between India, Pakistan and China. They believe that actors with common interests try 
to maximise absolute gains for all parties involved, as opposed to the belief of 
neorealists that the fundamental goal of states in a cooperative relationship is to prevent 
others from gaining more (Lamy et al., 2006: 205-225). 
 
The discussion above is important for this study because it reveals why the dispute over 
Kashmir emerged and why it continues today. Moreover, the section that follows will 
reflect on competition of scarce resources and the issue of water management in the 
region of Jammu and Kashmir. It especially concerns the well-being of Pakistan’s 
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agricultural sector and loss of income for Kashmiris as currently there are no levies 
charged on water released to Pakistan and the hydropower electricity generated for 
India’s growing population’s energy needs. This precarious situation is outlined by 
newspaper columnist Nizami in his article ‘Aqua-politics’: 
 
Unfortunately, awareness of this threat has been lacking on the part of Pakistan’s rulers 
in the past. But we cannot afford to ignore it any longer because the consequences will 
endanger not just the agriculture, economy, and the stability of Pakistan but its very 
survival. India knows this vulnerability of Pakistan and fired by its eternal enmity to this 
country has been moving ahead with plans to hit Pakistan hard in the sensitive sphere 
of water. India is constructing 62 dams and water reservoirs on Pakistan’s rivers, 
Chenab, Jhelum and Sindh (Nizami, 2018). 
 
One of this dissertation’s main research questions is: Why has the Kashmir dispute 
remained unresolved since 1947?  This section sheds light on the question by briefly 
outlining the issue of India’s energy needs paradigm and Pakistan’s agricultural security 
and this is at the heart of Kashmir’s unresolved dispute. It is abundantly clear that  
neoliberalism’s political economy, ideology and policy model  emphasises the value of 
free market competition. In particular, neoliberalism is often characterised in terms of its 
belief in sustained economic growth as the means to achieve human progress and its 
confidence in free markets as the most efficient allocation of resources. Neoliberalism’s 
political economy (Smith, 2007) is at the interplay between India and Pakistan on the 
border dispute on Kashmir. It is quite evident that India’s actions are  driven by realism 
by contravening the Indus Basin Treaty (IBT) and IWT  and using water for its economy, 
it shows Indian hegemony and realism at play with its hostile stance towards Pakistan. 
Moreover, there are proven patterns of overturning of Pakistan’s complaints by both the 
WB and Court of Arbitration (CoA) (Crook, 2014). This section also explains the energy 
dependency of India on Kashmir’s hydroelectric power generation which is crucial to the 
needs of its ever-growing population and economy. It is estimated that by 2030, the 
Indian population will reach about 1.5 billion people which would drastically increase the 
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energy consumption; hence, India’s hegemonic hold over Kashmir at any cost, given its 
alignment with India’s growth trajectories (IEA, 2020). 
 
However, it is further explained by the Indian columnist Kaushik in his article “How 
Ferozepur become ours” in the Times of India: 
Historians have acknowledged now that the unannounced alteration in the 
Punjab boundary line made by Radcliff and Mountbatten at the time of the 
Partition in August 1947, by which the two very important headwork’s of 
Madhopur on the Ravi and Ferozepur on the Sutlej were given to India, laid the 
foundation of depriving Pakistan of the water resources that historically and 
geographically belonged to it. The Indus Basin Treaty (IBT) of September 1960, 
whose provisions favoured India, and which the dictatorial general Ayub Khan 
then prime minister of Pakistan accepted although it was against national 
interest, was, similarly, designed to deny Pakistan even its rightful share of the 
water of the three allocated Rivers in the years to come (Kaushik, 2015). 
 
A new surprise induction into the geostrategic context is the CPEC which is partly a 
development scheme and partly a strategic gambit and Kashmir lies at the heart of it. 
Although Beijing and Islamabad have been close partners for decades, the CPEC 
intensified and expanded bilateral cooperation at a time of rising Chinese geopolitical 
ambition and persistent concerns about Pakistan’s security and development. This 
move has also been dissecting and counteroffensive towards US strategic encirclement 
of Chinese territory by ever-expanding US military air bases in South and Central Asia. 
The CPEC will also facilitate trade along an overland route that connects China to the 
Indian Ocean, linking the Chinese city of Kashgar to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, but 
passing through the borders and through troublesome Kashmir. This deep-water 
seaport will provide China with a strategic observation and intervention post for any 
possible future blockade of the Shaitul-Arab corridor and the Middle East oil-rich basin, 
where 67% of global oil and petroleum passes through (Markey and West, 2016). Since 
the importance of Kashmir’s location is under discussion within the framework of 
neoliberalism’s political economy at play between India and Pakistan; it is crucial to 
discuss the issue of India and Pakistan’s energy resources and examine  India’s 
building of numerous dams on the water flow of rivers which provide Pakistan with water 






2.3.9.1 Indus Water Treaty (IWT) 
It has been mentioned earlier in the chapter, that most of Pakistan’s irrigation water 
required for agriculture flows from the mountain ranges and melting glaciers of the 
Hindu-Kash mountain range of the Kashmir region. The Indian army entered Kashmir 
on October 1947, under the pretext that the maharajah (King) of Kashmir had signed an 
“Instrument of Accession” and requested a military intervention (Lamb, 1991: 148-150). 
Soon after, India started to divert the river water flow away from Pakistan and later built 
dams to hold the water for its own agriculture needs. The validity of the “Instrument of 
Accession” of Kashmir will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
  
This problem was reported to the WB in 1958, and after long deliberations and 
discussions between India and Pakistan, mediated by the WB, the IWT was signed by 
all parties. This treaty elaborates on the rights and privileges of Indus water usage by 
both countries. It also provided a mechanism and framework for negotiations and 
discussions, if the dispute arose again in the future (Rossi, 2019). 
  
As stated earlier in this chapter, when Gurdaspur was awarded to India it created a 
direct link to Kashmir. However, another potentially fatal consequence emerged at the 
time of the partitioning (Lamb, 1991: 6). Pakistani territory only had one major industry: 
primitive agriculture. Other known industries or resources were unheard of (Wilcox, 
2015). As demonstrated in Figure 2.13, all major rivers originated from the Indian 
Himalayan mountains, feeding water to canals, dams, aqueducts and lakes, used for 
agriculture and by hydroelectrical generators. The five major rivers Ravi, Sutlej, Beas, 
Chenab, and Jhelum, and all their headwaters start in the Kashmiri Himalayan 
mountains and pass through Gurdaspur before entering Pakistan (see Figure 2.13). 
This presented a problem for Pakistan, with Gurdaspur now under India’s rule 
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(Cleghorn, 2001, 109-112). For many in Pakistan and Kashmir, this was a serious 
problem, as they were cut off from future water resources. 
  
In recent years, India has started to build dams on the river arteries of the five main 
rivers to divert the flow to its territories. In doing so, India has circumvented the IWT of 
the distribution of water to Pakistan, which they co-signed in 1947. The Baglihar Dam is 
one of the many dams that are being built in this manner to obstruct the water supply to 
Pakistan. In recent years India has constructed 59 dams in the rivers that are the 
headwaters of the Pakistani watercourses and tributaries system, in order to obstruct 














Figure 2.13. Water Routes (United Nations, 2011) 
In Figure 2.13, number 10 is where the disputed Kashmir is located. This is an 
advantageous geopolitical position for India as this provides India with the only land 
connection to the lucrative market of the Central Asian Republic countries. It also should 
be noted that the Kashmir territories have headwaters of major rivers running into India 
and Pakistan. Pakistan is basically an agrarian country which solely relies on rivers and 
tributaries for its water needs.  
 




2.4  Dams and Hydroelectric Power Plants in Jammu and Kashmir 
The Indus River water traverses three countries: India, Pakistan and the disputed state 
of Kashmir, which are riparian states. The IWT sets out processes that both India and 
Pakistan agree to the fair usage of water from the Indus River. Recently India has failed 
to live up to this agreement. India’s justification to build dams is to satisfy its growing 
population and energy need. However, Pakistan sees this as a violation of the IBT and 
IWT, which deprives Pakistan of its need for constant water flow for its agrarian 
economy. Kashmiris who are still waiting for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute are 
being deprived of water usage levy income. The following section will offer examples of 
how India has been building dams in Jammu and Kashmir, to divert the water flow from 
Pakistan into newly built dams, which is in direct defiance of the IBT and IWT of 1960, 
and deprives Pakistan of its water needs (Norins, 2011). This is necessary in order to 
indicate that at the heart of the Kashmir dispute is a hidden motive of energy needs of 
both countries and for China as stakeholder in this a geostrategic positioning of Kashmir 
where the OBOR of China’s CPEC projects runs through. In recent months this has put 
the world’s focus on the region and Kashmir’s geostrategic position is being robustly 
debated in international forums (Kawal, 2015). 
 
2.4.1 Baglihar Dam and Hydroelectric Power Project  
The idea to build the Baglihar Dam surfaced in 1992. It was approved by the Indian 
government in 1996 in order to provide much needed energy to India, but construction 
only began in 1999. The estimated value of this project exceeds US$1 billion.  It also 
supports the argument that India is reliant on the water flow from Kashmir and 
demonstrates how India is subsidising its energy needs through the generation of 
hydroelectrical power. Mentioning the cost of each dam is a deliberate attempt to 
emphasise how heavily India is investing into a disputed territory, whose fate is still to 
be decided by the people of Kashmir through the promised plebiscites.  The dam is 
regarded by Pakistan as a direct contravention of the IWT, and the government of 
Pakistan made a formal complaint to the UN and WB as it was built on the water flow of 
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the river Chenab which is one of Pakistan’s five big rivers and accounts for 30% of 
Pakistan’s agricultural irrigation water. The volume-holding capacity of the Baglihar Dam 
is 321,002-acre-ft and the dam volume is 63,566,400 cu ft with a hydroelectric output of 
900 Mega Watt (MW) (FAO, 2012). According to a WB fact-sheet, Pakistan and India 
are at loggerheads over the technical design aspect of these two plants which 
contravene the IWT signed in the 1960s  and the WB accepted the IWT “designates 
these two rivers as well as the Indus as the Western Rivers’ to which Pakistan has 
unrestricted use.” The fact-sheet from the WB states that India can build hydroelectric 
power plants on these rivers provided it meets the specification of annexures listed in 
the IWT (Profit, 2018). 
 
2.4.2  Pakal Dul Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant  
The Pakal Dul Dam is under construction and due to be completed in 2022. The dam is 
being built on the Marusadar river, which is one of the tributaries of the Chenab river on 
which Pakistan has exclusive rights of exploitation as per the IWT. The dam’s total 
capacity is 108,000,000 m3 (88,000-acre⋅ft) with a hydroelectric power generation 
capacity of 1,000 MW. The estimated cost of the project is over US$1.2 billion (Ganai, 
2016).  
 
2.4.3 Ratle Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant 
The construction of this dam will be completed in 2020. It is being built on the Chenab 
river conflux in Kishtwar district of Jammu and Kashmir which is in direct contravention 
of the treaty. This is the second largest dam and hydroelectricity power plant built by 
India in Jammu and Kashmir with an 850 MW capacity and a total capacity of 
10,000,000 m3 (8,100-acre⋅ft). The construction cost is estimated to be over US$1 
billion (EuroAsian Times Desk, 2018). 
  
2.4.4 Salal Hydroelectric Power Station 
This is one of the biggest dams and hydroelectric power generator projects built in 
Kashmir in the Reasi district of Jammu and Kashmir, on the headwater of the Chenab 
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river. According to the IWT, Pakistan has an exclusive right on the river’s water and 
tributaries. Salal Dam has a total capacity of 228,000-acre⋅ft and dam volume holding 
capacity of 1,450,000 m3 (51,210,000 cu ft) with 3 x 115 MW hydropower-producing 
power generating capacity. This dam was completed in 1987 (NHPC, 2016). 
 
  
2.4.5 Uri Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant 
This dam is in the Uri Baramulla district of Jammu and Kashmir and is very close to the 
LoC. This dam was built by the Indian government on the Jhelum river, one of the five 
main rivers of Pakistan which feeds the bulk of Pakistan’s agricultural irrigation system. 
This dam and hydroelectric power project were completed and became fully operational 
in 2014. This dam was built at a cost of US$660 million (Power Technology, 2020). The 
WB has adopted a neutral mediator role and it is frustrated with the process and non-
cooperation from stakeholders, and the process of mediation has stagnated according 
to a WB report on the status of the IWT mediation: 
In December 2016, the Bank announced that it had ‘paused’ the process for 
either appointing a COA or a neutral expert and started mediation between the 
two countries. Since then the Bank arranged two rounds of talks between the two 
sides but the Indians kept on building the project …The last round of bank-
facilitated and secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan were held in 
Washington in September but no consensus was reached. In view of the inability 
of the parties to agree on the matter, the World Bank was reported to have called 
another round of discussions but failed to bring New Delhi to the negotiating table 
(Ian, 2018). 
  
2.4.6 The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Plant 
The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHEP) has been built on the Neelum 
river, one of the tributaries of the Jhelum river, and according to the IWT, Pakistan has 
exclusive right of its water exploitation. The building of the dam was commissioned in 
2007 and it was completed in 2016. The dam’s total capacity is 18,350,000 m3 
(648,000,000 cu ft) and it provides India with 330 MW of hydroelectric power-generated 
energy for its domestic needs. The dam was built at a cost of US$864 million, while 
Pakistan registered an official case at the international court of arbitration in The Hague. 
51 
 
There has been some compromise on the usage of water from the Jhelum river 
between India and Pakistan, as given that the KHEP is a run-off-river project that does 
not consume water, it is allowable under the IWT (Walton, 2010). It was further stated 
that India was to design and operate the KHEP to maintain a minimum water flow of 
nine cubic metres per second in the Kishanganga River, a ruling that India continues to 
abide by (Piesse, 2018). 
  
2.4.7 Dumkhar Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant 
This dam was built on the river Indus which is one of Pakistan’s longest and biggest 
rivers. This dam is based in the Ladakh area of Kashmir which is administrated by India 
and provides India with 45 MW of hydroelectric power. The Dumkhar Dam was 
completed in 2003 and is also in direct contravention of the IWT (Pubby, 2018). 
  
2.4.8 The Alchi Dam and Nimoo Bazgo Power Project 
This dam is non-controversial as it does not contravene the IWT’s prescribed use of 
water by India and Pakistan, but still it is built on the Indus river in the Leh district of the 
Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir. This is mentioned here to illustrate how much 
India is relying on hydropower generation produced in Jammu and Kashmir. This dam, 
built at a cost of US$390 million, was finished in 2014 and provides India with 45 MW of 
electricity (Parvaiz, 2013). 
 
2.4.9 Dul Hasti Dam and Hydroelectric Power Plant 
The Dul Hasti Dam and hydroelectric power plant was built in 2007, on the Chandra 
river which is one of the tributaries of the Chenab river. This was once again non-
controversial as Pakistan did not complain to the court on this matter. However, the 
building of this dam should be mentioned, as Kashmir is still an internationally 
recognised disputed territory and any capital building without the approval of the UN 
and its subsidiary is deemed illegal. The Dul Hasti hydroelectric power plant generates 
390 MW which supplies Jammu and Kashmir as well as northern Indian cities like 
Haryana, Punjab, UP, Rajasthan and Delhi, with crucial and peaking power demands. 
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The total cost of the dam was estimated to be US$750 million. The researcher would 
like to reiterate that apart from the geostrategic positioning of Jammu and Kashmir; it is 
also an important region for India’s ever-growing energy needs as illustrated above 
(NHPC, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 2.14. Map of headwater of five major rivers of Pakistan and Indian dams (United 
Nations, 2011) 
 
The Indian dams are obstructing the water flow to Pakistan and it is causing a 
catastrophe in the Pakistani agricultural and energy sector (Rahman, 1996: 119-120). 
Some political commentators have described  India’s building of dams as an act of 
aggression, further stating that if the problem persists and is not being resolved by 
intervention through international bodies, then Pakistan is destined to become an 
Ethiopia or Eritrea of South Asia (United Nations, 2018). India is, therefore, using 
political economy manoeuvring tactics to curtail water and energy as leverage for 
negotiation vis-a-vis Kashmir (Hussain, 2014). 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The picture can't be displayed.
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The aim of this chapter was to introduce the Kashmir conflict in an orderly way to 
provide context for the study. This chapter has explained the historical background of 
the Kashmir region, provided the evolution of the Kashmir conflict, described the 
geography, demography, economy and geostrategic position of Kashmir, and briefly 
discussed the importance of the underpinning issues as to why India and Pakistan are 
so desperately contesting for the territories of Kashmir, and why Kashmir’s geopolitical 
position is equally important for both countries. 
  
The latter part of the chapter then moved into a very critical part of this research: why 
and how the Kashmir dispute started and why it is still lingering as a hotbed of 
discontent and popular uprising. The historical context of Kashmir was then divided into 
two parts: 1846-1947 and 1947-1954. Furthermore, this research has connected the 
dots of historical incidents that took place and treaties signed during the period of 1846-
1947; however, only a select number of the most important ones were mentioned and  
discussed, especially those incidents and treaties that shaped the future of Kashmir, 
affected the future political dispensation of Kashmir, and led to unrest and ongoing 
violence in the region. 
  
In the last section of the chapter, the researcher has added the new dimension of the 
conflict and tested theoretical concepts of neoliberalism’s and neorealist political 
economy, by investigating the building of numerous dams and hydroelectric power- 
generating plants by India on the rivers flowing from Kashmir to Pakistan. It is 
abundantly evident that India is now using its 1.2 billion consumer market as an 
economic leverage to attract funding for building these dams and hydroelectric power 
plants, while equally leveraging its borrowing capacity to get the WB to be more lenient 
on the IWT of 1960.,  
 
This chapter has reviewed and investigated the Kashmir quagmire and the embryology 
of the Kashmir dispute. This research studied the four most prominent and historically 
important documents in detail. The first is the Indian  Independence Act of 1935, which 
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talks about the distribution mechanism of British India, followed by Lord Mountbatten’s 
Plan of Partition which reinforces the Act of 1935, and then the revised Indian 
Independence Act of  18 July 1947, which prescribed the dividing principles and 
methodologies of territories between India and Pakistan, and lastly the Sir Radcliffe 
Boundary Commission document which shed light on the controversial awarding of 
strategically important tehsil (sub-districts) of Gurdaspur and Ferozepur to India despite 
the majority population in these two subdistricts being Muslim, contradicting the Indian 
Independence Act of 1935 and 1947. These two subdistricts ultimately provide a vital 
surface link for India to the Kashmir region which is seen as the major bone of 
contention between India and Pakistan. 
 
The next chapter will unpack some of the most important historical treaties, Acts and 
instruments that have played a role in shaping the Kashmir dispute including the Indian 
Independence Act of 1947, Sir Radcliffe’s boundary awarding of Gurdaspur to India, 
and the mysterious Instrument of Accession. In Chapter 3, the researcher will set out to 
engage the dissertation’s argument by describing the different partition treaties, Acts, 
agreements, UN resolutions, international instruments and human rights reports which 
have historical significance in the making of the Kashmir conflict. An emphasis will be 




INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AIMED AT RESOLVING THE KASHMIR DISPUTE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 provided the historical context to the Kashmir dispute. This chapter will set out to 
describe the international instruments aimed at resolving the dispute. These instruments will 
be discussed with an emphasis on how they are shaping the future of Kashmir and affecting 
the status quo. The most salient treaties and agreements will be selected for the process of 
this discussion. This is important as, before South Africa’s foreign policy position on the 
Kashmir dispute can be examined in Chapter 4, it is necessary to ascertain what has already 
been done to try to resolve this dispute. This chapter will also begin to tie in South Africa’s 
historical involvement, if any, on the Indian subcontinent since the independence of India and 
the creation of Pakistan. 
 
This chapter will shed light on the most critical documents, treaties, UNSC 
resolutions/decisions, Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) reports and 
international documents of significant value in describing the Kashmir situation between 1949 
and 2019. Two OHCHR reports issued in 2018 and 2019 respectively have brought the 
Kashmir situation back into the global spotlight. These two reports outline cases of human 
rights abuses in Kashmir from 2016 to 2019. The UN Human Rights Commission was 
prompted to investigate the Kashmiri situation and allegations of human rights violations by 
international civil and human rights bodies after the death of Burhan Wani, the young leader of 
the Hizbul Mujahidin, in July 2016 (OHCHR, 2019).  
 
The last section of the chapter will discuss the most well-known peace plans for Kashmir’s 
dispute. Two initiatives, one proffered by Australian diplomat, Sir Owen Dixon, and the other by 
Pakistani army chief General Pervez Musharraf, whose four-point peace plan was put forward 




The next section will examine the most important agreements, accords, and conventions 
between India and Pakistan concerning the dispute of Kashmir on their merits and/or demerits 
and offer possible reasons for their success or failure.  
  
3.1.1 Karachi Military Agreement  
In 1948, after the outbreak of the first Indo-Pakistani War from 1947-1948, the United Nations 
Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was created by the UNSC to learn about and 
investigate  the dispute, and to act as a mediator in trying to resolve the dispute. The UNCIP 
was later expanded to include military observers and became known as the United Nations 
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). In July 1949, the UNSC’s Karachi 
Military Agreement was implemented creating an LoC, or ceasefire line (see Figure 3.1), 
between Pakistan-controlled and India-controlled Kashmir. In drawing a parallel to South 
Africa’s history, it was an annus horribilis for Kashmir and South Africa as 1948 marked the 
election year of the apartheid government and prelude to a 46-year maelstrom for the South 
African people, while, for Kashmir, it marked the beginning of a de facto border agreement 
between India and Pakistan which became a point of continued conflict and historical injustice 
for the people living in Kashmir (McConachie, 1999).  
 
The picture can't be displayed.
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Figure 3.1. The LoC in 1972, indicated in blue and similar to the LoC drawn up in 1949 
(Wirsing, 1998) 
 
The UNSC adopted Resolution 47 of 1948 [on restoration of peace and order and the 
plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir] and this resolution was accepted by both India 
and Pakistan as a ceasefire was attained on 31 December 1948 (Wirsing, 1998: 9-11). The UN 
mandated the UNCIP to monitor any Kashmir border disputes. The LoC was signed on 27 July 
1949, organised by the Truce Subcommittee of the UNCIP and supervised by the UNCIP 
(Ganguly, 2016: 134). After the UNCIP ceased to operate in 1951, the UNSC passed 
Resolution 91 of 1951 which mandated the UNMOGIP to monitor the ceasefire and continue 
its mission until peace could be achieved on both sides of the LoC (UNMOGIP 2019). The 
Karachi Military Agreement was ratified by India and Pakistan on 29 and 30 July 1949 






Figure 3.2. UN Document Number S/1430/Add in UN-Peacemaker, 1949 
 
3.1.2 UNCIP and UNMOGIP mandate 
As referred to earlier in this Chapter, the UNSC adopted Resolution 39 in 1948 (establishing a 
Commission on the India-Pakistan question), which established the UNCIP in order to maintain 
and mediate peace between India and Pakistan. The UNSC wanted to enlarge its operation in 
the disputed territory of Kashmir between India and Pakistan, and so, as mentioned previously 
in this Chapter, on 30 March 1951, following the termination of the UNCIP, the Security 
Council, by its Resolution 91 created the UNMOGIP (UNCIP, 1951). The UN has played a 
pivotal role in safeguarding regional peace after the independence of Pakistan and India in 
1947. After the landing of Indian forces in Kashmir at the capital Srinagar’s airfield in October 
1947, a violent civil uprising started in Kashmir. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India 
approached the UN and sought resolution on the Kashmir dispute at the UNSC in January 
1948. The UNSC mandated the UNCIP to investigate the Kashmir area. Soon after this, the 
The picture can't be displayed.
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UN found it imperative to establish the UNMOGIP to maintain and monitor peace in the region 
(UNMOGIP, 2019). UNMOGIP’s military observers are mandated to monitor the LoC and to 
report any incidents, or any perceived violations of the ceasefire, to the UN Secretary-General 
(UNMOGIP, 2019). 
 
In early 1965, India and Pakistan became embroiled in a territorial dispute on the Rann of 
Kutch marshland on the south-eastern border of Pakistan. During mid-September 1965, a full-
scale war broke out between the two countries along the LoC in disputed areas of Kashmir. On 
4 September 1965, the UNSC passed Resolution 209 calling for an immediate halting of the 
war. The Council also adopted Resolutions 210 and 211 in 1965 that renewed the UNMOGIP’s 
mandate to implement a ceasefire and continue its observer mission in the region. When the 
ceasefire was subsequently not affected across the border, the UNSC passed another 
Resolution 214, on 27 September 1965, instructing both countries again to bring about a 
ceasefire and respect the UNSC resolution (UNCIP, 1965). 
 
India continues to maintain that the need for UNMOGIP is redundant as both countries have 
their bilateral agreements on the issue with no need of further extending the UNMOGIP. In 
continuing the historical parallel to South Africa at the time, when the UNCIP and UNMOGIP 
resolutions were passed, South Africa was facing upheaval from the international community 
concerning the newly installed apartheid government. 
 
3.1.3 Tashkent Accord 
Between August and September 1965, India and Pakistan were once again at war with each 
other over Kashmir. After 17 days, the UNSC had secured a ceasefire on 22 September 1965. 
The Tashkent Accord, a peace agreement named after the meeting place in modern-day 
Uzbekistan, was initiated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). On 10 January 
1966, the agreement was signed by India’s Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, who passed 




This peace initiative was mediated by Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin. A brief summit took 
place and, finally, both India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their armies to positions held 
before the start of the war in August 1965; to restore diplomatic relations, and enter into 
discussions on economic issues, refugees, and other relevant concerns. The agreement was 
criticised in India because it did not contain a no-war pact or any repudiation of cross-border 
insurgencies in Kashmir (Bajwa, 2013: 362). To consider South Africa’s political history at this 
point of the discussion, South Africa was facing a challenging time after the Sharpeville 
massacre in March 1960, when the police killed 69 black demonstrators protesting against 
apartheid and wounded almost 200 more, as well as a subsequent economic and political 
boycott of South Africa in 1962 by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (Vaqué, 
1989: 77-79).  
 
3.1.4 Simla Accord 
The Simla Accord followed the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. This war was initiated by India who 
covertly became involved in the Bangladeshi struggle for separation from Pakistan and 
supported Bangladesh’s War of Liberation in 1971. Formerly, Bangladesh was known as East 
Pakistan. The Simla Accord was seeking a way forward by establishing principles that should 
guide future relations between India and Pakistan. It also anticipated steps that needed to be 
taken to further normalise relations between the two neighbours. It was important to bring the 
two countries “to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations” 
(Cutts, 2000: 73). 
 
Essentially, the Simla Accord was signed to recognise Bangladesh as a sovereign nation and 
to normalise diplomatic relationships between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This 
agreement also recognised the de facto border LoC as both India and Pakistan signed an 
agreement that the Kashmiri dispute should be resolved bilaterally, without the involvement of 
any third party. It is important to point out that no consultation took place between the leaders 
of Jammu, Kashmir and Azad Kashmir or Pakistan-administrated Kashmir. The Simla Accord 
was signed without the Kashmiri leadership’s involvement; thereby deciding their future without 
their consent. This has been a bone of contention for the Kashmiri people who regard this 
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agreement as a betrayal. Please refer to annexure “B” on the page 171 for the full text of the 
Simla Accord. 
 
3.1.5 Lahore Summit 
The Lahore Summit denoted an Indo-Pakistan bilateral agreement which was signed on 21 
February 1999 by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee respectively. This summit was held to normalise the tense relationship between the 
two countries on the issue of atomic tests, which had been undertaken by both countries in 
May 1998 (Mumtaz, 1999). This agreement holds a symbolic value as it comes after a long 
gap of 27 years, when the last agreement, the Simla Accord of 1972, was signed between the 
two countries. 
 
The background of this agreement had two salient points: first, the agreement was to 
normalise the relations of the two strained countries after the tit-for-tat nuclear tests initiated by 
both countries in 1998, and, second, it served as a stalemate on the Kashmir issue. The Non-
Nuclear Aggression Agreement (NNAA) was signed in 1998, and soon after the Vajpayee visit, 
was ratified by both countries’ Parliaments. A peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute was 
on   the agenda along with the normalisation of trade and tourism as both countries agreed to 
issue travel visas for road and air travel through their respective high commissions in India and 
Pakistan. 
 
Although this agreement was applauded by the international community, the relationship 
between India and Pakistan became strained once again with the start of the Kargil conflict just 
three months later. The prospect of extending the Lahore Agreement was doomed after this 
unfortunate incident. After a few months, a dramatic military coup d’état took place in Pakistan, 
where Pakistani Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 




Drawing South African political history into this discussion once again, there were notable 
events that provide anecdotal evidence that South Africa’s new democratic political 
dispensation, post-1994, was more inclined to pay attention to the Indo-Pakistani relationship 
in regard to the Kashmir issue. South Africa’s first democratic President Nelson Mandela gave 
a compassionate plea during his address at the inaugural session of the 12th Conference of 
Heads of State of Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, in Durban in 1998: 
All of us remain concerned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved 
through peaceful negotiations and should be willing to lend all the strength we have to 
the resolution of this matter (Mandela, 1998). 
 
Nelson Mandela visited Pakistan in May 1999, a few months after the signing of the Lahore 
Agreement, and delivered a speech where he said: 
It is our earnest hope that the spirit which led to the signing of the Lahore Declaration 
will sustain progress towards peace and security in the South Asian subcontinent. We 
must continue, with still greater speed, to change the lives of our people, especially the 
poorest of the poor, by eradicating what remains of apartheid and its legacy (Mandela, 
1999). 
 
Since its embryonic stages from 1947 to 1998, there has been a long absence of a South 
African foreign policy regarding Kashmir due to reasons briefly discussed earlier in the chapter. 
This is understandable as South Africa had a goal to safeguard its territories in southern Africa 
against USSR intervention in Africa (the red menace) and against South African terrorist 
groups domestically; it had little interest in South Asia and why should it at the time when 





3.1.6 Agra Agreement 
Following the fall of Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1999, and in the wake of the 11 
September 2001 terror attacks in the US and the subsequent War on Terror, Pakistan was 
under immense pressure to mend fences with its neighbour. A two-day summit was held in 
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Agra, India in July 2001, with an aim to negotiate all outstanding issues between India and 
Pakistan and pave the way to peaceful relations between the two countries. There were great 
expectations that both countries would be able to find solutions on all outstanding issues. The 
summit’s agenda included discussions around radically reducing the number of nuclear 
warheads and resolving the matter of Kashmir through bilateral dialogue. Unfortunately, the 
meeting collapsed, and the summit ended without any resolution. Later, in July 2015, it was 
disclosed by an Indian external intelligence agency chief, AS Dulat, that the Indian Union 
Home Minister, LK Advani, had allegedly played a major role in collapsing this promising Agra 
Summit of 2001 (Dulat, 2015: 49-50). The Agra summit made some vital progress on the 
predetermined agenda points like the unresolved Siachen glacier, terrorism in the region, and 
peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute. They were the most important items on the agenda 
beside Confidence Building Measures (CBM), narcotics, peace and security, and promotion of 
bilateral trade and tourism (Schofield, 2000: 49-62). 
 
The failure of the summit was not a surprise to the world as there had been a series of 
composite dialogues between the two countries, which have been conducted in the most 
cordial manner without producing any fruitful results. The declaration at the end of the summit 
was promising but given that declarations/proclamations such as those in 1972 in Simla (Indira 
Gandhi − ZA Bhutto); in 1987 in New Delhi (Rajiv Gandhi-Zia − Ul Haq); in 1989 in Islamabad 
(Benazir Bhutto – Rajiv Gandhi); in 1997 in New Delhi  (IK Gujral – Nawaz Sharif); in 1999 in 
Lahore (Vajpayee − Nawaz Sharif); and in 2001 in Agra (Vajpayee − Musharraf); all ended up 
in both disagreement and some agreement; with the main issues of Kashmir at the peril of 
discussions, its future was uncertain. 
 
It is important to examine and to introduce South Africa and the Indo-Pak historical 
comparative journeys in order to arrive at a better understanding of the political position of 
South Africa towards India, Pakistan and Kashmir. While these events outlined above were 
taking place in the Indo-Pakistan region South Africa was going through its own political 
evolution. South Africa was trying to find its place in the international community as a 
respected political and economic powerhouse of the southern African region but, paradoxically, 
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had to defend its racialist policy of apartheid. Balancing the discord between domestic and 
international issues was difficult for South Africa because its foreign policy was not consistent, 
only evolving with the unfolding of domestic events, which put the state in an unfavourable 
position in the eyes of the international community. Eventually, South Africa was forced to 
adjust its foreign policies according to the standards of the international community. The 
following section will shed light on these poignant historical crossroads which eventually 
resulted in the new democratic Republic of South Africa (Thomson, 1996).  
 
It must be noted that Malan was following the political ideologies and foreign policies that were 
conceived by apartheid’s founder figures like Paul Kruger (1883-1902), Louis Botha (1910-
1919), General Jan Smuts (1919-1948) and James Barry Hertzog (1924-1948). It is interesting 
to observe that while the British were negotiating with Paul Kruger’s triumvirate council and 
following the London conference of 1881 and 1884, where the resolution was to relinquish the 
British paramountcy  of Transvaal and the Orange Free State, at the same time, they were 
busy annexing Indian territories and entering into treaties like Amritsar and Lahore, which saw 
the sale of the British annexed region of Jammu and Kashmir to the Sikh empire and, 
eventually, to Hindu Prince Hari Singh.   
 
The period between 1948 and 1994, was dominated by some heavyweights of the apartheid 
regime that were at the forefront of the South African foreign policymaking and implementation 
abroad. It could be said that the foundation the regime laid 80 years ago is still having its 





3.3 Surveys and Human Rights Abuses 
3.3.1 Chatham House Survey “Kashmir: Path to Peace” 
The UK-based think tank Chatham House’s Kashmir survey was organised and funded by Dr 
Saif Al Islam Al Qadhafi in 2009. This survey was to ascertain the aspiration of the Kashmiris 
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on both sides of the LoC. The survey was conducted between September and October 2009. 
The study had a supposition that the Kashmiri opinion represents a vital interest in regional 
peace, politics, and stability for the entire South  
Asian region (Bradnock, 2010). 
 
The survey was conducted on both sides of the LoC and it was the first of its kind since the 
ceasefire was initiated by the UN in 1949.The findings of the survey produced unexpected 
results. Close to 44% of people in Pakistani Kashmir favoured independence compared to 
43% in Indian Kashmir. However, in the Muslim-majority Kashmir valley, which is at the centre 
of the 70-year long anti-India uprising, between 75% and 95% supported freedom from both 
India and Pakistan. This finding validates the unresolved issue of the right to self-determination 
as enshrined in the UNSC Resolution 47 of 1948 (Bradnock, 2010). 
 
 
3.3.2  The OHCHR Report on Human Rights Violations  
After a long period of silence by the UN on the Kashmir dispute, a 2018 OHCHR report 
shocked the world. This report consisted of 49 pages with authenticated facts of human rights 
violations, extra-judicial killing, and abduction, the use of pellet guns, rape and torture in Indian 
occupied Kashmir. The report covers the said incidents between July 2016 and April 2018. 
This report also investigated the situation in Pakistan-administered Kashmir within that time 
frame where the human rights violations were of a different, more structural, nature (UN 
OHCHR, 2019).  
 
This report put the spotlight on atrocities committed in Kashmir especially in Indian-
administered Kashmir as 49 pages (85%) and remaining of its reporting questioned Pakistan-
administered Kashmir. It is a major milestone in the Kashmir struggle as it validates Kashmiri 
claims of the Indian iron fist’s handling of the Kashmiri’s resistance of the Indian occupation; 
this report tarnished the image of India in the international community and asked many 
questions about the Indian secularism and democratic values as enshrined in its own 
constitution (Güldoğan, 2019). Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
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have repeatedly asked the Indian government to respect the civil and political rights of 
Kashmiris and halt ongoing human rights violations on both sides of the disputed territories of 
Kashmir (HRW, 2019). Thus, it is important to bring this topic into this research study to shed 
light on the gross human rights violations and it is also part of this dissertation’s research 
question of why the 73 year Kashmir dispute remains unresolved. 
 
The Indian government vehemently rejected the report and denied UNHRC personnel access 
to Jammu and Kashmir as requested by the United Nations Human Rights Commission to 
conduct a fact-finding mission. The Pakistani government, however, welcomed the report and 
provided the UNHRC personnel with unobstructed access to Pakistan-administered Kashmir 
(Ganguly, 2019). 
 
A report was compiled by Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Societies (JKCCS) on alleged 
Indian atrocities which focused on the registered cases at police stations in Jammu and 
Kashmir. The report consists of 500 pages and includes First Information Reports (FIRs) to 
police. The foreword for this report was written by Juan E Mendez, a former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(2010-16). This report is a useful example of how civil society should monitor, investigate, and 
report violations of internationally recognised standards, and of how governments must behave 
towards all persons under their jurisdiction. This second report published by the OHCHR about 
human rights abuses in India and Pakistan-administered Kashmir reviewed the period from 
mid-2018 to mid-2019 (UN ONCHR, 2019). 
 
3.4. Peace Plans 
 
3.4.1  Peace Plans for Kashmir 
Over the 73 years of turbulent history of the Kashmir conflict, there have been many peace 
plans. However, two of them in particular offered pragmatic and implementable solutions for 
the Kashmir dispute. Although these plans failed to materialise, two of the most prominent 
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plans were Sir Owen Dixon’s plan for Kashmir and General Pervez Musharraf’s Four Point 
Kashmir Peace Plan. 
 
3.4.2 Sir Owen Dixon’s Plan 
Sir Owen Dixon was an Australian judge whose meticulous report, which was submitted to the 
UN in 1950, received praise for his analysis on the Kashmir dispute. His plan for the Kashmir 
dispute was positive and insightful. It allocated Ladakh to India, the northern Areas and 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to Pakistan, split Jammu between the two, and had suggested a 
referendum for the Kashmir dispute. When Dixon first met the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru in June 1953, the Prime Minister told Dixon that “he was the only person to have 
grasped the Kashmir question”. Yet, Nehru was hesitant to accept all the prerequisites of the 
referendum on which the UNCIP had arranged a ceasefire (Korbel, 1953: 498-510). The Indian 
White Paper on Kashmir also suggests that the accession was purely temporary. Moreover, 
Lord Mountbatten’s letter to the Maharaja Hari Singh on 27 October 1947 also noted that the 
dispute should be settled according to the wishes of the people, which explains why the 
UNCIP had to appoint a referendum administrator (Chadda, 1997: 97-102).  
 
3.4.3 General Pervez Musharraf’s Four Point Kashmir Peace Plan 
In the contemporary history of Kashmir, the most recent attempt to resolve the issue was made 
by former Pakistani President General Musharraf who proposed a four-point formula in 1999 
which involved the following:  
1. Demilitarisation or phased withdrawal of troops;  
2. No change to the borders of Kashmir; however, people of Jammu and Kashmir would 
be allowed to move freely across the LoC;  
3. Self-governance without independence; and 
4. A joint supervision mechanism in Jammu and Kashmir involving India, Pakistan and 
Kashmir (Ahmed, 1998: 155-159). 
 
However, the above four-point peace plan lacked ingenuity and a truly consultative process 
(Fai, 2019). This dissertation contends that if a similar plan is prepared by a neutral country or 
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mediating party, then it might be acceptable to all concerned parties, subject to the all-inclusive 
negotiation process and stakeholder involvement that would need to take place. The people of 
Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered Kashmir must be consulted and taken into 
consideration, if not, then no peace plan could ever work or be implemented.  
 
There were many other Kashmiri peace initiatives, but unfortunately, none of them has 
succeeded. In recent history, US Presidents Bill Clinton and Donald Trump have offered to 
mediate on the issue of Kashmir. The US’s position on Kashmir is that the territory’s status 
should be settled through negotiations between India and Pakistan, while taking into 
consideration the wishes of the Kashmiri people (Kronstadt, 2020). 
 
The most important US diplomatic intervention occurred during the time of President Bill 
Clinton, when he mediated between India and Pakistan over the Kargil conflict in Kashmir. It 
was one of the timeliest interventions since the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Bill Clinton did not 
only intervene to avert the nuclear war between India and Pakistan, but he also offered to 
resolve the long-standing conflict of Kashmir through White House mediation, but 
unfortunately, the post-Kargil events led to the ousting of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from his 
office in 1999 as mentioned earlier in this chapter (Riedel, 2009). 
 
During a July 2019 meeting, US President Donald Trump informed Pakistan's President Imran 
Khan that  
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi asked U.S. President Donald Trump to help 
mediate with Pakistan in their dispute over the Kashmir region. Trump told newspaper 
reporters that Modi had asked him during a meeting in Japan last month if he would like 
to be a mediator on Kashmir.  Trump was speaking at the White House just before 
holding talks with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Khan welcomed the U.S.’s effort 
to intercede, saying he would “carry the hopes of more than a billion people in the 




However, the comments triggered a political storm in India, which has long bristled at any 
suggestion of third-party involvement in tackling Kashmir (Miglani, 2019). 
 
 
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the Kashmir dispute in post-independence India and select 
partition treaties, Acts, agreements, UN reports, international instruments and human rights 
reports which have a historical significance in the making of the Kashmir conflict. It is 
imperative to take cognisance of the efforts already made in attempting to resolve or pacify the 
Kashmir dispute since 1947. Exploring the different treaties like the Karachi Agreement, 
Tashkent and Simla accords to Lahore and Agra summits, sheds further light on their 
background, and offers the opportunity to learn from their success and failure. It also offers an 
opportunity to determine what procedural precautions could be taken by future peace 
negotiators to initiate a possible peace deal between the two countries and resolve the 
Kashmir dispute peacefully. There are lessons to be drawn from both Sir Owen Dixon’s Peace 
Plan for Kashmir and General Pervez Musharraf’s Four Point Kashmir Peace Formula. 
 
There have been many peace agreements between India and Pakistan since the start of the 
Kashmir dispute, such as the Karachi Military Agreement, Tashkent Accord, and the Simla 
Accord of 1972. It is important to point out that most of the treaties and accords examined 
above have come about after the end of a war. For example, the Karachi military agreement 
was signed after the 1947 war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, then the Tashkent 
Accord after the 1965 war, followed by the Simla Accord after the 1971 war between India and 
Pakistan; and all of them involved the resettlement of the Kashmir LoC.  
 
The study also interlinked the South African history and inputs to the making of Kashmir’s 
status quo. However, it is unfortunate that not much was contributed by South Africa at the 
political  and  international levels, given that the then government was preoccupied with its 
internal and external pressures and the fear of ending up in isolation due to the  policies of the 
apartheid regime. At this point, it is worth mentioning that among all the resolutions passed in 
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the context of Kashmir disputed at the UNSC, there is no record or evidence, on the one hand, 
of South Africa being a party as a signatory or an observer, or even taking part in the voting for 
Kashmir’s resolution between 1947-1974 (it was denied voting rights thereafter due to its 
domestic policies). On the other hand, South Africa was the major role player in the creation of 
the state of Israel as South African President Jan Smuts was a close friend of the first Israeli 
Prime Minister and a delegate member of the Imperial War Cabinet which influenced Britain 
and Europe to accept the Balfour Declaration (Cottle, 2017). It is also worth noting that as soon 
as India became a member state of the UN, India vehemently opposed South Africa’s 
apartheid regime in every forum of the UN. In the following chapter this dissertation will be 





















SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE KASHMIR DISPUTE 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore democratic South Africa’s foreign policy vis-à-vis 
Kashmir from 1994 and propose a possible peaceful resolution to the conflict through South 
Africa’s neutral positioning and mediation. South Africa has a record of success with previous 
mediations from a neutral position. For example, in 2014, former President Jacob Zuma 
appointed then Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as special envoy to Sri Lanka for a peace 
mediation process (SA News, 2014). Prior to that, in 2009, then President Thabo Mbeki was 
elected by the AU to broker a power-sharing mediation deal between South Sudan and Sudan 
(Du Plessis, 2016). As shown in these cases, South African neutrality and mediation can play 
a fruitful role; mediation is a process in which the parties discuss their disputes with the 
assistance of a trained impartial third person(s) who assists them in reaching a settlement 
(FindLaw, 2016). Now the question is: Could South Africa once again play a neutral role in 
conflict resolution and mediation in relation to the Kashmir dispute? 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, former South African President Nelson Mandela expressed 
concern  regarding the situation in Kashmir during his speech at the Non-Aligned Movement 
Conference in Durban in 1998:  “All of us remain concerned that the issue of Jammu and 
Kashmir should be solved through peaceful negotiations and should be willing to lend all the 
strength we have to the resolution of this matter” (Mandela, 1998). 
 
South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy has been moulded by a blend of its internal and 
external contexts. In 1993, the incoming president Nelson Mandela outlined five key priorities 
for South Africa’s foreign policy as: advancing human rights; promoting democracy; 
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universalism based on respect for international law; the pursuit of peace through non-violent 
mechanisms, and international cooperation to promote economic development. Thabo Mbeki’s 
(1999-2008) administration focused on the same five key priorities, but Mbeki further prioritised 
peacekeeping, deploying about 3,000 troops to Burundi and the DRC (PMG, 2005). Jacob 
Zuma (2009-2018) focused on furthering Mbeki’s foreign policy but with more tilt towards 
neoliberalism and current South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa (2018-), has prioritised 
his foreign policy to defend human rights and advance democracy and promote multilateralism 
as in South Africa’s foreign policy. In between we have had a caretaker president Kgaleme 
Motlanthe between 25 September 2008 and 9 May 2009, following the resignation of Thabo 
Mbeki, without much adjustment to the South African foreign policy.  
 
The next section will briefly examine South Africa’s foreign policy in relation to fundamental 
principles and priorities.  It will then move on to discuss South Africa’s relationships with India, 
Pakistan and the territory of Kashmir.  
 
4.2 South Africa’s Foreign Policy  
In this section, South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy will be explored in relation to South 
African foreign policy principles and priorities in an ever-changing political and economic global 
environment as well as a brief review of the state and non-state actors that influence the 
republic’s foreign policymaking. South African foreign policy is premised on certain variables, 
such as domestic and external situations, circumstances, and developments, that shape the 
foreign policies of states (Breuning, 2007: 115). History has proven that a skilled, disciplined, 
and well-armed military has the capability to not only secure the territorial integrity of its state, 
but even protect regional and international security. While keeping a durable military for 
strategic deterrence or offence, states conjointly depend on national economic capability to 
finance and form formidable policies. It is relatable to notice that national interests or the 
collective goal of a state in international politics determines the way leadership employs 
military and economic proficiency within the framework of its foreign policy (Folarin, 2013: 49-
58). The media, public opinion, and pressure groups also influence foreign policy; they play 




Holsti (1995: 16-17) refers to policy decision-makers as “state behaviour” determinants. This 
implies that policymakers make decisions about foreign policy purposes, aims, objectives, 
resource allocation, formulation, and execution of the state’s actions. Nonetheless, this does 
not necessarily signify that decision-makers are “free agents” for their decision-making powers 
are limited by numerous national considerations and other policymaking frameworks. They 
nevertheless are permitted to make minimal policy changes according to their leadership styles 
and the national status quo. 
 
Often, a state’s foreign policy framework can be as multifaceted and stimulating as domestic 
affairs. Economic projections explain foreign policy more than anything else. This is for two 
reasons: first, “policy itself is that the projection of domestic values, strengths (or weaknesses) 
and interests towards national development. Foreign policy strengthens the internal context 
from outside. South Africa’s post-apartheid foreign policy transcends continental territorial 
boundaries” (Government of South Africa, 2019).  From 1994 onwards South African foreign 
and trade policies have focused on building the republic’s credibility and influence abroad. 
Importantly, Tshwane’s relations with global multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), European Union (EU), and the BRICS countries have largely been 
driven by the country’s domestic need to address South Africa’s own socio-economic 
developmental challenges (Breuning, 2007: 163). 
 
Since its readmission to the UN in 1994, South Africa has further taken up key leadership roles 
in the global organisations of security, human rights, and development efforts. Tshwane served 
as a non-permanent member of the UNSC from 2007-2008 and 2011-2012. More recently, in 
2019-2020, South Africa is once again on the Council. During the Mbeki presidency, South 
Africa advanced the “African Agenda” in order to strengthen and institutionalise the security 
relationship between the UN and the AU. Tshwane also pushed for a separation of labour 




South Africa’s commitment to multilateralism has been demonstrated by its participation in the 
WTO in an effort to bridge the gap between emerging powers and diverse groups of 
developing countries. Tshwane played a key role in the new round of trade negotiations that 
took place in Doha from 2001 (SaurombeI & NkabindeI, 2013). Due to the long-standing 
association between South Africa and the EU, the country’s post-1994 foreign policy focused 
on consolidating this key relationship (Assarson, 2005). South African foreign policy has also 
been reformed by its need to have access to the European markets and strengthen South-
South ties through the 79-member Organisation of African, Caribbean, and Pacific (OACPS) 
group of states, which is an organisation that still depends on Brussels for half of its operating 
budget. 
 
As mentioned previously, democratic South African foreign policy is guided by the “belief in the 
respect for human rights; promotion of global democracy; upholding of international law in 
international relations; promotion of international peace; development of African interests; and 
economic development”  (Ali, Ali-Dinar, 1994). These are the bedrock concepts, repeated in 
DIRCO’s strategic plans, upon which South African foreign policy is based. They inform all of 
South Africa’s foreign relations.  
 
 According to Hill (2003: 89), foreign policymaking frameworks include: 
1. Major political influential actors (political power propellers) 
2. The state actors interacting with non-state actors (eg, civil societies and NGOs, social 
propellers) 
3. The government actors that interface with various state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
(economic propellers) 
 
Foreign policymaking involves opposing government actors and/or sectors that have the most 
effect on policy choices, through “bargaining” and “compromise” (McGowan, 2006:267-296). 
There is consensus that there are other factors that need to be taken into consideration which 
also guide and influence the making of foreign policy, such as government type; social 
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characteristics; international affairs; the global system and functions of decision-makers 
(McGowan, 2006:267-296). 
 
In any foreign policy creation, within the policy framework, the principles of policymaking are 
powerful determinants in the decision-making process. “Values additionally facilitate and 
preserve the culture of a specific community, particularly within the international sphere. 
Consequently, values or principles stay as parts of the setting that exercise influence on and 
penetrate the psychological setting of decision-makers” (Frankel, 1963: 117-119). 
 
 
4.2.1. Actors in Foreign Policymaking 
The state and non-state actors that inform, influence and create  South African  foreign policy 
(in varied levels of influence) include, among others, the President, DIRCO, the Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) as well as civil society actors.   
 
Most heads of states are involved in their country’s foreign policymaking, policy formulation, 
and implementation and spend a great deal of their time on these tasks (Hill, 2003: 53). This is 
true for the Republic of South Africa where the President is the head of the state and national 
government (Van der Westhuizen, 2011: 129-134). A state’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or 
DIRCO in South Africa’s case, is usually the primary policy planner unit (Van der Westhuizen, 
2011: 129-134). In contrast to policy that is somewhat “continuous”, foreign ministers change 
from government to government and from term to term. This department usually does not 
exercise policymaking and execution in isolation from other government bodies. It is duty-
bound to inform cabinet members of policy issues (Government of South Africa, 2018).  
 
4.2.2 instruments of Foreign Policy Implementation 
In addition, the DTI has been considered the “backbone” of South Africa’s bilateral and 
multilateral international relations (Tjomelane, 2011: 72-73). Numerous economic agreements 
between South Africa and other states worldwide demonstrate that the DTI has a direct 
influence on South Africa’s foreign policymaking. Noteworthy economic policy drivers and 
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influencers in the DTI include the International Trade and Economic Development Division 
(ITED) (principal negotiator); the International Trade Administration Commission (ITAC) 
(economic policy administrator); and Trade and Investment South Africa (export and 
investment promoter) (Tjomelane, 2011: 73). These policy influencers deal with matters related 
to South Africa’s economic development, exports, divergence, and industrialisation policies. 
 
Civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as non-state actors, play a vital and 
influential role in the country’s foreign policymaking, implementation, and its monitoring. They 
consist of various sectors of society, ranging from human rights groups, gender groups, social 
justice groups, academia, labour unions, business, and environmental groups, etc. The foreign 
ministries often invite civil societies and NGOs for the consultative process of policy- making or 
amending (Government of South Africa, 2018). 
Civil society typically represents the views of and informs the plenty, cooperates with or 
denounces government actions on policies began. Civil society is, however, for the most 
part, placed on the boundary of foreign political though several observers understand 
that civil society “should” conspicuously be party to foreign political, there has not been 
regular and consistent involvement of civil society during this regard (Tjomelane, 
2011:73).  
 
DIRCO is in the vanguard of external affairs and plays an important part in implementing and 
enforcing government formulated policies abroad, and in all international negotiations. It also 
deals with aspects of trade, industry, defence, political, and social culture. DIRCO acts on 
behalf of the government, with its given mandate, interacting with other countries and supra-
national organisations like the UN, WTO, International Monetary Fund (IMF), EU, and the AU. 
The President, DIRCO and DTI all work in unison to make South African foreign policy.   
 
Despite Mandela’s statement in 1998 implying that South Africa should, perhaps as part of the 
larger multilateral community, resolve to assist Jammu and Kashmir in their plight, it would 
appear that since then respective South African governments have not found this to be a 
foreign policy priority. If so, then what is South Africa’s position?  There are many factors which 
directly and indirectly contribute to and influence the final position of policies in international 
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affairs. South Africa’s lack of an active position on Kashmir can be attributed to three 
dimensions which link South Africa’s relationship with India: historical, economic and political.  
1. Historical dimension: the Gandhi connection and Indian National Congress (INC) 
merger with the African National Congress (ANC) in 1956 have played a role in 
influencing South Africa’s positive foreign policy. 
2. Economic dimension: South Africa’s post-apartheid economy has been exploited by 
Indian neo-liberalism’s political economy, which is prevalent through Indian Foreign 
Direct Investment, and has risen from US$500 million in 1995 to US$250 billion by 2016 
(PWC, 2016). 
3. Political dimension: it will be amply amply discuss and illustrate in following sections of 
this study that South Africa has deliberately grouped with India on regional forums like 
IOR-ARC, so as to get a vote from India to gain the UNSC seat twice. South Africa 
returns the favour by keeping Kashmir and its regional security issue out of the forum 
and, moreover, deprives Pakistan of membership of the IOR-ARC forum. 
 
This dissertation will further present and analyse, using the instrument of foreign policy and 
diplomacy, neoliberalism and political economy, the effects of diverting South African foreign 
policy principles, by bringing the case of the Dalai Lama’s visa refusal and the defence of the 
government minister and ANC leaders at that time. 
  
4.3 South Africa’s Foreign Policy Goals and Principles since 1994 
The ANC and its national value system are “social” instead of “personal”. The cognitive 
influence that these values impose on policymakers differs depending on the extent of their 
meta-cognitive consciousness and the support they need. Traditionally, policymakers create a 
variety of choices in the name of the state and its completeness, with the principles guiding the 
decision-making processes which additionally emerge from public interest and culture. Hughes 
(2004: 10) observes that the ideas that drive decision-making processes in modern South 
African policy are not any less powerful since “the guiding plan undergirding … South African 
policy is that of the African Renaissance”. Schoeman (2007: 93-104) argues that post-
apartheid South African policy is Africa-oriented. However, the Republic of South Africa did not 
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assume an Africa-oriented policy, neither has its policies been continually “so African”, 
particularly within the pre-1994 period. In the post-apartheid era, the ANC adopted a foreign 
policy framework that has been criticised for its simple “idealism” (recall mottos like the 
promotion of respect for human rights and democracy), instead of being realistic (Nieuwkerk, 
2004:120). 
 
4.3.1 The Mandela Era 1994-1999 “Principle-based Foreign Policy” 
In the post-apartheid era, South African policy has often prioritised the improvement and 
development of the African Agenda. It additionally initiated the North-South Dialogue 
(Landsberg, 2006a: 252) and the International Governance Imperative, devoting a lot of 
attention to contentious problems (DIRCO, 2005). South Africa’s post-1994 policy is guided by 
the subsequent normative principles. The principle is to promote respect for human rights 
above economical gains, and improvements of economic, social, and environmental issues. As 
indicated earlier, the prioritisation of human rights was emphasised by President Nelson 
Rolihlahla Mandela. Prioritisation of human rights in South Africa’s post-apartheid policy 
emerged as a legacy of the ANC’s historical resistance for human dignity and equality (Barber, 
2004: 87). The jury remains out on this matter, however, as the principle of respect and 
promotion of human rights lost its way with the new administration in office since the departure 
of Mandela as leader of the ANC and president of the Republic of South Africa (1994-1999). 
 
Thus, is it important to note, as observed by several scholars of international relations studies, 
such as Schraeder (2001: 237), that the Mandela administration’s support for human rights 
was self-contradictory. It based its position, for instance, on cases of the “Two Chinas” and the 
unfortunate “1995 Nigerian Human Rights” story, that involved numerous human rights 
violations. Unfortunately, the political economy continued to take precedence over human 
rights protection issues and advancement of democracy. 
 
The human rights issues, particularly throughout the Mandela administration, were an integral  
part of South Africa’s policy (Maluwa, 2000) since respect for human rights was not solely 
important for the political structure, but it also had important influences in economic, social and 
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even environmental spheres. South Africa is committed to its peacekeeping initiatives through 
principles of peace, justice, and law. It is important to notice that South Africa’s international 
and continental commitment to international security was not a priority throughout the pre-1994 
era. This solely became a priority in 1998, with South Africa’s military intervention in African 
nations. However, the commitment became particularly pronounced in 1999 when the African 
continent entered the peacekeeping arena with the DRC. Within the scope of its commitments, 
the African nation provided prominence to the promotion of continental security: it joined the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and voluntarily abdicated its nuclear weapons programmes; 
united with alternative African states and other states from outside the continent; and made a 
major contribution to the development of worldwide prohibition of anti-personnel landmines 
(Schoeman, 2007: 98-99). The extent of how pro-African the South African government would 
be mostly depended on pragmatic and evident peacekeeping operations, rather than 
principles. 
 
South Africa has successfully held out international peacekeeping missions wherever 
necessary. The South African nation has been the “dominant military power” on the African 
continent and it will probably remain one (Inglis, 2008: 34). In its peacekeeping mediations, 
negotiations, and interventions in Africa, South Africa has usually served under the guidance 
and protection of SADC, the AU, and the world organisations. Inglis (2008: 34) posits the 
expectation of South Africa as a “continental peacemaker and keeper”. The South African 
government has served as a peacemaker in peacekeeping operations in countries like the 
DRC and Burundi with great success (Adebajo, Adedeji, & Landsberg, 2007: 21). South Africa 
is also committed to promotion of justice and law and advancement of democracy on the 
continent (GCIS, 2009b: 360).  
 
Since the latter country does not meet any of the democratic needs mentioned above, the 
alleged South African “quiet diplomacy” towards Zimbabwe could possibly seriously hamper 
the country from accomplishing its continental democratic aspirations (Landsberg, 2006: 212-
140). Policy scholars, such as Pere and Nieuwkerk (2002: 250), state that South Africa’s post-
apartheid policy has placed an excessive amount of stress on “ideas” and “concepts” like 
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continental “democratisation”, paying minimal attention to clearly delineated implementation of 
tactics and strategies. 
 
South Africa’s policy has been often sharply criticised, inter alia, for outlining idealistic policy 
goals while not tactically delineating how its objectives are pragmatically obtainable (Hudson, 
2007:2-18; Venter, 1997:73-78). For example, South Africa’s wide “identity” of “rainbow nation” 
is so pragmatically unclear, attracting a lot of vilified criticism for its “ambiguity”. It is argued 
that the country “… cannot, afford a ‘rainbow policy’ in [its] foreign relations; it can't be 
everything to everyone”, condemning South Africa’s endeavour to be all things to everyone. 
Although the problems of human rights, economic development, and democracy are all equally 
important, South Africa must be selective and establish bounds, restricting its priority areas of 
concern, regarding its commitment in Africa (the African Agenda), and still remaining relevant 
in the international community. This can clearly facilitate and establish the country’s “concept 
of self-presentation”, which is presently missing. Most states commit to avoid contradictory 
targets and, as a result, realise that it is tough to put down specific priorities. Consequently, 
they uphold a broad sense of national interests and direction (Westhuizen, 1998: 445).  
 
Hudson (2007: 2) criticises South Africa’s post-apartheid policy as “inconsistent”, “incoherent” 
and “schizophrenic”. Lack of “coherence” allegedly stems from different mindsets, that shaped 
the capital punishment policy (Suttner, 1996). Spence (2004: 37), in contrast, argues that 
South Africa’s policy is kind of “coherent” and “goal-oriented”. The robust debate continues 
whether the South African foreign policy is coherent, cohesive, and consistent, still managing 
to be relevant in the ever-changing global dynamics of the political and economic environment.  
 
4.3.2 South Africa’s Foreign Policy’s Priorities (Thabo Mbeki’s foreign policy) 
In its Parliamentary Review in 2010, DIRCO (2010) noted that the following areas had been 
recognised as parts where important changes were envisioned in policy priorities. It was 
considered that preventive diplomacy and proactive initiatives are preferred, rather than 
reaction to crisis. A peer evaluation network with African stakeholders is essential. 
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1. South Africa should assume a leadership role on the African continent in all the areas 
where a constructive contribution could be made without politically antagonising the 
country's African partners (DIRCO, 2010). 
2. Government should continue to pursue a non-aligned approach with due regard for SADC, 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the NAM and other membership commitments 
(DIRCO, 2010). 
3. Diplomacy of bridge-building between the "North" and "South" should be pursued (DIRCO, 
2010). 
4. In multilateral forums, South Africa should strive to promote its interests regarding the 
major global issues, such as respect for human rights, democracy, global peace, security, 
and the protection of the environment (DIRCO, 2010).  
5. South Africa should constantly, to the extent of its abilities, endeavour to positively 
influence and change the direction of events and developments internationally (DIRCO, 
2010). 
 
Diplomatic relations and all related aspects should be a means to an end, namely, to promote 
the well-being of the country and its citizens. In addition to the principles discussed before, 
more practical issues are emphasised, such as reactive diplomacy; a leadership role in Africa; 
a continued non-aligned approach; bridge-building between the "North" and the "South"; and 
diplomatic relations promoting the well-being of the country and its citizens (DFA, 2008b). 
 
4.3.3 Pillars of South Africa’s Post-apartheid Foreign Policy 
During a parliamentary session in October 2011, then President Zuma clarified that South 
Africa's foreign policy was guided by four tenets: 
1. South-South participation; 
2. North-South exchange;  
3. Multilateral and financial discretion; and  




There will be a continuous cross-pollination between these tenets (SAIIA, 2008: 22). Taking 
into account, specifically the significance of a South-South agreement on cooperation within 
the international framework of governance at supranational organisations and multilateral 
economic and political forums.  
  
4.3.4 South African Foreign Policy: Transformation of Global Institutions and 
Multilateralism 
Since 1994, South Africa was actively involved in transformation of the global institute by 
adopting its foreign policy goals and using multilateralism as a foreign policy tool to achieve 
this. Global democracy could be a key political issue, although it is not a goal shared by all. 
South Africa’s post-apartheid policy reveals that transformational world governance issues 
have enjoyed higher priority than all administrations previous to 1994 in the era of apartheid 
administration (1948-1994) (Landsberg, 2010: 23). All have aimed to remodel the worldwide 
order from its Western bias to become sensitive to the requirements of the African continent 
and the Global South more widely, while supporting a rules-based international society. The 
unilateralist tendencies of major powers are opposed, while the Republic of South Africa 
backed active participation within the four-sided domain (advancing human rights; promoting 
democracy; universalism based on respect for international law; the pursuit of peace through 
non-violent mechanisms; and international cooperation to promote economic development), 
one goal was to remodel structures and establishments of world governance, whereas another 
was to put developmental goals on the world agenda (Landsberg, 2010: 32). South Africa 
advocated for a multilateralist stance and emphasised the need to change international, 
political, developmental, and financial institutions, so that transfers of wealth and power would 
affect Africa and the Global South (Kumar, 2011: 150). 
 
4.3.5 South Africa’s View on Mediation and Self-determination  
In this section of the study South Africa’s view on mediation and self-determination will be 
examined, by first understanding the definitions and scope of these terms (mediation and self-
determination). Mediation is a procedure in which the parties discuss their disputes with the 
assistance of a trained impartial third person(s) who assists them in reaching a settlement 
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(FindLaw, 2016). Under international law, minority groups that qualify as “peoples” have the 
right to self-determination: the ability to freely determine their political fate and form a 
representative government (Sterio, 2018). While international law embraces the principle of 
self-determination, it does not contain a right of secession. It may be argued that international 
law merely tolerates secession in instances of external self-determination, where people are 
colonised or oppressed (like in the case of Kosovo) (Sterio, 2018). 
 
An independence referendum is a type of referendum in which the citizens of a territory decide 
whether the territory should become an independent sovereign state. An independence 
referendum that results in a vote for independence does not always ultimately result in 
independence. An independence referendum typically arises first after political success for 
nationalists of a territory. This could come in the form of election of politicians or parties with 
separatist policies, or from pressure from nationalist organisations (Roth, 2015: 304-5).  
 
India had been prolonging Kashmir’s promised referendum (or plebiscite) which is enshrined in 
UNSC resolution 47 of 1948 and several preceding this resolution. India maintains that the 
issue of Kashmir’s referendum is a stalemate, and it is no longer valid. Given that the people of 
Kashmir have not accepted the Indian presence for the last 73 years, and India’s brute 
oppression in recent months, the illegal annexation of Kashmir by revoking Article 370, 35a is 
questionable, and there is a need to seriously consider why the UNSC, in particular, is staying 
quiet on the issue. There was hope, held by human rights activists (Syed, 2020) among others, 
that since South Africa had been re-elected for the third time as a non-permanent member of 
the UNSC, that perhaps South Africa would use its neutral positioning as leverage to resolve 
the long-awaited Kashmir dispute by bringing it to the attention of the UNSC.  Figure 4.1 
illustrates the separatist movements recognised by the UN which are present almost on all the 






Figure 4.1. Separatist Movements Recognised by UN 1945-2019 (Legal.un.org, 2005) 
 
A number of things facilitate determining South Africa’s policy vis-à-vis the creation of the 
latest states in Africa: primarily the country’s ‘branding’ and its trials to export its ‘negotiated 
democracy miracle’. The second rests on the assumed and obligatory responsibilities and 
actions of powerful South African figures, like former  statesman and President, Thabo Mbeki 
(Sidiripoulos, 2008) Third, is South Africa’s pursuit of a sort of middle-power, scrupulous policy 
concerning concerns such as the protection and advancement of human rights. Fourth, is that 
the historical background of an African country is relevant to the actual question at hand. Fifth, 
African nations have a lot of possibility to support secession sanctioned by international legal 
principles on the matter; and eventually, South Africa is a lot more inclined to support 
secession once it is part of a method of decolonisation (Sidiripoulos, 2008).  
The following section will briefly examine a few examples reflecting South Africa’s foreign 
policy position on the DRC, Palestine, East Timor, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), 
South Sudan and Somaliland, in an effort to ascertain if South Africa has a consistent view on 
cases involving statehood disputes, or if South Africa has  different positions or different 
methods based on selected priorities.   
 
4.3.5.1 South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
It is instructive to think about the case of the DRC, which despite its ethnic diversity and 
tribalism, has remained intact as a sovereign state up to now, and is usually considered as the 
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prime example of success. However, secession might bring instability, under-development, 
and eventual emergence of a counter revolution. Given this axiom, it would be worthy to 
remain conservative vis-à-vis secession, since the creation of a brand-new state could lead to 
the proliferation of state weakness, under-development, and conflict (Spears, 2004: 45). 
 
The South African government has repeatedly expressed its concern about the DRC and 
therefore, the African Great Lakes region’s involvement is usually considered as an example of 
a Pax Pretoriana. After years of mediation within the region, the DRC visited the polls in 2006. 
South Africa’s involvement is underpinned by the notion as mediator between peace, security, 
democratic governance, and economic process. Tshwane was notably active in urging the UN 
to ascertain a peacekeeping force within the DRC, that eventually materialised in 2000 
because of the UN mission to the Congo (Monuc), within which South Africa played a critical 
role (Landsberg, 2006: 121-140). It could be argued that South Africa’s involvement in the 
DRC was due to the Pax Pretoriana and also part of the African agenda and a similar situation 
exists in Kashmir but Tshwane is reluctant to get involved in the Kashmir conflict as it has a tri-
dimensional relationship with India:  emotional, political and economic.  
 
4.3.5.2 State of Palestine 
The South African support to the issue of the state of Palestine has historical ties due to the 
Palestinian Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) support to the ANC during apartheid. The use of 
the example of the Palestinian struggle and South African support has a significant similarity 
between Kashmir and the Palestinian dispute apart from the fact that Kashmir does not enjoy 
any support in its struggle. The occupation of Palestine and Kashmir started in the same years 
with a difference of a few months in 1947 and both lands of  Palestine and Kashmir have been 
occupied by illegal settlers, so drawing a parallel between the two disputes is appropriate and 
also poses many questions why South Africa supports one cause but neglects another. The 
Palestine and Israel conflict’s origin can be traced back to Jewish immigration and sectarian 
conflict in Mandatory Palestine, this conflict can also be seen as between Jewish and Arab 
people. It has been referred to as the world's "most intractable conflict," with the ongoing Israeli 




Since 1996, South Africa has openly adopted a policy of engaging Palestinians, including the 
PLO and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), now the majority party in the PLO. Under 
President Mbeki’s leadership, South Africa hosted the Spier ‘presidential peace retreat’, to 
explore the possibility of a South-African-style peace agreement in Palestine. The grouping 
included delegates from Israel, Palestine, and other Middle Eastern states. By July 2004, the 
South African government had announced its commitment to the Palestinians’ right to a 
Palestinian state, and its support for the Palestinian side in the case before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). It is necessary to examine South Africa’s involvement in the conflict 
between Palestine and Israel but not having an appetite to get involved in a similar conflict in 
Kashmir. It could be argued that South Africa’s historical involvement was as comrades with 
the PLO and many uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) members were trained and funded by the PLO 
during the time of apartheid (Middle East Monitor, 2014). 
 
Alfred Nzo, South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1995, paid an official visit to Palestine 
in September 1995, and signed an agreement on the establishment of a Joint Commission of 
Co-operation. Other formal bilateral agreements between South Africa and the State of 
Palestine include:  
1. “Protocol of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
and the Palestine Liberation Organisation acting on behalf of the State of Palestine. 
2. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation PLO representing the State of Palestine for the Establishment 
of a Joint Commission of Cooperation. 
3. Declaration of Intent concerning Co-operation in the field of Health 
4. Declaration of Intent on Co-operation in the Education Sphere. 
5. Agreement on Education Co-operation 
6. Executive Agreement on Co-operation in the Health Sphere” (DFA, 2019) 
The then PLO president, Yasser Arafat, paid a state visit to South Africa in August 1998, and 




4.4.5.3 East Timor Leste 
First colonised by European countries and occupied by Indonesia in 1975, East Timor was 
annexed by Indonesia in 1976 as its 27th province. Despite the UN’s declaration of East 
Timor’s right to self-determination, the world’s supranational organisations, for example, the 
UN, IMF and WB  neglected the issue since the 1980s, until President Nelson Mandela took up 
the question in 1997 (dfat, 2000). 
 
This case presented the South African government with several challenges. Indonesia was not 
only host to the landmark Bandung Conference of 1955, at which representatives of 29 African 
and Asian nations resolved to promote economic and cultural cooperation and to oppose 
colonialism, but it was also one of the founding members of NAM and a staunch supporter of 
the ANC during its liberation struggle. Furthermore, South Africa had continued to sell arms to 
Indonesia under the government of General Suharto. Backed by then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, Mandela persuaded Suharto, an erstwhile financial supporter of the ANC, to allow 
a meeting between Mandela and East Timorese resistance leader Xanana Gusmao, who was 
serving a 20-year prison sentence (DFA, 2008). Launching his own peace initiative on the 
issue, Mandela visited Indonesia in July 1997. Subsequent to South Africa’s lobbying of the 
UN Secretary-General, the Security Council established the UN Transitional Administration in 
East Timor (UNTAET) with a mandate to administer East Timor until May 2002, when the 
newly independent Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste was established in succession to East 
Timor, with Gusmao as its President (Dfat, 2000). 
 
The South African government supported the creation of Timor-Leste, sent election observers, 
and recognised the new country as a legal entity and a legitimate government. It maintains 
high-level political relations with Timor-Leste but does not have an ambassador there (and vice 
versa). President Gusmao visited South Africa in April 2004 (The Jakarta Post, 2013). In 
December 2006, South Africa, on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, participated in the 
UNGA committee which recommended that the General Assembly authorise a budget of 
approximately US$170 million for the establishment of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-
Leste (UNMIT) for the period of August 2006 to March 2007 (UNMISET, 1999). 
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The creation of Timor-Leste as an independent sovereign state is founded on the 
international legal norms on such matters, regarded as a case of de-colonisation, Timor-
Leste’s case for independence was also based on the outcome of a UN supervised 
referendum. The will of the people of the affected area has become accepted as a 
necessary condition for the creation of a new state (The Jakarta Post, 2013). 
The South African involvement in the peace process for East Timor Leste illustrates that  
South Africa lends its support not only to African countries for mediation but also has an 
appetite  for overseas conflicts, so  getting involved in the peace process for Kashmir is a 
possibility, but the quiet diplomacy adopted by South Africa on Kashmir raises some serious 
questions. 
  
4.3.5.4 Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) 
In 1975, Spain ceded sovereignty (the power of a country to control its own government) of the 
Spanish West desert territory to Morocco. The monarchy with its expansionist ideologies 
started to invade part of Spanish Sahara, while Mauritania started to invade western 
Saharawi’s territories from the east, thereby resulting in an armed conflict between Morocco 
and Mauritania. On 16 October 1975, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion on western Sahara in 
which it ruled that there never existed any tie of territorial sovereignty between western 
Sahara, and the Kingdom of Morocco, or Mauritania. The ICJ’s ruling was in favour of the 
Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination. Morocco’s military occupation of western Sahara 
in 1976 and armed resistance thereto by the Polisario Front has resulted in one of Africa’s 
longest struggle wars, with the SADR having been recognised by some African states since 
1976 (GCIS, 2009). 
 
South Africa remains seized with the situation of western Sahara and continues to highlight 
and support the standing of the Sahrawi people in multilateral platforms. South Africa 
recognises the Sahrawi people’s right to self-determination and independence in terms of 
provisions like those of UNSC Resolution 1598 (The situation concerning Western Sahara) 
(GCIS, 2009). It offers humanitarian and expatriate help to the SADR which has an official 
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representative in the national capital Laayoune (PMG, 2005). Following South Africa’s full 
recognition of the SADR in September 2004, the republic established full diplomatic relations 
at ambassadorial level with the SADR. South Africa supported the 2003 Baker Plan which was 
adopted by the UNSC.  The Baker Plan was the peace plan for the self-determination of the 
western Saharan people.  In 2005, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs paid an official 
visit to the SADR.  South Africa established diplomatic relations with Morocco in 1991. In 1992, 
relations were upgraded to ambassadorial level, and in 1998, the first meeting of the South 
Africa-Moroccan Joint Bilateral Commission took place (Embassy of Morocco, 1997). 
 
Established in 1991 by the Security Council to organise a self-determination referendum in the 
former Spanish colony (Othieno and Zondi, 2005: 8), the UN Mission for the Referendum in 
Western Sahara (Minurso) has been monitoring the 1991-brokered ceasefire between the 
Polisario Front and the Moroccan government. The AU fully recognises the SADR and accepts 
it as a member. Moreover, 43 individual states have also granted the SADR recognition. In the 
face of efforts to resolve the issue, Morocco remains insulated from pressure by African states 
through its boycott of the AU, and even the almost 50-year-old Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
remains moribund and incapable of pressuring them. This set a precedent for the Kashmiri’s 
struggle for their right to self-determination as far as the UN is concerned; but for the South 
African government to be so invested in the resolution of western Sahara on a multilateral 
platform and at the same time ignoring the conflict of Kashmir illustrates once again that South 
African foreign policy is not consistent in its application and  using double standards.  
 
4.3.5.5 South Sudan 
It was in 1884, during the Berlin Conference, when European imperialist powers decided to 
demarcate the African continent and annex it into the trans-continental empire without any 
African representation. This geopolitical unjust distribution of land by European imperialist 
powers, (sometimes referred to as “colonial masters”), is also known as the first scramble for 
African resources. It is only in 1940 and onward that African countries gained independence 
from their colonial masters. This was followed by the formation of the OAU in 1963 to, inter 
alia, protect and promote African unity. The OAU decided to use the existing border division, 
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which was the outcome of the Berlin Conference, leaving it in force to avoid interstate wars 
over border issues. This arrangement was accepted by the OAU Charter: “…all Member 
States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national 
independence” (OAU, 1963: Act III). This forced arrangement resulted in civil unrest because 
some states based on colonial boundaries had ethnic groups that were split between different 
states, with substantial minorities present in some of these states. In practice, the ethnic 
groups that were excluded from mainstream politics, economics, self-determination 
opportunities, and social development usually tend to unite due to similarities in belief, religion, 
values, norms, and feelings of independence that result in nationalism. One such case was 
Sudan and South Sudan’s secessionist movement. 
 
After 27 years of civil unrest and bloody civil war, the Republic of South Sudan (hereafter 
referred to as South Sudan) on 9 July 2011 became the 54th sovereign state on the African 
continent by signing a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. International 
recognition allowed South Sudan to become the 193rd member of the UN (UN, 2011).  
 
During the 1980s, the ANC, the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and the 
political wing of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), signed a memorandum of 
political understanding and coordinated their activities in exile. Once the SPLM split in 1991, 
the ANC helped the SPLM to briefly freeze its activities until the SPLM was reunited. The ANC-
SPLM relationship was re-established in 2001 and a brand-new memorandum of 
understanding was signed. A peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the 
SPLM/A was signed in 2005, the AU endorsed the peace agreement (Yoh, 2006: 37-45). 
 
South Africa maintains full diplomatic relations with Khartoum. South African firms have 
already created vital investments within the South of Sudan and in March 2005, South Africa’s 
Department of Foreign Affairs and the University of South Africa (Unisa) were co-hosting 
coaching programmes for SPLM personnel (Yoh, 2006: 37-45).South Africa has played an 
active role in the formation and independence of the world’s newest country, which ceded from 
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the north in 2011. The leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition 
(SPLM-IO), Dr Riek Machar, spent several years in exile in Pretoria before returning home 
after signing the revitalised peace agreement in Addis Ababa last year. It raises once again the 
question of South African foreign policy application to its principles as it uses multilateral 
platforms to get involved in the conflict resolutions but remains numb on the issue of the 
Kashmir conflict which is also a UN recognised conflict and also endangers the lives of 14 
million Kashmiris; it is safe to say that South Africa’s foreign policy is inconsistent in its 
application. 
 
In 2018, the former South African president, Thabo Mbeki, travelled to South Sudan’s capital 
Juba as the AU’s mediator between Sudan and South Sudan. In his meeting with Kiir, the two 
men discussed the speedy implementation of the South Sudan peace deal, which was 
monitored by the regional bloc and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and 




The self-declared Republic of Somaliland seceded from Somalia in 1991. Notwithstanding its 
16 years of independence from a collapsed Somalia, few other governments recognise 
Somaliland as a sovereign state, and in fact, between 1991 and 2000, Somaliland’s 
independence claims were set aside by the OAU and the Djibouti-based east-African regional 
grouping, IGAD. In December 2005, Somaliland submitted its application for membership of 
the AU. Its case for recognition, once again stated by its Minister of Foreign Affairs, was that 
“Somaliland’s case was unique in Africa, because Somaliland was a separate colonial entity 
from Somalia, and was recognised previously as an independent state in 1960, before it joined 
in a disastrous union with Somalia” (Government of Somaliland, 2007). 
 
It is perhaps significant for South Africa’s foreign policy position that Somaliland had played a 
“very big role in the struggle against apartheid”.  Somaliland’s former president Mohamed Egal 
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died at One Military Hospital in Pretoria. A South African delegation paid a fact-finding visit to 
Somaliland in January 2003 and declared it “a challenge rather than a problem for the African 
Union” (SomaliLandandEconomic, 2018). Subsequent to Dahir Rayaleh Kahin’s swearing in as 
national leader, he faced a full electorate in the country’s first presidential elections in April 
2003. International observers, including South Africans, declared the presidential elections as 
“peaceful, orderly, and transparent” (Independent Online, 2009). 
 
Somaliland’s geostrategic location in the Horn of Africa, together with Berbera, and its major 
port, have recently attracted renewed attention. Along with numerous EU and UN agencies, 
Ethiopia, which makes increasing use of Berbera, has opened a diplomatic trade-liaison office 
in the Somaliland capital of Hargeisa. The US and other Western powers, mindful of the 
strategic importance of the Horn, continue to investigate the possibility of establishing an 
interest office in Somaliland. 
 
From the above discussion is it evident that South Africa has taken a stand on issues, either in 
support of, or at least with a position on, cases involving secession, self-determination and 
territorial disputes within Africa and outside of Africa. What, therefore, is South Africa’s foreign 
policy (if any) on a similar case, the case of Kashmir? The next section will examine South 
Africa’s foreign policy in relation to Kashmir, India and Pakistan, the central stakeholders in the 
Kashmir dispute.  
 
1. South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Kashmir, India and Pakistan 
It is necessary to investigate South Africa’s foreign policy towards South-East Asia, and more 
specifically its relationship with India, Pakistan, and Kashmir. This is important as the study 
aims to investigate democratic South Africa’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Kashmir dispute. In 
order to explore democratic South Africa’s position on the Kashmir dispute, it is important to 
examine South Africa’s relationship with the major regional actors: Kashmir, India, and 







4.4.1 South Africa’s Position on the Kashmir Dispute 
 
When the government of India revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir under article 
370, 35a, in early August 2019, DIRCO released the following statement on these 
developments:  
 
South Africa notes with concern the escalation of tensions surrounding developments in 
Jammu and Kashmir. The issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be resolved bilaterally, 
and South Africa urges India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through peaceful 
means. South Africa calls on both countries to exercise restraint and refrain from 
actions that could further exacerbate the situation and potentially destabilise the region. 
There is an urgent need for rhetoric to be toned down. South Africa further appeals that 
the freedom and rights of citizens be respected in line with international humanitarian 
and human rights laws. Given South Africa’s history of a peaceful and democratic 
transition, we strongly believe that meaningful dialogue and consultations are the only 
way to sustainably resolve disputes. In this regard, the future of Jammu and Kashmir 
should be settled by peaceful means, through inclusive dialogue. We have noted that 
demonstrations have taken place in South Africa. We reiterate that South Africa is a 
democracy, which allows the freedom to express different views, but all actions should 
still be in accordance with, and be observant of, the law (DIRCO, 2019 in Monyela 
2019). 
 
Earlier in the chapter brief mention was made about the Pulwana attack in Kashmir when 40 
Indian paramilitary personnel were killed by freedom fighters, similar to the MK’s attack on 
South African security personnel during apartheid. It was surprising that the ANC-led 
government condemned the freedom fighters’ attack on Indian security personnel who are 
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brutally oppressing the people of Kashmir. DIRCO issued and official statement condemning 
the attack:  
The South African Government condemns in the strongest terms the attack in Kashmir, 
killing around 40 security personnel and injuring many others in one of the deadliest 
attacks on Indian forces in this area for years. President Cyril Ramaphosa has, on 
behalf of the Government and people of South Africa, extended the country’s deepest 
condolences to the Government and the people of the Republic of India following the 
unjustifiable and cowardly attack. He conveyed that the thoughts of South Africans are 
with the people and the Government of India during this trying time. Acts of terrorism 
have no place in society and constitute a threat to development, peace and security. 
The South African Government wishes to reiterate its solidarity with the Government of 
India in confronting the scourge of terrorism and will continue to support regional and 
international efforts to address terrorism in all its forms (Dirco, 2019). 
 
South Africa is not ignoring the Kashmir dispute but apart from its expressions of concern 
noted above, and its declarations that the situation be resolved peacefully and bilaterally 
between India and Pakistan, South Africa has not acted to become more involved or to 
highlight the issue in the Security Council, for example, where it is completing its final year of 
its third term. This would suggest that South Africa’s involvement is limited to that of concerned 
international observer. This is surprising as the dispute is the world’s longest unresolved 
matter on the UNSC agenda since 1948. The longest debate that ever took place at the UNGA 
was on Kashmir and there are more than 28 UN resolutions on Kashmir. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Kashmir territory is hotly contested by three nuclear powers: India, China, and 
Pakistan and is a significant site of geopolitical tensions.  
 
Thus, the fact that South Africa has not taken any position on the conflict is a bit confusing. 
Especially in light of Nelson Mandela’s statement articulating the need for a peaceful resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute during the 1998 NAM meeting in Durban: “All of us remain concerned 
that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved through peaceful negotiations and 
should be willing to lend all the strength we have to the resolution of this matter” (Mandela, 
1998). The only reference to the Kashmir dispute in the archive of South African foreign policy 
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(DFA), now DIRCO, is Mandela’s reference to the crisis in his NAM speech over 20 years ago. 
However, despite this passionate plea, the issue of Kashmir has not been an area of focus in 
South Africa’s post-1994 foreign policy.  
 
This stance is even more confusing when considering that, since 1994, the new political 
dispensation led by the ANC has been largely quiet about the ongoing atrocities in Kashmir 
and has never adopted a firm policy on Kashmir, while in the same era, South Africa has taken 
an official position on other disputes or conflicts  in the world; including Sri Lanka (as 
discussed in Chapter 1) and others such as western Sahara, Palestine, and South Sudan. 
Would this seem to suggest that Kashmir is not a particular priority for South Africa or that its 
relationship with India, for example, is influencing the South African government’s limited 
involvement in the Kashmir dispute?  
 
4.4.2 South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards India 
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the current South African foreign policy towards 
India and Pakistan, it is important to analyse the historical context of South Africa’s relationship 
with both countries which underpins the status quo of South Africa’s limited position on the 
Kashmir dispute. In this section, the researcher will examine the following aspects of India and 
South Africa’s bilateral cooperation under two focus areas: South Africa and India’s historical 
relationship, and their political and economic relationship.  
 
4.4.2.1  South Africa and India’s Historical Relationship  
Relations between two countries South Africa and India are unique, based on shared 
ideas, ideals, and icons. The common fight by the two countries against apartheid forged 
a deep bond between leaders of India and South Africa. The challenge for the two 
countries has always been how to leverage the excellent political understanding between 
the leaderships into concrete and beneficial outcomes for the strategic partnership 




The root of the historical relationship between South Africa and India can be traced back to 
1684. It is estimated that the first group of slaves that landed on the shores of the Cape Coast 
included 16,000 people, and 80% of them were Indians (SAHO, 2020). The second arrival of 
Indians tracks back to when the first British brought Indian indentured labourers to the 
sugarcane fields of KwaZulu-Natal in 1854; there were two categories of Indians: one was 
“indentured labourers”, and the other was “Free or Passengers”, which were basically traders 
from Indian coastal areas who were looking for greener pastures and new business 
opportunities in South Africa (SAHO, 2019). 
 
The arrival of Indian indentured labourers increased due to the new Law 14 that was passed 
by the Natal Legislative Council of 1857, which provided regulations for the importation of 
indentured Indian labourers for sugar plantations. In 1895, indentured labour practice and 
slavery was abolished in South Africa, and all neutralised slaves had to pay three British 
Pounds as annual tax to remain in South Africa as “Free labour”. It is estimated between 1684 
and 1895, about 168,000 indentured labourers were imported from India, and only 26% of 
them returned to India, while the rest adopted South Africa as their new homeland. Not all the 
Indians stayed in Natal or Cape Town, but many of them travelled and settled in what was 
known as the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR). No matter where they lived in South Africa, 
they were exposed to social, economic, and political discrimination, and male Indians were not 
allowed to bring their wives and children from India. They were forced to live in “Bazaars” − 
areas for Indians only (Naidoo, 2018). 
 
The first legislative discrimination started in 1885, against Indians in the ZAR now called the 
Republic of South Africa, which led to a protest against the British who were treating Indians as 
their subjects. It is a common belief that Mahatma Gandhi was responsible for the South-
African-Indian political enlightenment, which is not true, as the Natal India Congress (NIC) and 
Transvaal Black and Indian Association (TBIA) were formed well before the arrival of Gandhi in 
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South Africa. It has been recorded that the organised traders and commercial interested 
parties who formed the NIC and TBIA inducted Gandhi into the Indian political structures and 
then hired him as a political organiser (Naidoo, 2018). Gandhi played a pivotal role in 
mobilising and organising South African Indian communities on one platform, and launching 
his polite resistance strikes and civil disobedience, such as the £3 Tax on ex-indentured 
labours of Indian origin and a famous Newcastle mine strike march from Newcastle to 
Transvaal on 29 October 1913, which eventually resulted in the historic Smuts-Gandhi 
Agreement and passage of the Indian Relief Act in 1914, before Gandhi returned to India in 
1915. 
 
In 1933, yet another organisation was born known as the Colonial Born and Settlers Indian 
Association (CBSIA), which was perceived as the mouthpiece to provide a voice to the 
interests of South African-born Indians of indentured origin; it proved ultimately to be no more 
effective than its predecessor in terms of strategy and tactics. In 1939, the NIC and CBSIA 
eventually merged and formed a united front: the NIA. There is striking revelation that the NIC, 
NIA and TBIA all were started by the Indian merchant class, or financially well-off traders, to 
protect their commercial interests. These lineages persist in today’s South African Indian 
political landscape, whether it is through religious organisations, civil welfare, or politics 
(Naidoo, 2018).  
 
4.4.2.2 Red Fort and Tshwane Declarations 
The Red Fort Declaration of March 1997 was reinforced by the Tshwane Declaration of 
October 2006 between India and South Africa. It refers to a strategic partnership between the 
two states which was updated in January 2019 on a state visit to India by South African 
President Cyril Ramaphosa (Dirco, 2006) The prelude to these declarations stems from the 
shared values of both countries’ struggle against the imperialist colonial powers. The Mahatma 
Gandhi Satyagraha was a civil non-obedience campaign against the British and white 
minorities in South Africa, which Gandhi continued against the British Maharaja on his return to 
100 
 
India in 1924. In the post-Indian liberation from the British in 1947, Indian unions continued to 
play a role at various international forums to expose the white minority’s apartheid rule in 
South Africa. In May 1993, India re-established its social ties with South Africa and opened its 
culture centre in Johannesburg. This was followed by Pik Botha, the then South African 
Foreign Minister’s, visit to India in November 1993 when consular and diplomatic relations 
were restored. As part of the Red Fort Declarations (1997), India and South Africa aimed at 
cementing social, political and economic cooperation (MEA, 1997). 
 
4.4.2.3 South Africa and India’s Political and Economic Relationship 
The trade between South Africa and India has a history going back to 1880 when the first 
Indian traders started to arrive at Durban’s port and since then it has steadily grown   between 
the two countries. 
India-SA trade in 2017-2018 (Apr’17-Feb’18) was at USD 9.380 billion with Indian 
Exports at USD 3.546 billion and Indian Imports at USD 5.834 billion. From a 
continental perspective, 44.7% of South Africa’s total imports, and 32% of South African 
exports by value in 2017 were from/to Asian countries. India was the 4th largest 
importing partner and the 5th largest export destination for South Africa in 2017-18 
(cgijoburg.gov.in, 2018). 
  
4.4.2.4 Formation of NEPAD and Indian-sponsoring  of NEPAD  
The founding background of NEPAD was based on three initiatives designed to address the 
complex challenges to growth faced by African states: The Millennium Africa Recovery Plan 
(MAP), led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki; the Omega Plan, developed by 
the former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade; and the New African Initiative (NAI), which 
combined the first two initiatives. In 2001, these were reworked and expanded to provide a 
framework for all African states. NEPAD was adopted in 2001 by the OAU 37th Summit and 




The aim and purpose of NEPAD was as follows: 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) is the pan-African strategic 
framework for the socio-economic development of the continent. NEPAD was officially 
adopted by the AU in 2002 as the primary mechanism to coordinate the pace and 
impact of Africa’s development in the 21st century. Its primary objective is to provide a 
new mechanism, spearheaded by African leaders, to 
• Eradicate poverty 
• Place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable 
growth and development 
• Halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process 
• Accelerate the empowerment of women 
• Fully integrate Africa into the global economy (AU.org, 2013). 
The third India-Africa Forum Summit held in Delhi in April 2008 was a major milestone in 
India’s engagement with Africa. The Delhi Declaration and the Africa-India Framework for 
Cooperation adopted during the Summit highlighted: Shared vision and worldview; taken 
together these provided a sound foundation for the intensification of our (India-Africa) 
engagement in the years to come (Delhi Declaration, 2015). 
 
India has been involved in NEPAD’s formation from its embryonic stages. India has invested 
over US$8 billion in NEPAD since its inception: US$3 billion as Line of Credit (LOC) and 
US$5.4 billion as revolving credit to NEPAD’s various projects during the 64th UNGA, on 20 
October 2009 (MEA, 2011). This mega investment from India is part of its neoliberal political 
economy leveraging tactical strategy. Over the years, there has been a sharp increase in 
Indian LOCs committed to African countries. In 2004, LOCs to Africa were valued at US$304 
million, while in 2011, LOCs to Africa were valued at US$4.3 billion. In 2012, 17 LOCs were 




Moreover, since the African continent lacks energy efficiency, growth prospects and 
construction of mega projects across Africa are directly affected. These opportunities were 
recognised by Indian multinational companies, and hence the Government of India (GOI) 
began funding many independent power producers’ projects with Africa as part of its long-term 
political economy leveraging strategy in Africa (Mishra, 2018). These opportunities were further 
cemented at the South Africa founding conference in 2018, where India undertook to build 27 
solar projects in 15 countries. These projects were valued at around US$1,392.48 million. 
Among them, 13 countries are from the African continent. These projects arguably 
demonstrate an Indian appetite for establishing its economic and political footprint on the 
continent. It appears that India is the third largest investor in Africa, after the US and China 
(The Economic Times, 2018). 
 
It can be argued that India is using its economic leverage to gain influence in the power 
corridors of the AU, including South Africa. Having economic ‘friends’ in Africa could be 
beneficial for India as their reliance on the state could reflect in offers of support in multilateral 
forums for India’s right to its sovereignty over issues that are of importance to India. The point 
of mentioning this here is that India for the last 73 years has suppressed the legitimate issue of 
Kashmir from discussion at the UN and if it got on the agenda no resolution could easily be 






Figure 4.2 Price Waterhouse Cooper’s Report on India (PWC, 2016) 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the Indians have successfully captured the South African market. An 
upward trend can be observed in the last 20 years of trade between South Africa and India. 
South Africa has been a dumping ground for many other Asian countries too. South African 
exports to India have constantly declined from 2001 to 2016, while Indian exports rose in the 
same period. It provokes the question whether the South African-Indian trade relationship is 
based on mutually beneficial bilateral trade or on historical ties.  
 




Figure 4.3 Major Sectors Receiving Indian Investments in South Africa 2008-2017 (PWC, 
2016) 
 
Figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 shows the Indian companies established in South Africa, which looks 
good at face value. However, how much of the foreign exchange which has been repatriated to 
India is unknown, and some would argue that this Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) does 
generate much needed jobs. It is a balancing act whether it is a fact or fiction. The Indian 
companies, especially the Indian state bank and bank of Baroda, played a major role in 
transferring millions of US$ from the Guptas’ business empire as these facts are widely 
discussed and now under investigation by the Zondo Commission of Inquiry − known officially 
as the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of State Capture (Corruptionwatch.org, 
2018). The Guptas brothers made history by corrupting many SOEs in South Africa like 
Eskom, Prasa and Transnet, abused the local procurement systems, squandered billions of 
Rands and are now facing charges of embezzlement and corruption and being investigated by 
the state capture inquiry; according to Marianne Merten an investigative journalist at The Daily 
Maverick (Merten, 2019). 
 
The picture can't be displayed.
105 
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates some of the 140 Indian companies investing in South Africa and 
accounting for 4 Billion USD with direct employment generation of 18,000 new jobs. This 
demonstrates the growing trade and economic cooperation and possible influence of India on 




Table 4.4 Indian investments into South Africa (PWC, 2016). 





4.4.2.5 Formation of IBSA  
The India, Brazil and South African (IBSA) Dialogue Forum is a social, economic, and political 
dialogue forum which was established in 2003 in Brazil’s capital Brasilia, with the following 
founding principles: 
The principles, norms and values underpinning the IBSA Dialogue Forum are 
participatory democracy, respect for human rights and the Rule of Law. The strength of 
IBSA is the shared vision of the three countries that democracy and development are 
mutually reinforcing and key to sustainable peace and stability (IBSA, 2003). 
The forum’s main aim is to enhance South-South cooperation and establish consensus on 
matters of international importance. IBSA’s goal is to improve the trilateral economic 
opportunities between the three countries, as well as facilitate the triangular exchange of 
information, technologies, and skills to coordinate opportunities and cooperation among them 
(IBSA, 2003). Since the signing of the IBSA Free Trade Agreement (FTA), South Africa has 
increased its market share of trade in this agreement, exporting US$184 million to India, and a 
marginal US$7 million to Brazil.  
 
Although IBSA’s founding principles include the ‘Respect of Human Rights and Rule of Law’ 
(IBSA, 2003), this does not appear to carry over into the sovereign acts of its members, at 
least, it does not appear to have been present in India’s activities in the Indian-administered 
part of Kashmir. India’s record of human rights violations has been recorded by AI and HRW in 
their annual reports and most recently the UNCHR and OHCHR have issued two lengthy 
reports in 2018 and 2019 on Indian human rights violations in Indian-administered Kashmir 
(OHCHR, 2019). The IBSA forum provides South Africa, as a member, with an opportunity to 
engage India on the issue of the unresolved dispute of Kashmir. However, it can be argued 
that the benefits of stable economic relations take precedence over the protection and defence 
of human rights and the rule of law.  It is important to note that, according to Narayanan 
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(Naryanan, 2019), IBSA, as an expression of multilateralism “steer clear from articulating the 
softer aspects of foreign policy like refugee rights or human rights invoking the ‘sovereignty’ 
clause with domestic political sanctity paramount”. IBSA, therefore, appears to be working 
sometimes in contradiction to its espoused goals (Narayanan, 2019). 
 
4.4.2.6 The Formation of BRICS 
The term BRIC, originally coined by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Goldman Sachs, 
represents the economic bloc Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Later in 2010, South Africa was 
inducted into BRIC to form BRICS. The BRICS countries have an estimated total population of 
3.21 billion, a combined land mass area of 39,746,220 km2 (15,346,101.0 sq. mi), which 
represents about 41% of the world population and 27% of the world land surface (O’Neil, 
2005). Economists estimate their nominal GDP to be about US$18.6 trillion, which is about 
23.2% of the gross world product; a combined GDP (PPP) of around US$40.55 trillion (32% of 
World's GDP PPP); and an estimated US$4.46 trillion in combined foreign reserves. South 
Africa was formally invited by China into this newly formed elite economic club of the world, as 
it is considered as the most vibrant and progressive country in Africa (Ayres, 2017). In his 
closing speech, the South African President declared the BRICS summit in 2018 in 
Johannesburg a success: 
We reiterated in our [BRICS] discussions the strengthening of multilateral institutions of 
global governance and the need for comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including 
the Security Council. We affirmed our commitment to the World Trade Organisation to 
ensure a rules-based, transparent, non-discriminatory, open, and inclusive multilateral 
trading system (DIRCO, 2018). 
 
After briefly examining the NEPAD, IBSA and BRICS formation let us consider one of the 
largest trade and economic cooperation blocs: the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 




4.4.2.7 The Formation of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation 
(lOR - ARC) and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 
This is another of the regional trade and economic blocs which is a very vital maritime shipping 
corridor from the east to the west and in transit lies India and Pakistan. The IORA was officially 
formed in 1997 and it has been said that this was the brainchild of Prime Minister Nehru, and 
rejuvenated by later leaders of India, South Africa, and far eastern countries. It was formed to 
enhance regional cooperation between Indian Ocean rim countries and to protect trade 
between members’ countries, apart from Pakistan which was not offered an opportunity to join 
(to be discussed later in this chapter). At inception it had only 14 members. Later it expanded 
to 22 countries: India, Iran, Comoros, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Thailand Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Australia, 
Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kenya, Madagascar and Yemen. IORA has 10 
consultative stakeholders: Republic of Korea, France, UK, USA, Italy, Turkey, China, Egypt, 
Germany, and Japan (MEA-IORA, 2012). 
 
IOR-ARC, a regional cooperation initiative of the Indian Ocean rim countries, was established 
in Mauritius in March 1997, with the aim of promoting economic and technical cooperation. 
IOR-ARC is the only pan-Indian ocean grouping. It brings together countries from three 
continents having different sizes, economic strengths, a wide diversity of languages, and 
cultures. It aims to create a platform for trade, socio-economic, and cultural cooperation in the 
Indian Ocean Rim area, which constitutes a population of about two billion people. The Indian 
Ocean Rim is rich in strategic and precious minerals, metals, other natural resources, such as 
marine resources and energy, all of which can be sourced from Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ), continental shelves, and the deep seabed (Dewi, 2015). Presently, the IOR-ARC 
consists of 19 members: Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Tanzania, Thailand, UAE, and Yemen. There are five Dialogue Partners, namely UK, Japan, 
China, France, and Egypt: and two observers namely, Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) 
and Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation (IOTO), Oman. The Association has its own Charter 
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and guidelines to include projects in its Work Programme (MEA-IORA, 2012). The objectives 
of the Association are as follows: 
1. To promote the sustained growth and balanced development of the region and of the 
Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic co-operation. 
2. To focus on those areas of economic co-operation which provide maximum 
opportunities to develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits. 
3. To explore all possibilities and avenues for trade liberalisation, to remove impediments 
to, and lower barriers towards, freer and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment, 
and technology within the region. 
4. To encourage close interaction of trade and industry, academic institutions, scholars, 
and the peoples of the Member. 
5. To strengthen co-operation and dialogue among Member States in international fora on 
global economic issues, and  
6. To promote co-operation in development of human resources, particularly through 
closer linkages among training institutions, universities and other specialised institutions 
of the Member States (MEA-IORA, 2012). 
 
It is evident that through IOR-ACR, NEPAD, IBSA and BRICS, South Africa shared 
further ties through these contemporary regional and world forums beside their 




     
  Figure 4.5 South Africa – Indian Contemporary Relations Timeline (PWC, 2016) 
 
To summarise this section on South Africa and India’s relationship, Figure 4.5 gives a birds-
eye view of the relationship’s milestones, major events, and signing of significantly important 
declarations, accords, and state visits by both countries. It is safe to say that South Africa and 
India’s relationship is cordial and very strong based on shared history, values, and strong ties 
of culture and economy, coupled with India’s role in the fight against apartheid and Gandhi’s 
arrival and starting of satyagraha by the burning of his Transvaal Asiatic Registration 
Certificate on 16 August 1908 at Hamidia mosque in Mayfair (SAHO, 2014). This relationship 
will continue to grow not only due to the historical ties, but also due to the economic relations 
as well as the presence of one of the largest Indian diasporas in the world, living in South 
Africa. 
 
There is ample evidence that South Africa and India have a very strong relationship politically, 
socially, culturally, and economically. Their historical ties are unquestionable, and this also 
The picture can't be displayed.
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influences South Africa’s relationship with Pakistan, which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
4.5 South Africa’s Foreign Policy towards Pakistan 
In this section, South Africa and Pakistan’s historical, political, and economic relationship will 
be briefly examined. Historical ties appear to be the most prominent as there have not been 
any trade and economic relations of any significance, as both countries are not part of any 
regional or global trade and economic bloc together, in comparison to South Africa and India − 
for example, BRICS, IBSA, IORA-ARC as outlined above. 
 
4.5.1 South Africa and Pakistan’s Historical and Political Relationship 
The research studies on the topic under discussion demonstrated that South Africa’s 
relationship with Pakistan is not as cordial as it is with India. Pakistan does not enjoy bilateral 
trade and diplomatic relations with South Africa as its neighbour does, despite the fact that 
Pakistan was previously an equally good supporter of the ANC’s struggle against apartheid. 
The ANC’s guerrilla wing, MK, received training and support from Islamabad, as the pictorial 
timelines, displayed at Johannesburg’s Military Museum (see Figure 4.6), show the MK training 






Figure 4.6 Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) notice board (1962), erected in Ferrier Park, 
Karachi, denouncing apartheid in South Africa, and showing solidarity with the ANC 
(KMC.gos.pk, 2020) 
 
In addition to this, Pakistan brought the oil export embargo motion at the UN session in 1961, 
which caused Pakistan to ban all export to South Africa since then. On 7 October 1964, it was 
announced in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, that the government had decided to ban all exports from 
Pakistan to South Africa and it issued instructions to Pakistani shipping companies not to enter 
South African ports. Moreover, landing and passage facilities would be refused to South 
African aircraft in Pakistan. This move by the Pakistan government was aimed at forcing the 
South African government to abandon its apartheid policy (O’Malley, 1964). Pakistan, with its 
continued efforts to support the ANC’s struggle against the apartheid regime, organised a 
conference in Karachi, “Racial Crisis in South Africa” (Address to Meeting of Pakistan Institute 
of International Affairs, March 2, 1961). 
 
The picture can't be displayed.
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There are not many events and bilateral or regional agreements that Pakistan is part of that 
should be mentioned here as part of this study, except the few events and visits from Nelson 
Mandela to Pakistan. President Mandela visited Pakistan on two occasions and addressed the 
joint session and statement of tension between India and Pakistan after the Kargil war crisis in 
early 1999. The following statement was made by Nelson Mandela, while speaking during an 
address to the Joint Session of the Parliament of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, on 4 May 
1999: 
Pakistan's proud history of solidarity with struggles in Africa against colonialism and 
apartheid makes your country a true partner in the rebirth of our continent. Mr Prime 
Minister, Honourable members. Amongst the bonds between Pakistan and South Africa 
is that of a common Islamic heritage. That heritage is a vital thread in our history. As we 
look back on five years of freedom, it would be right to pay tribute to Muslims who 
participated over generations in the struggle for justice in South Africa. Many made 
sacrifices so that all South Africans should be free, and we think in particular of those 
who died in detention: Babla Saloojee; Ahmed Timol; Imam Haroun; and Dr.Hussein 
Hafferjee. In this regard, South Africa was encouraged by the latest round of dialogue 
between the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India and we welcomed the conclusion of 
the Lahore Declaration. It is our earnest hope that the spirit which led to the signing of 
the Lahore Declaration will sustain progress towards peace and security in the South 
Asian subcontinent. We must continue, with still greater speed, to change the lives of 
our people, especially the poorest of the poor, by eradicating what remains of apartheid 
and its legacy (Mandela, 1999). 
 
Despite a warm and friendly visit by Nelson Mandela to Pakistan, the bilateral relationship is 
limited between the two countries. It has a lot to do with India and South Africa’s historical 
relationship, which has kept Pakistan from establishing a meaningful relationship with South 
Africa. The following passage from the book “South Africa’s Foreign Policy Dilemmas of New 
Democracy” suggests that India may have manipulated South African policy to circumvent 
Pakistan from regional political and economic trade blocs, shown in Figure 4.11. 
A strategy regularly employed by India its participation in IORI deliberation is to ensure 
of security or strategic debates. This has to prevent the forum being used as instrument 
to comment on the Kashmir issue, for example. Yet, despite this renunciation of 
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expressing political opinion within the forum, it has been proposed that India may use 
the initiative as political platform. (Broderick, Burford, Freer, 2001: 209) 
 
 
Figure 4.7 The Map of IORA Forum Participating Countries (Dewi, 2015). (Map wording direct 
from source) 
 
This situation has been further debated by Australia, as a member of IORI-ARC, that this 
forum must include the political, economic, and regional security dimensions. India opposed 
this as IORI-ARC is exclusively for the purpose of multilateral trade cooperation, and hence, 
other appropriate international forums should be used for the regional security discussion and 
debate. Broderick et al. (2001: 210) have further argued that, “India, wanting the process to be 
exclusive in order to prevent Pakistan membership, supported first track process, and 
Australia, wanting to include as many potential markets as possible”.  
 
In the 1995 Perth conference, the South African delegation neatly summarised the concerns of 
the other five members, except Australia:  
The picture can't be displayed.
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concentrated on that which binds us and avoid divisive issues, as with APEC, IOR 
should concentrate on trade and economic related matters, issues such as security 
should be avoided and if there is a need to deal with security matters (…) they should 
be dealt with bilaterally or in a forum created for the purpose (quoted in Botha, 1997). 
 
It is against this background that South Africa’s participation in IOR-ARC must be judged and 
what can be seen as normal diplomatic functioning (albeit awkward) multistate grouping, 
equivalent to collusion. It is this narrow practising of diplomacy limited to economic gains 
versus the legacy of Nelson Mandela’s idealism of promoting human rights and advancement 
of democracy, that shifted the trend from South Africa’s foreign policy based on Mandela’s 
principled policies to  neoliberalism’s political economy. It could be further argued that the 
behaviour shift in the South African foreign policy stems from its ambition to gain non-
permanent UNSC membership, which was lobbied by India and co-sponsored to get South 
Africa to serve on the UNSC (Carvalho, 2018). 
 
There are a few other South African statements made on Pakistan and on the situation 
between India and Pakistan, but there are not many official statements from DIRCO in 
connection with South Africa’s relationship with Pakistan.  Nevertheless, DIRCO has stated: 
 
Within the South Asian region, the continuing tension between India and Pakistan over 
Kashmir remains an international concern and poses a potential threat to the stability of 
the region. Should this issue not be resolved, or should the dispute worsen, the 
demonstrated nuclear capabilities of both countries pose a serious potential risk, which 
is of great concern to the international community (DIRCO, 2014). 
 
Pakistan and South Africa enjoy cordial, bilateral relations. South Africa views Pakistan 
as an important role-player in the international arena and South Africa welcomes the 
strengthening of democracy in Pakistan. South Africa has identified additional avenues 
of cooperation regarding law enforcement issues, an Extradition Treaty, an Agreement 
on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, an MoU on Cooperation in Combating 
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the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics, Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursor 
Chemicals (GCIS, 2016). 
 
South Africa considers Pakistan an important market for business cooperation and is 
keen to further enhance bilateral trade with it as the two countries have good potential 
for trade in many areas, said High Commissioner of South Africa in Pakistan 
Mthuthuzeli Madikiza (Turbine.com, 2020). 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that South Africa’s consolidated economic 
and historical relations with India, could be influencing South Africa’s view to remain relatively 
uninvolved in the Kashmir dispute other than to offer expressions of concern as noted above. 
South Africa is perhaps missing a real opportunity to use the leverage it has with India to 
become more involved or at least to support bringing the Kashmir dispute to the attention of 
the global community − at the UN for example. Surely by not doing do, South Africa’s inaction 
would be in contradiction to its foreign policy principles, especially respect for human rights 
and the advancement of democracy globally? 
  
4.6 Economic Prospects Trump Human Rights as Fundamental Principles of South 
Africa’s Foreign Policy? 
While neorealists focus on security issues, being concerned with issues of power and survival, 
neoliberalists study political economy and focus on cooperation and institutions (Dunne, 2006: 
185-204). For neorealists, states are self-interested, and an anarchic and competitive system 
pushes them to favour self-help over cooperative behaviour (Lamy, 2006: 205-225). This 
standpoint helps one to understand the arms race taking place between India and Pakistan. 
Moreover, it enables one to comprehend the alliance building efforts of both countries, 
especially India’s strategic partnership with the US and Pakistan’s partnership with China. 
Furthermore, neorealists argue that states are rational actors, selecting strategies to maximise 
benefits and minimise losses. There are two barriers to international cooperation, which 
include a fear of those who might not follow the rules, and the relative gains of others (Lamy, 
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2006: 205-225; Sridharan, 2005: 103-124). This explains why little economic cooperation has 
taken place between India and Pakistan, and more importantly, why the grand energy 
cooperation of building the IPI and TAPI) pipeline projects have not materialised. 
 
The CPEC provides a new twist on the geopolitical context. Even though national capital and 
capital of Pakistan have been partners for many years, the CPEC could reflect intense and 
distended bilateral cooperation at a time of rising Chinese government ambition and chronic 
considerations regarding Pakistan’s security and development. This move has conjointly been 
seen as dissecting and counter offensive towards US strategic military action on Chinese 
territory by ever-increasing US military air bases in South and Central Asia. The CPEC will 
facilitate trade on associated land routes that connect China to the Indian Ocean, linking the 
Chinese town of Kashgar to the Pakistani port of Gwadar, however, passing through the 
borders and through hard geographic regions. This deep haven can give China a strategic 
perception and intervention post for any future blockade of the Shaitul-Arab passageway, and 
therefore, access to the geographic  oil wealthy basin, where 67% of the world’s oil and rock oil 
passes through (Daniel, 2016). 
 
The preceding assumption of neorealism permits the investigator to analyse the problem from 
a security perspective. For neoliberals, cooperation occurs automatically wherever states have 
mutual interests, however, Kashmir lies as an unresolved dispute between India, Pakistan and 
China. Neoliberalists believe that actors with common interests attempt to maximise absolute 
gains for all parties concerned, while the idea of neorealists is that the basic goal of states in a 
very cooperative relationship is to stop others from gaining a lot more (Lamy, 2006: 205-225).  
 
To further investigate how South Africa’s foreign policy has been underpinned by neo-
liberalism’s economics which have proceeded on the basis of respect for human rights; 
promotion of world democracy; upholding of the law of nations in international relations; 
promotion of international peace; development of African interests; and economic 
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development, this study highlights examples in global relations where South Africa has bowed 
down to the pressure from powerful allies like China, India, and the US. Based on these 
examples, it could be argued that the South African government’s position in world affairs is 
driven by economic gain (realism) at the cost of human rights (liberalism/idealism). Moreover, 
South Africa’s policies in international affairs, especially dealing with the protection of human 
rights, are sometimes aligned to the aspirations of China, Russia, India, Western powers, and 
its allies, which can be seen by South Africa’s voting behaviour, as a non-permanent member 
of the UNSC from 2007 to 2012, and in its current term, which is referred to briefly later in this 
chapter. 
 
South Africa voted in favour of the UK and US, and co-sponsored India’s application to the 
UN's 1267 Sanctions Committee, which was requested to designate Jaish-e prophet, Chief 
Masood Azhar, as a world terrorist after the Pulwama terror attacks in  which 40 CRPF 
personnel were killed. Neither an indication, nor proof, was given to the UNSC (The Week 
Magazine, 2019). The South African president Cyril Ramaphosa issued a statement 
condemning the attacks. 
 On behalf of the South African government, President Cyril Ramaphosa extended 
deepest condolences to the people of India and said that acts of terrorism have no 
place in society (Business Standard, 2019). 
 
This choice was criticised by civil society groups in South Africa and human rights activists, for 
example, the Muslim Lawyer Association (MLA), the Media Review Network (MRN), and AI.  
 
Let us further examine South Africa’s human rights principles in its foreign policy using the 
example of the Dalai Lama’s visa refusal for the 2009 Peace Conference. The Dalai Lama has 
since been refused a visa in 2011 and 2014. Relations with China, punctuated with the 
establishment of an office to disburse a US$5 billion Africa investment fund, were clearly 
paramount in South African thinking. The Daily News noted that the disappointing decision 
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denied the South African Constitution, surrendering high principles to expediency (Daily News, 
2009). 
 
South Africa’s foreign policy is not being consistent to its basic principles of respect for human 
rights and the advancement of democratic values. South Africa’s foreign policy has not been 
consistent and even in its application there are dichotomies since the birth of the new 
democratic South Africa. Often it is self-contradictory and selective in its approach, as when it 
comes to the issue of Palestine, the South African government is  vocal and consistent but 
diametrically opposes its zeal for human rights protection when its faces the issues of  Tibet, 
Kashmir and Myanmar − perhaps it is a confused foreign policy? (The Conversation, 2017). 
 
The above illustration of the rejection of the Dalai Lama’s visa  begs the question, is it possible 
that just as South Africa’s relationship with China took precedence over the Dalai Lama’s visits 
(and by extension the Tibetan people oppressed by China), (IOL, 2014) South Africa’s 
relationship with India has influenced South Africa’s ‘limited’ view of the Kashmir dispute? (IOL, 
2014). 
 
1.  South Africa as a Defender of Human Rights? 
At the outset, democratic South Africa’s foreign policy was guided by Nelson Mandela’s 
principle-based policy to protect and defend human rights and advance democracy at home, 
and abroad. In this regard, South Africa’s advocacy for human rights is not only “national” 
(constitution-oriented) but also “international”, motivated by international human rights law 
(GCIS, 2009: 268). 
It was a very clear manifestation of Mandela, even before he became the first Black 
African president of [the] Republic of South Africa, that human rights are the sunshine 




In this regard, South Africa’s advocacy for human rights is not only a “national domain” 
(embedded in the Constitution and Bill of Rights) but also plays a pivotal role internationally, as 
human rights protection is enshrined by international human rights conventions and 
instruments (Titus, 2009: 5-8). The South African post-apartheid government saw it fit to take 
up an appropriate position as human rights defender, both internationally and at home (Mills, 
2000: 308-309).  
 
The reason it is important to  discuss this topic is because  this research study has three main 
questions which need answers  connected to this section as to why the Kashmir conflict has 
remained unresolved for the last 73 years, what is the South African foreign policy position on 
Kashmir, and what South Africa can do to use her neutral position to assist the Kashmiri 
conflict in its peace process. South Africa’s role in human rights issues on the continent and 
internationally as a trend will be discussed later in this section. 
 
Based on its commitment to human rights problems and capability (though ostensibly limited), 
South Africa has been delineated by several as a “Torch bearer of Hope” within the 
international arena, particularly for the people of the world who are still under the influence of 
colonialism or neocolonial masters. Having adopted this stance of promoting progressive 
constitutions around the world, South Africa should discourage, prevent, and alleviate any form 
of discrimination and human rights violation, fully supporting human rights and dignity. As an 
example, the 1990s marked the abolishment of capital punishment, voluntary disassembly of 
nuclear weapons programmes, and resolved human rights-related issues at home by 
mandating the South African Human Rights Commission to educate, promote and defend 
human rights at home, and abroad.  
 
Recently South Africa has been declared by the UN as one of the leading actors in the 
diffusing of international human rights law.  
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Since 1994, South Africa has assented to a creditable list of international and African 
human rights instruments and conventions … which require the submission of … annual 
follow-up reports to the depository body to monitor and evaluate progress in achieving 
the objectives of the relevant treaties (Wheeler, 2004: 98). 
Since its ascent to these conventions, South Africa has submitted some of the required reports 
to the UNSC. The country monitors and evaluates the expediency of current human rights 
accords and suggests methods and instruments that can be used in both national and 
international human rights recognition. South Africa is an active member of the UNHRC and 
has played an important role in getting it established (OHCHR, 2019). It is also a key advocate 
of an alternative procedure to the International Covenant with the aim of developing an 
appreciation for political, social, cultural, and economic rights.   
 
According to Wheeler (2004: 85-103), South Africa’s foreign diplomacy in the context of human 
rights has been “uneven” although this aspect forms a cornerstone of South Africa’s idealism 
and legacy of Madiba, which forms the basic tenet of South African foreign policy. Thus, South 
Africa’s pragmatic position and role, on the continent and abroad, in reaction to human rights 
problems are widely questioned and denounced. The concern is that South Africa’s policy in 
this regard is inexplicable, rhetorical, and ambiguous. Borer and Mills (2009: 10) note that “…in 
South Africa, the breach between principle and pragmatism emerged perhaps more clearly 
than in other cases”. South Africa has often been castigated for its absence of will in 
participating in human rights cases, especially under the banner of the UN (subsidiary 
institutions). Its human rights policy is somewhat marked by contradictions, the most obvious 
being the case of Zimbabwe, Swaziland (eSwatini), and Nigeria, on the continent. 
Apprehension over South Africa’s approach to human rights in its policy peaked in 2008 and 
2009. Such considerations sprang up in reaction to South Africa’s stance on the Zimbabwean 
crisis and other African conflicts (Titus, 2009: 11).  
 
According to The Economist (2008), South Africa has often abstained from voting in favour of 
sanctioning dictator states infamous for gross human rights abuses. The study suggests that 
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South Africa is loath to condemn and disapprove of its allies accused of human rights abuses, 
including in Zimbabwe, Myanmar (Burma), Kashmir, and Iran (Borer and Mills, 2009: 8; 
Wheeler, 2004: 99). The South African government, once the champion and advocate of 
human rights protections, before becoming a torch of hope, is now throwing its weight behind 
human rights violators and oppression. It is safe to say that given the UNSC voting pattern in 
the context of human rights and sanctions, the ANC-led government of South Africa has made 
a U-turn away from human rights protection and defence in most instances. This research will 
be further investigating South Africa’s behaviour in the UN in the next section. One of the 
questions of this study was to find out the reason why the Kashmir conflict remains unresolved 
and seek possible South African intervention to resolve the Kashmir conflict. The previous 
section revealed that South Africa could be ignoring the plight of the oppressed people of the 
world, including Kashmir, because of their economic ties with regimes that are in direct conflict 
with their people’s sovereignty. There was renewed hope from the South African government 
since the new political dispensation and election of Cyril Ramaphosa as President, when he 
adopted a back-to-basics approach in terms of South African foreign policy. President Cyril 
Ramaphosa has put human rights defence and advancement of democracy back on the South 
African foreign policy agenda.  
 
Chidaushe (2010) reported that 
 South Africa used its position to stop initiative to an investigative mission to analyze 
post-election violence; nor wouldn't it enable the Security Council to peruse dialogue 
on the worsening situation in Zimbabwe. 
 
On the one hand, the West has been calling for the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. On 
the other hand, the Mbeki government arranged a meager one-page report declaration that 
there was no crisis within  Zimbabwe and condemning the imposition of any embargo on its 
northern neighbour. Chidaushe (2010) maintains that South Africa has been criticised for 
adopting a “quiet diplomacy” approach towards human rights-violating African states and 
elsewhere, which tainted its image as a land of human rights champions. Some observers 
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argue that this practice of quiet diplomacy of South Africa is attributed to the undermining of 
the African Charter on Human Rights, its Constitution, and Bill of Rights, as well as that it 
contradicts the character of Africanism.  
 
The above is the bedrock on which South Africa’s foreign policy was based and all the South 
African international relationship transactions must be guided by its core principle. No one can 
dispute that the decision to deny the Dalai Lama a visa was in contempt of South Africa’s 
foreign policy principles. This case is being mentioned here to illustrate the shifting of South 
African policy from idealism to realism. To some extent it is evident that the South African non-
policy on Kashmir is due to the backdoor channel diplomacy to keep the Kashmir issue of the 
South African foreign policy agenda. 
 
South Africa has further been chastised for its attitude towards Angola. This follows South 
Africa’s economic interests in Angolan oil which have culminated in disregarding human rights 
violations in that country (Chidaushe, 2012). South Africa, in accordance with the Rome 
Statute, was also obliged to incarcerate President Al-Bashir of Sudan when he visited South 
Africa (Titus, 2009: 13) which did not happen. The UN Watch also released a report based on 
47 member-states to the Human Rights Council in 2007. In this regard, South Africa was 
disappointingly ranked at the bottom, grouped with states such as Cuba, Russia, China, and 
Saudi Arabia. South Africa’s grading was conclusively ascribed to its closeness with 
perpetrators instead of victims of human rights violations. Since President Cyril Ramaphosa 
took office in 2018 the human rights defence and advancement of democracy is once again 
back on South Africa’s foreign policy agenda. 
 
In 2018, at the BRICS conference held in Johannesburg, the South African Kashmiri Action 
Group (SAKAG) and MLA brought a case of war crimes against PM Modi of India for his 
alleged role in human rights abuses in Kashmir throughout his tenure as Prime Minister of 
India (IOL, 2018). President Ramaphosa sent Minister Radebe to New Delhi to assure Modi 
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that he would not be arrested in South Africa (Singh, 2018). This is illustrated in the letter from 
the NPA, shown in figure 4.9, that Prime Minister Modi was being offered Presidential immunity 
from any imminent arrest. The War Crimes in case number MLA/0081/YT remain active and 
under investigation. However, the investigation was hampered as the Hawks Directorate of 
Priority Crime Investigation DPCI investigation team’s application for visas was denied by the 
Indian embassy in South Africa, stating in their response that this is an Indian internal matter 
(Gous, 2018). According to DIRCO, the case of War Crimes against PM Modi is still active and 
under investigation, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
 
Figure 4.8 Letter by DIRCO regarding Modi Docket (DIRCO, 2018) 
 
It is evident that South African foreign policies are no longer coherent to their basic principles, 
as they are now ambiguous and have a double standard in their applications, particularly in the 
The picture can't be displayed.
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context of human rights defence on the African continent and elsewhere. South Africa did not 
uphold international law, the AU charter, its own constitution, and bill of rights, while protecting 
African leaders like Omar Al-Bashir.  
 
Figure 4.9. Request for Investigation, Kashmiri Action Group (PCLU, 2018) 
 
Since  President Cyril Ramaphosa’s inauguration, there has been renewed hope and 
commitment as shown in his inaugural speech in early 2018 and reinforced during the 70th 
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anniversary of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) where he states his 
government’s commitment to the UDHR and Bill of Rights. It is hoped that this will not serve as 
mere rhetoric but that his speech will translate into real action in terms of defence and respect 
of human rights and advancement of democracy on the African continent and elsewhere in the 
world (Government of South Africa, 2018). It  must be acknowledged and appreciated that the 
case of war crimes was opened in a South African court against the visiting Indian Prime 
Minister during the BRICS summit in July 2018, so it is safe to assume  that there is a ray of 
hope and perhaps the dawn of a new beginning for South Africa and rejuvenation of Mandela’s 
legacy of idealism and respect for human rights and the advancement of democracy. There is 
a huge expectation for South Africa to play an active part in resolving international conflicts 
and human rights issues as South Africa is seen by the international community as a beacon 
of hope and perceived as a  “Champion of Human Right defenders”, so, South Africa needs to 
rise to these expectations (Pikoli, 2020). 
 
4.7 South Africa’s Voting Behaviour at the UNSC 
South Africa has been elected as a non-permanent member of the UNSC three times (2007-
2008 and 2011-2012 and then again 2019-2020). South Africa’s self-assessment on its UNSC 
voting is satisfactory in the context of its stated policy positions on the Security Council (Singh, 
Carvalho, 2020). It has also been observed that South Africa emerged as more confident on 
the UNSC, with an increase in the number of co-sponsored resolutions, and a strong focus on 
African issues. The overall outcome so far appears to demonstrate some success in South 
Africa’s pursuit of its ‘African Agenda’ on the UNSC but it drew huge criticisms on some of its 
voting decisions (Bowland, 2012). 
 
Following the announcement of South Africa’s prospect for a second term as a non-permanent 
member on the UNSC, the Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-
Mashabane expressed that South Africa’s policy within the Council would be driven primarily 
by the goals of achieving South-South cooperation; North-South cooperation; the 
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advancement  of the African continent agenda; the support of multilateralism in reference to 
problems with international peace and security; and finally, to establish close  cooperation with  
AU members on the UNSC. The Minister additionally stressed that South Africa would still 
promote stronger cooperation between the UNSC, and also, the AU Peace and Security 
Council (AU PSC).  
 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the cross-pollination of the states represented on the UNSC forum 
having links to other regional forums. Multiple alliances, such as these, could arguably have an 
influence on a state’s foreign policy decision-making and behaviour in other platforms, for 
example, its voting at the UNSC (Bowland, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 4.10. States’ Membership in Different Groupings (Bowland, 2012) 
 




Figure 4.11. Number of Resolutions Involving Africa versus the Rest of the World and Non-
country Specific Issues (Bowland, 2012). 
 
The above snapshots explain that the members of supranational organisations like the UN and 
UNSC are also part of regional and global blocs which forms a possibility of alliance and 
collusion when it comes to the UN resolution voting. These figures also illustrate how the 
Kashmir issue may have been suppressed at international forums as India is part of many of 
the abovementioned international and regional forums and uses its diplomatic and political 
economic influence in preventing the Kashmir issue being raised on international forums, as 
we have already discussed how the IORA-ARC members were influenced by India to remove 
regional security from the IORA-ARC agenda and keeping Pakistan out of the trade bloc. 
 
At the start of South Africa’s third tenure, concerns and questions were raised: “will it continue 
to propel her influence of the African Agenda in the UNSC? Will it succeed in pushing for a 
more balanced and neutral representation in the Council? And will it still be representative of 
the mouthpiece of the Africa continent?” (Mazrui, 2012: 78). 
South Africa had consistently voted in favour of thematic human rights resolutions, 
including those protecting civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and also 
the right to development and the promotion of democracy. However, it had in the 20-
year period failed, at times, to use its public UN vote to take a stance against human 
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rights abuses in Cuba, China, Belarus, Indonesia, Iran, Libya, Uzbekistan, Myanmar, 
Sudan and Zimbabwe (Graham, 2016).  
 
It could be argued that in the last 20 years, there has been more than 6,300 resolutions on 
which South Africa had to decide to vote and avoid any major condemnation, keeping in mind 
that in the UNSC, 80% of the conflict-driven resolutions are from the African continent. In 
balancing the act as the responsible representative of the African people, South Africa has 
done reasonably well despite the unfortunate vote against Myanmar, and later South Africa 
rescinded its vote and blamed the contradiction on the Council mandate. South Africa 
abstained from voting only once, on Resolution 1757, which authorised the formation of an 
international tribunal to try the suspects in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister, Rafiq Hariri, and then again in 2008, South Africa similarly used its right to abstain, or 
vote against a resolution, very minimally. South Africa in fact voted against a resolution only 
once, which was in the case of the failed draft resolution imposing sanctions on Zimbabwe 
(SAIIA, 2012). This voting behaviour has been described by Graham (2016) as, “South Africa’s 
reputation going from a country wholly committed to human rights and democracy promotion 





Figure 4.12. South Africa’s Voting Behaviour at UNSC in the Context of Human Rights 
(Zapiro, 2015). 
 
It can be observed that South Africa’s voting behaviour during its two previous tenures has 
been inconsistent and incoherent and went against the fundamental founding principles of 
South Africa’s foreign policy in the post-apartheid era. Currently, South Africa is serving a third 
term on the UNSC, and there is hope that South Africa will repair its damaged reputation as 
being supportive of oppressive regimes such as those in Zimbabwe, Tibet, Cuba and Kashmir 
(Forsythe, 2000). 
 
The oppressed people of the world place their hope on South Africa, as it represents the 
beacon of hope, since Nelson Mandela branded it internationally as the land of freedom 
fighters. Moreover, South Africa is also seen by many around the world as the ‘messiah’, to 
bring peace and prosperity to the Africa Continent  as South Africa has fresh experience and 
has emerged from the ashes of the most brutal oppressive regime of apartheid. It is not a 




4.8 South Africa’s Possible Role as Mediator in Kashmir? 
After the apartheid regime was abolished in 1994, South Africa has become progressively 
drawn to the resolution of conflicts and promotion of peace and stability on the African 
continent. The enduring standing of Nelson Mandela as a leader of reconciliation and 
forgiveness became famous and was used as a model for different conflict-torn countries to 
emulate, such as for Tshwane, with South African foreign policy including an obligation to 
'repay' Africa for the sins of its social policies which had a considerable effect  economically 
(Southall, 2006). South Africa has long advocated for conflict-prevention mechanisms 
internationally, with tools like mediation and negotiations supporting the advancement of 
human rights and democracy.  
 
Since its political changes in the 1990s, Tshwane’s policy has been built on principles of 
commonness, Pan-Africanism, and internationalism. Specifically, South Africa has highlighted 
its negotiation skills in some way by resolving the continental conflicts among other African 
nations. Between the late-1990s and 2000s, South Africa’s response to conflict in places like 
Burundi, Sudan, and the DRC has been as an honest peace broker. Taking a lesson from the 
past, South Africa was ready to draw on its own distinctive experiences: alongside the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, South Africa developed a 
Constitution which was mutually accepted by the previous white minority government, black 
majority, and other groups and through a negotiated transition was able to move into a 
democratic dispensation relatively peacefully  (Gustavo and Nganje, 2016).  
 
It is evident that South Africa has acted as a mediator and acted on resolutions in relation to 
South Sudan and Sri-Lanka. Therefore, what is preventing South Africa from playing a vital 




South Africa is committed to the promotion of justice and jurisprudence on the continent. The 
South African Foreign Policy Yearbook 2008/9 (GCIS, 2009:360) prescribes guidelines for 
actors handling the international promotion of justice and jurisprudence. As a young 
democracy, South Africa aims to encourage democracy globally. It aims to realise this through 
the utilisation of the similar model it applied in negotiating its own democracy within the early- 
to mid-1990s: the “democracy through peace deal model” (GCIS, 2009:360).  
 
This dissertation suggests that South Africa could use its experience and its soft power to be 
an influential peace broker in the Kashmir dispute.  
 
1.  Conclusion 
To conclude this chapter, an analysis was made on South Africa’s foreign policy regarding the 
regional and international conflict, since 1994, and the way it ought to use its current sitting on 
the UNSC and overall neutral position to contribute to a peace process for Kashmir. 
 
It could be suggested that South Africa’s limited position on Kashmir is attributed to three 
dimensions: historical, economic and political. These dimensions link South Africa’s 
relationship with India:  
1. Historical dimension: the Gandhi connection and INC merger with the ANC in 1956 has 
played a major role in influencing South Africa’s foreign policy. 
2. Economic dimension: South Africa’s post-apartheid economy has been exploited by 
Indian neo-liberalism’s political economy which is prevalent through Indian Foreign 
Direct Investment which has risen from US$500 million in 1995 to US$250 billion by 
2016 (PWC, 2016). 
3. Political dimension: South Africa has political connections with India through many 
multilateral groupings. These connections might be a deciding factor in South Africa’s 
134 
 
possible unwillingness to upset these relations by speaking out against India’s actions in 
Kashmir.  
 
It would not be an over-statement to say that South Africa’s foreign policy has been tilted 
towards its domestic and economic needs, and that its current foreign policy is underpinned by 
economic inclinations. However, some principles of South African policy, such as advancing 
human rights and promoting democracy have been sidelined. The goal of Nelson Mandela for 
his country to advance human rights, and democracy has been compromised somewhat in the 
context of Kashmir.  
 
It should be mentioned here that the denial of the Dalai Lama’s visa validates this research 
argument that the principles of advancing human rights and promotion of democracy, as basic 
tenets of South African policy, are lost in the balancing act of international relationship with 
many countries, especially with India, Saudi Arabia and China where Kashmiris, Yemenis and 
Uyghars’ human rights oppression by their respective regimes are overlooked. South Africa 
has shifted its role as a mediator of peace and replaced it with that of an economic trade bloc 
former, as its role was prevalent in the establishment of BRICS, IBSA, and IOR-ARC. South 
African support to Indians in the IORA-ARC was directly linked to its intention to secure a seat 
on the UNSC, as it is a known fact that India lobbied for South Africa to get a seat on the 
UNSC.  
 
Despite Mandela’s plea in 1998, the issue of Kashmir has not been a specific focus in South 






















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This final chapter will be revisiting the objectives of the study, and its motivation and aims, and 
will summarise the key findings of each chapter.  It will also offer recommendations to resolve 
the Kashmir dispute and provide a scope for further studies. Moreover, this study has 
comprehensively examined the treaties, accords and agreements, signed between 1846 to 
1999, which gave birth to the Kashmir conflict tragedy, and described how these instruments 
have affected the status quo and shaped the political landscape of Kashmir.  It is evident 
through a preliminary study, that South Africa does not have any position on Kashmir and 
since the Nelson Mandela speech at the NAM conference on 2 September 1998 (Mandela, 
1998), there had been hardly any official statement issued by South Africa’s government on 
the Kashmir issue. 
 
1. The Objectives of the Study 
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The objectives of this research study were to investigate the root causes of the Kashmir 
dispute and why the dispute had remained unresolved since 1947, as well as to investigate 
what foreign policy position, if any, South Africa has adopted on the Kashmir dispute. In order 
to achieve this aim, the dissertation was guided by the following research questions: (1) Why 
has the Kashmir conflict remained unresolved since 1947? and (2) What is South Africa’s 
foreign policy position, if any, on the Kashmir dispute? and the (3)How should South Africa use 
its current sitting on the UNSC and the principles of its foreign policy to contribute to the peace 
process of Kashmir? 
The underlying objective of this study was to find ways to bring peace in Kashmir through 
South Africa’s possible involvement, perhaps as mediator. In order to explore this, South 
Africa’s role as mediator in continental and international conflicts, such as in the South Sudan, 
DRC, Zimbabwe, East Timor Leste, Sri Lanka and Myanmar disputes was examined. This was 
done to provide evidence to motivate South Africa’s possible participation in the Kashmir 
conflict peace process. To do so, it was important to first analyse the historical background of 
the Kashmir conflict and its embryology, and the hasty departure of the British from Indo-Pak 
which created the two new dominions, India and Pakistan, leading to the birth of the Kashmir 
dispute tragedy. Finally, an in-depth study was conducted on South Africa’s foreign policy in 
the context of its foreign policy, its pillars, instruments, relationship with Kashmir, India and 
Pakistan and focusing on the voting behaviour at the UN. The later part of the section looked 
into South Africa’s role in the creation and secession movements, and also South Africa’s role 
as a mediator on the continent and in international disputes and conflicts.   
 
5.3 The Motivation and Aims of the Study  
The Indo-Pak relationship has been mired for seven decades in border tensions between 
India, Pakistan, and the civil unrest in the Kashmir valleys, which has resulted in the loss of 
over 100,000 lives of Kashmiri people since 1947. The main motivation of the study was to 
investigate the root causes of the Kashmir dispute and examine South Africa’s foreign policy, if 
any, in relation to this dispute. Moreover, the overarching motivation was to find ways which 
could bring peace and stability in the region possibly using South Africa’s positioning with India 
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and Pakistan. The secondary motive of this research was to revisit the Kashmir dispute and 
encourage further reflections on it. 
  
5.4 The Theoretical Framework  
A tri-dimensional analytical framework was applied in this investigative and exploratory study. 
Geopolitics, neorealism, and neoliberalism were relevant to the subject under discussion, to 
conceptualise the dynamics of this research topic and used as the theoretical framework. 
Through the prism of these theories South Africa’s foreign policy in relation to India and 
Pakistan and its position on Kashmir were explored. This dissertation argued that the ideal of 
self-determination is a discursive cornerstone of the contemporary dispute in Kashmir which 
has been examined through this research. The first concept of geopolitics  provided the 
fundamental basis of this study, while the concepts of neorealism and neoliberalism were used 
as status quo-oriented and problem-solving theories, which shared several assumptions 




5.5 The Key Findings of the Study  
A key finding of this study was that South Africa has no declared official foreign policy on 
Kashmir, at least there was no in-depth active response, save the notion that the region should 
sort itself out. South Africa’s latest statement on Kashmir on 19 August 2020 by DIRCO was 
that the dispute was a bilateral issue between two neighbours, and it should be resolved 
through peaceful negotiation. Chapter 4 argued that it was possible that South Africa’s lack of 
involvement on the disputed Kashmir territory was due to Indian-South African multiple 
relationships, namely, historical ties, and political and economic ties as part of economic 
forums such as IORA, IBSA and BRICS.  
 
Admittedly, there has been a stalemate on the issue and an ineffectiveness on the part of the 
UN to enforce plebiscites, as enshrined in UNSC resolution 47 of 1948 (UNSCR, 1948). 
Despite this stalemate and slow impediment by supranational organisations like the UN and 
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UNSC, there has been a renewed interest and focus on Kashmir since the demise of Kashmiri 
resistance fighter Shaheed Burhan Wani in July 2016, and then again when India unilaterally 
revoked Article 370, 35a on 5 August 2019. In addition to this, the skirmishes and encounters 
between India and Chinese armies in the Galwan valleys Daulti bagh in Ladakh Kashmir, 
where the standoff between the two nuclear powers India and China persisted, attracted 
further attention to the Kashmir region  (Khan, 2019). 
 
Furthermore, other findings are summarised per chapter as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 provided the objectives as well as the research questions that the dissertation aimed 
to answer. These questions were: 
1. Why has the Kashmir conflict remained unresolved since 1947? 
2. What is South Africa’s foreign policy position, if any, on the Kashmir dispute?  
3. How should South Africa use its current sitting on the UNSC and the principles of its 
foreign policy to contribute to the peace process of Kashmir? 
 
A literature review was also conducted to investigate the most important literature on 
Kashmir’s history, British Indian rule, partition and post-partition of India and Pakistan, and the 
making of the Kashmir conflict. This study employed a qualitative desktop-based research 
methodology, employing the tool of qualitative content analysis, which entailed the systematic 
text analysis of primary and secondary sources.   
 
Since Kashmir is in perpetual curfew and all civil and political rights including freedom of 
speech, freedom of expression and association are suspended, this reality limited sourcing 
relevant material from Kashmir itself given the volatility of the situation and fear of retribution.  
 
Chapter 2 introduced the Kashmir conflict in a systematic way in order to provide context for 
the study, explain the historical background of the Kashmir region, demonstrate the evolution 
of the Kashmir conflict, describe the geography, demography, economy, and geostrategic 
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position of Kashmir, briefly discuss the importance of the underpinning issues as to why India 
and Pakistan were so desperately contesting for the territories of Kashmir, and finally, describe 
why Kashmir’s geopolitical position was equally important for both countries. The latter part of 
the chapter then analysed why and how the Kashmir dispute started, and why it was still 
lingering as a hotbed of discontent and popular uprising. The historical context of Kashmir 
investigated two episodes of the history: 1846-1947 and 1947-1954; thereby connecting the 
dots of historical incidents that took place and treaties signed during the period. However, only 
the most important ones were discussed, focusing on those that shaped the future of Kashmir 
by affecting its future political dispensation, thereby leading to unrest and ongoing violence in 
the region. In the last section of the chapter, the researcher added the new dimension of the 
conflict and tested theoretical concepts of neoliberalism and neorealist political economies, by 
investigating the building of numerous dams and hydroelectric power-generating plants by 
India on the rivers flowing from Kashmir to Pakistan. It was abundantly evident that India was 
using its 1.2 billion consumer market as economic leverage to attract funding for building these 
dams and hydroelectric power plants, while equally leveraging its borrowing capacity.  
 
This chapter’s foundational study  also reviewed and investigated the Kashmir quagmire and 
the embryology of the Kashmir dispute, by studying the four most prominent and historically 
important documents in detail: the first was the Indian Independence Act of  1935, which talked 
about the distribution mechanism of British India, followed by Lord Mountbatten’s Plan of 
Partition which reinforced the Act of 1935. Then, there was the revised Indian Independence 
Act of  18 July 1947, which prescribed the dividing principles and methodologies of territories 
between India and Pakistan, and lastly the Sir Radcliffe Boundary Commission document 
which shed light on the controversial awarding of strategically important tehsil (sub-districts) of 
Gurdaspur and Ferozepur to India, despite the majority population in these two subdistricts 
being Muslim, contradicting the Indian Independence Acts  of 1935 and 1947. This was 
something Kashmiris perceived as the greatest injustice rendered to them by the British rulers 




The main research question of this study has been answered: Why has the Kashmir quagmire 
remained unresolved for the last 73 years? Chapter 3 examined the Kashmir conflict in post-
independence India and Pakistan partition treaties, Acts, agreements, UN reports, international 
instruments, and human rights reports, which have a historical significance in the making of the 
Kashmir conflict. It was imperative to take cognisance of the efforts made on resolving or 
pacifying the Kashmir conflict since 1947. Exploring the different treaties like the Karachi 
Agreement, Tashkent, and Simla accords to Lahore and Agra summits, shed light on their 
background and offered the opportunity to learn from their successes and failures. 
 
It was important to point out that most of the treaties and accords examined above had their 
root cause in war-like situations, and almost all the treaties and international instruments came 
about after the end of each war. For example, the Karachi military agreement was signed after 
the 1947 war between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute. Then, the Tashkent accord 
after the 1965 war, followed by the Simla accord after the 1971 war between India and 
Pakistan; all of them involved Kashmir LoC resettlement. These historical instruments and 
summits were worth examining to determine their failure factors, learn from their mistakes, and 
to determine what procedural precautions could be taken by future peace negotiators to initiate 
a possible peace deal between the two counties, to resolve the Kashmiri dispute peacefully. 
There were obviously lessons from both Sir Owen Dixon's Peace Plan for Kashmir and 
General Pervaiz Musharraf’s Four Point Kashmir Peace Formula. 
The study also interlinked the South African history and inputs to the making of Kashmir’s 
status quo. It was also worth noting that as soon as India became a member country of the 
UN, India vehemently opposed South Africa’s apartheid regime at every forum of the UN. It 
could be said with conviction and evidence that at the time of the Indo-Pak partition, South 
Africa was busy helping decolonisation of Africa and providing a diplomatic vanguard to 
Western power interests, against the expansion of communism on the African continent. This 
was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. However, some principles of South 
African policy, such as “advancing human rights; promoting democracy; religious doctrine 
supported respect for international law; the pursuit of peace through non-violent mechanisms; 
and international cooperation by economic development”, took precedence over its economic 
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and domestic needs. Somehow, the ideals of Nelson Mandela for his country to advance 
human rights, democracy, and respect for jurisprudence were compromised; particularly in the 
contexts of Myanmar, Kashmir, Tibet, South Cameroon, Oromo, and other regional conflicts in 
recent history. It was amply evident that South Africa had adopted a model of neoliberalism 
which often  contradicted its position as the champion of human rights; as basic tenets of 
South African policy, were lost in the balancing act of its international relationship with many 
countries, especially with India, Saudi Arabia and China, where Kashmiris, Yemenis, and 
Uyghurs’ human rights oppression by their respective regimes were overlooked. In line with the 
dissertation’s final question, the next section will explore recommendations and scope for 
further studies on the topic, by exploring the way South Africa can use her current sitting at the 
UNSC, by leveraging her neutral position, to mediate Kashmir’s peace process. 
 
5.6 Recommendations  
Even though there seems to be no hope of enduring resolution in the near future, as the India-
Pakistan enmity over Kashmir has continued for more than seven decades, there is still a silver 
lining as in recent years there has been a renewed interest shown by the international 
community, civil societies and social media which has played a significant role in reviving the 
dying struggle of Kashmir’s liberation. A host of features opposing an enduring resolution of 
the enmity in Kashmir; is the prime cause of conflict between both countries. Several peace 
processes, peace agreements, UN resolutions, and even wars have not solved this obstinate 
global problem. Besides the Kashmir conflict, other territorial issues, political irreconcilability, 
trust deficit positions on national identity, and lack of significant economic and trade relations 
do not make for peace on the Indian subcontinent (Westcott, 2020). These factors also prevent 
the diplomatic resolution of the Kashmir conflict. The Kashmir nationals’ narratives have 
always been ignored, as they profoundly look to practice their right to self-determination. Most 
of the peace processes in the past, namely Sir Owen Dixon’s peace plan for Kashmir, 
Musharraf’s four points formula, and Washington initiatives; all lacked ingenuity, as they failed 
to consult with the people of Kashmir. 
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A peaceful resolution for the Kashmir conflict is possible but would require a systematic and 
scientific approach, as only a proper peace plan with a structured approach can resolve the 
matter. This would require root cause analyses, force field analyses, carefully thought out 
stakeholder management, and full participation from all stakeholders, which includes Indians, 
Pakistanis, Kashmiris from both sides of the divide, and the Chinese. Perhaps Indians, 
Pakistanis and Kashmiris are all waiting for a neutral and honest ‘peace broker’, and South 
Africa could fill this noble role and bring peace to the violence-ridden Kashmir region. This 
could be the silver lining for the Kashmir conflict; South Africa might hold the key to the 
Kashmir peace process. 
It is encouraging to note that last year, in 2019, during the visit of the Prime Ministers of India 
and Pakistan to the US, President Trump offered to mediate the Kashmir issue if both 
countries were willing to accept his role as mediator (Miglani, 2019). Unfortunately, his offer fell 
on deaf ears as Indian Prime Minister Modi decided unilaterally to annex the semi-autonomous 
state of Kashmir into the Indian union territories, by abrogating Article 370, 35a on 5 August 
2019 (Dutta, 2020). There had been more attention on the Kashmir conflict in recent years 
than ever before, as two lengthy UN OHCHR reports were published on India’s alleged 
involvement in gross human rights abuses in Indian-occupied Kashmir, which listed issues to 
be debated. Moreover, the UNSC has to take a vote on UN interventions if the unobstructed 
access to Indian-occupied Kashmir is not granted by the Indian government (OHCHR, 2019). 
1. The UN and the international community should enable a platform for an all stakeholder 
engagement strategy and assure Pakistan of its serious intention to respect the latter’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
2. The government of India must treat the people of Kashmir more humanely, respecting 
their human rights, as applicable in mainstream India, which includes the right to self-
determination, should they choose this option. 
3. The UN and international human rights bodies must be given unobstructed access to 
Kashmir for their fact-finding missions, as requested in both UN OHCHR reports of 2018 
and 2019.  
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4. The international community and trade blocs like IBSA, BRICS,  Mercosur and G7 must 
hold India and Pakistan accountable, and use their economic power to pressure both 
countries to resolve the conflict of Kashmir amicably, peacefully, and equitably for 
Kashmiri people to accept it. Since South Africa is already in economic blocs with      
India, such as IBSA, BRICS, IORA-ARC, it is well placed to leverage its influence on 
India.  Mercosur is the Latin American regional trade and economic cooperation bloc 
with a GDP of US$3.4 trillion, making it the world’s largest trade bloc and having 
permanent members of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is a full 
member but has been suspended since 1 December 2016. Associate countries are 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru and Suriname (CFR, 2019). 
5. India and Pakistan should boost trade and relax visa regulations. 
6. Military-to-military exchanges should be initiated to obviate the trust deficit. Due to the 
seven decades of rivalry and border tension on LoC in Kashmir there has been a 
surplus of trust deficit and this situation can be mended by having regular military 
contact and dialogues. It is encouraging to know that recently India and Pakistan have 
jointly issued a statement for the ceasefire and have set-up friendly channels of 
communication on three levels: Military Major level communication, Brigadiers Level 
communication and Director Generals of Military Operations (DMGO). These initiatives 
will de-escalate the border tension between Indian and Pakistan and will open up 
avenues of confidence building measures (Dutta, 2021). 
7. The South African government must use its neutral morality position to leverage its 
influence on both countries to resort to the peaceful resolution of Kashmir. 
8. The AU must leverage its position, especially with India being the fourth largest trading 
partner on the African continent, to use the power of political economy to convince India 






5.7 Scope for Further Studies 
The scope for further studies about the Kashmir dispute and attaining a peaceful resolution for 
the region is wide. The following are examples of questions which can be answered in further 
studies: 
1. What are the prospects of the Kashmir referendum and what roles can international 
communities possibly play? What can be done by the global community to address the 
plight of the Kashmiri people and to change the status quo? What can be done by the 
international community to end 73 years of unresolved conflict between India and 
Pakistan over the disputed territories of Kashmir?  
2. What ‘role’ is South Africa currently playing in resolving the Kashmir conflict? To what 
extent can South Africa use its neutral position to further the cause of Kashmir in 
international forums? What role can South Africa play as mediator in the peace process 
of the Kashmir conflict using its current sitting as non-permanent member of the UNSC? 
What more can be done to ensure that the ongoing human rights violations can be 
stopped by a meaningful intervention from South Africa, as chair of the AU? What can 
be done to end the double lockdown in Kashmir?  
3. If Kashmir obtains its independence, what could the economic and political gains be for 
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“Simla Agreement on Bilateral Relations between India and Pakistan signed by Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, and President of Pakistan, Z. A. Bhutto, in Simla on 2 July 1972. The 
Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that the two countries put 
an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations and work for 
the promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable 
peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and 
energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people (Singh, 2009: 528-538). 
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan 
have agreed the following: 
1. The principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations shall govern the 
relations between the two countries. 
2. The two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through 
bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between 
them. Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, 
neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation, and both shall prevent the organization, 
assistance, or encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peace and 
harmonious relations. 
3. The prerequisite for reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace between 
them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful coexistence respect for each 
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and noninterference in each other’s internal 
affairs, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. That the basic issues and causes of 
conflict which have bedeviled the relations between the two countries for the last 25 
years shall be resolved by peaceful means. 
4. They shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political 
independence, and sovereign equality. 
5. In accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they will refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of each other. 
Both governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile propaganda directed 
against each other. Both countries will encourage the dissemination of such information as 
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would promote the development of friendly relations between them. In order progressively to 
restore and normalize relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed that: 
1. Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea, land, 
including border posts, and air links, including over flights. 
2. Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other 
country. 
3. Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed as far as 
possible. 
4. Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted. 
In this connection delegations from the two countries will meet from time to time to work out 
the necessary details. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, 
both the governments agree that: 
1. Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border. 
2. In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the ceasefire of December 17, 
1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of 
either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it unilaterally, irrespective of mutual 
differences and legal interpretations. Both sides further undertake to refrain from the 
threat or the use of force in violation of this line. 
3. The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be 
completed within a period of 30 days thereof. 
This agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance with their 
respective constitutional procedures and will come into force with effect from the date on which 
the instruments of ratification are exchanged. 
Both governments agree that their respective heads will meet again at a mutually 
convenient time in the future and that in the meanwhile the representatives of the two sides will 
meet to discuss further the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of durable 
peace and normalization of relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war 
and civilian internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of 




Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto President Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Indira Gandhi Prime Minister Republic of India” 
 
Simla, 2 July 1972. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
